docling-graph

Version	Released
`1.9.1` patch	Jul 17, 2026
`1.9.0` minor	Jul 17, 2026
`1.8.0` minor	Jul 17, 2026
`1.7.1` patch	Jul 10, 2026
`1.7.0` minor	Jul 06, 2026
`1.6.0` minor	Jul 04, 2026
`1.5.1` patch	May 01, 2026
`1.5.0` minor 1 CVE	Apr 19, 2026
`1.4.4` patch 1 CVE	Feb 18, 2026
`1.4.3` patch 1 CVE	Feb 18, 2026
`1.4.0` minor 1 CVE	Feb 18, 2026
`1.3.1` patch 1 CVE	Feb 16, 2026
`1.3.0` minor 1 CVE	Feb 15, 2026
`1.2.4` patch 1 CVE	Feb 10, 2026
`1.2.3` patch 1 CVE	Jan 26, 2026
`1.2.2` patch 1 CVE	Jan 26, 2026
`1.2.1` patch 1 CVE	Jan 25, 2026
`1.2.0` minor 1 CVE	Jan 25, 2026
`1.1.0` minor 1 CVE	Jan 24, 2026
`1.0.0` major 1 CVE	Jan 23, 2026
`0.4.1` patch 1 CVE	Jan 22, 2026
`0.4.0` minor 1 CVE	Jan 22, 2026
`0.3.0` minor 1 CVE	Jan 22, 2026
`0.2.5` patch 1 CVE	Jan 21, 2026
`0.2.4` initial 1 CVE	Jan 21, 2026

1.9.1 patch

Jul 17, 2026

1.9.0 minor

Jul 17, 2026

1.8.0 minor

Jul 17, 2026

1.7.1 patch

Jul 10, 2026

1.7.0 minor

Jul 06, 2026

1.6.0 minor

Jul 04, 2026

1.5.1 patch

May 01, 2026

1.5.0 minor

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Apr 19, 2026

1.4.4 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Feb 18, 2026

1.4.3 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Feb 18, 2026

1.4.0 minor

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Feb 18, 2026

1.3.1 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Feb 16, 2026

1.3.0 minor

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Feb 15, 2026

1.2.4 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Feb 10, 2026

1.2.3 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 26, 2026

1.2.2 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 26, 2026

1.2.1 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 25, 2026

1.2.0 minor

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 25, 2026

1.1.0 minor

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 24, 2026

1.0.0 major

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 23, 2026

0.4.1 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 22, 2026

0.4.0 minor

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 22, 2026

0.3.0 minor

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 22, 2026

0.2.5 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 21, 2026

0.2.4 initial

1 CVE

CVE-2026-44520 PYSEC-2026-2458 GHSA-fqph-j6v6-jvgx Jul 13, 2026

docling-graph has SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler

5.7 / 10

Medium

Network Low Low Required Unchanged High None None

Impact

The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.

An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:

Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials
Internal services on loopback (127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)

This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.

Users should upgrade immediately:

pip install --upgrade docling-graph

The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.

Resources

Affected versions


          0.2.4


          0.2.5


          0.3.0


          0.4.0


          0.4.1


          1.0.0


          1.1.0


          1.2.0


          1.2.1


          1.2.2


          1.2.3


          1.2.4

+ 6 more


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.3


            1.4.4


            1.5.0

Fixed in


          1.5.1

References

Updated Jul 13, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 21, 2026

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