Version	Released
`1.11.0rc1` pre	Sep 11, 2026
`1.10.0` minor	Aug 25, 2026
`1.10.0rc6` pre	Aug 21, 2026
`1.10.0rc5` pre	Aug 13, 2026
`1.10.0rc4` pre	Aug 13, 2026
`1.10.0rc3` pre	Aug 12, 2026
`1.10.0rc2` pre	Jul 20, 2026
`1.10.0rc1` pre	Jul 20, 2026
`1.9.0` minor	Jul 09, 2026
`1.9.0rc1` pre	Jul 03, 2026
`1.8.4` patch	Jun 25, 2026
`1.8.3` patch	Jun 16, 2026
`1.8.2` patch	Jun 15, 2026
`1.8.1` patch 1 CVE	Jun 10, 2026
`1.8.0` minor 1 CVE	Jun 01, 2026
`1.8.0rc1` pre 1 CVE	May 26, 2026
`1.7.3` patch 1 CVE	May 13, 2026
`1.7.2` patch 1 CVE	May 12, 2026
`1.7.1` patch 1 CVE	May 04, 2026
`1.7.0` minor 1 CVE	Apr 22, 2026
`1.6.4` patch 1 CVE	Apr 20, 2026
`1.6.3` patch 1 CVE	Apr 09, 2026
`1.6.2` patch 1 CVE	Apr 09, 2026
`1.6.1` patch 1 CVE	Apr 07, 2026
`1.6.0` minor 1 CVE	Mar 27, 2026
`1.5.1` patch 1 CVE	Mar 09, 2026
`1.5.0` minor 1 CVE	Mar 05, 2026
`1.4.1` patch 1 CVE	Mar 03, 2026
`1.4.0.dev0` pre 1 CVE	Mar 03, 2026
`1.4.0` minor 1 CVE	Mar 02, 2026
`1.3.1` patch 1 CVE	Feb 12, 2026
`1.3.0` minor 1 CVE	Feb 05, 2026
`1.2.13` patch 1 CVE	Jan 21, 2026
`1.2.11` patch 1 CVE	Jan 14, 2026
`1.2.10` patch 1 CVE	Jan 14, 2026
`1.2.9` patch 1 CVE	Jan 14, 2026
`1.2.8` patch 1 CVE	Jan 08, 2026
`1.2.7` patch 1 CVE	Jan 07, 2026
`1.2.7rc2` pre 1 CVE	Jan 06, 2026
`1.2.7rc1` pre 1 CVE	Jan 05, 2026
`1.2.6` patch 1 CVE	Jan 03, 2026
`1.2.6rc3` pre 1 CVE	Jan 01, 2026
`1.2.6rc2` pre 1 CVE	Dec 30, 2025
`1.2.6rc1` pre 1 CVE	Dec 28, 2025
`1.2.5` patch 1 CVE	Dec 26, 2025
`1.2.5rc4` pre 1 CVE	Dec 26, 2025
`1.2.5rc3` pre 1 CVE	Dec 26, 2025
`1.2.5rc2` pre 1 CVE	Dec 23, 2025
`1.2.5rc1` pre 1 CVE	Dec 22, 2025
`1.2.4` patch 1 CVE	Dec 22, 2025

1.11.0rc1 pre

Sep 11, 2026

1.10.0 minor

Aug 25, 2026

1.10.0rc6 pre

Aug 21, 2026

1.10.0rc5 pre

Aug 13, 2026

1.10.0rc4 pre

Aug 13, 2026

1.10.0rc3 pre

Aug 12, 2026

1.10.0rc2 pre

Jul 20, 2026

1.10.0rc1 pre

Jul 20, 2026

1.9.0 minor

Jul 09, 2026

1.9.0rc1 pre

Jul 03, 2026

1.8.4 patch

Jun 25, 2026

1.8.3 patch

Jun 16, 2026

1.8.2 patch

Jun 15, 2026

1.8.1 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jun 10, 2026

1.8.0 minor

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jun 01, 2026

1.8.0rc1 pre

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

May 26, 2026

1.7.3 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

May 13, 2026

1.7.2 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

May 12, 2026

1.7.1 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

May 04, 2026

1.7.0 minor

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Apr 22, 2026

1.6.4 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Apr 20, 2026

1.6.3 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Apr 09, 2026

1.6.2 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Apr 09, 2026

1.6.1 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Apr 07, 2026

1.6.0 minor

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Mar 27, 2026

1.5.1 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Mar 09, 2026

1.5.0 minor

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Mar 05, 2026

1.4.1 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Mar 03, 2026

1.4.0.dev0 pre

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Mar 03, 2026

1.4.0 minor

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Mar 02, 2026

1.3.1 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Feb 12, 2026

1.3.0 minor

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Feb 05, 2026

1.2.13 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 21, 2026

1.2.11 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 14, 2026

1.2.10 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 14, 2026

1.2.9 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 14, 2026

1.2.8 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 08, 2026

1.2.7 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 07, 2026

1.2.7rc2 pre

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 06, 2026

1.2.7rc1 pre

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 05, 2026

1.2.6 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 03, 2026

1.2.6rc3 pre

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 01, 2026

1.2.6rc2 pre

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Dec 30, 2025

1.2.6rc1 pre

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Dec 28, 2025

1.2.5 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Dec 26, 2025

1.2.5rc4 pre

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Dec 26, 2025

1.2.5rc3 pre

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Dec 26, 2025

1.2.5rc2 pre

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Dec 23, 2025

1.2.5rc1 pre

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Dec 22, 2025

1.2.4 patch

1 CVE

CVE-2026-55419 PYSEC-2026-3916 GHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jr Sep 10, 2026

reachy_mini Allows Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

5.3 / 10

Medium

Network Low None None Unchanged None Low None

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

No authentication mechanism.
No file extension validation.
No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):

 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media

After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"

Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:

curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"

Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected versions


          1.0.0


          1.0.0rc1


          1.0.0rc4


          1.0.0rc5


          1.1.0


          1.1.0rc3


          1.1.0rc4


          1.1.1


          1.1.2


          1.1.3


          1.1.4


          1.2.0

+ 46 more


            1.2.0rc1


            1.2.1


            1.2.10


            1.2.11


            1.2.13


            1.2.2


            1.2.3


            1.2.3rc1


            1.2.4


            1.2.4rc1


            1.2.4rc2


            1.2.4rc3


            1.2.4rc4


            1.2.5


            1.2.5rc1


            1.2.5rc2


            1.2.5rc3


            1.2.5rc4


            1.2.6


            1.2.6rc1


            1.2.6rc2


            1.2.6rc3


            1.2.7


            1.2.7rc1


            1.2.7rc2


            1.2.8


            1.2.9


            1.3.0


            1.3.1


            1.4.0


            1.4.0.dev0


            1.4.1


            1.5.0


            1.5.1


            1.6.0


            1.6.1


            1.6.2


            1.6.3


            1.6.4


            1.7.0


            1.7.1


            1.7.2


            1.7.3


            1.8.0


            1.8.0rc1


            1.8.1

Fixed in


          1.8.2

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Dec 22, 2025

reachy-mini

Activity

Details