py-rattler

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6

rattler_cache and py-rattler were vulnerable to package-cache path traversal when handling package metadata from conda channels.

During cache materialization, the ratter_cache code used the package record build string as part of a cache key that was joined into a filesystem path. A malicious or untrusted channel could publish repodata with path separators or traversal components in that field, causing package contents to be written outside the configured package cache directory.

The issue requires use of a malicious or otherwise untrusted conda channel. Curated channels that validate package metadata are not expected to allow malformed build strings of this form.

Users should upgrade to a patched version and avoid untrusted conda channels.

Summary

EntryPoint::FromStr in rattler_conda_types performs only .trim() on the command field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious noarch:python package can ship an info/link.json with an entry-point name containing .., /, \, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as bin/pip) with mode 0o775 on Unix and a copied launcher .exe on Windows. This affects the default install path of pixi install, rattler-build, some methods in py-rattler, and any other consumer of the rattler install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.

Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.

Affected

• Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
• Commit: a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3 (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
• Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: prefix-dev/pixi @ e640477
• pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue

Researcher

Berkant Koc me@berkoc.com PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6