nono-py

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Summary

nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived ProxyConfig did not automatically enforce CapabilitySet.proxy_only, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored.

Impact

A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and workload.

Older-kernel note

On Linux kernels without Landlock ABI v4 network rules, patched versions continue to support proxy-only enforcement through the seccomp supervisor fallback introduced in 807fb4b. Users on older kernels should ensure policy-resolved proxy configurations are coupled to CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy); merely injecting proxy environment variables is not sufficient.

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Summary

On Linux kernels that do not support Landlock network rules, nono_py.sandboxed_exec() could run CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy) without supervising the seccomp-notify proxy-only fallback returned by the Rust core.

In that configuration, a sandboxed child process could remove HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY environment variables or use raw sockets and then open direct TCP connections that should have been denied by proxy-only policy.

The issue affects proxy-only enforcement. It does not mean that all nono-py network blocking is ineffective. ECS validation showed caps.block_network() denied regular TCP and ECS metadata TCP on the tested Linux 6.1 host.

Impact

The intended proxy_only() security property is:

• child processes may connect only to the local nono proxy port
• the proxy enforces host allowlists and metadata/link-local denial
• direct TCP to any other target is denied

Before the fix, on kernels without Landlock AccessNet, the Python binding applied the sandbox and then executed the child, but did not install and supervise the proxy-only seccomp-notify fallback. A child could therefore bypass the proxy layer in that old-kernel path.

The highest-impact scenario is a sandboxed workload with access to cloud metadata discovery inputs, where direct TCP to a metadata endpoint could retrieve task or instance credentials after proxy environment variables are removed.

Affected Conditions

The issue requires all of the following:

• Linux runtime.
• Kernel without Landlock network support, such as Linux 6.1. Landlock network rules require Landlock ABI v4 / Linux 6.7 or newer.
• nono_py.sandboxed_exec() is used.
• The capability set uses caps.proxy_only(proxy).
• The child process removes or ignores proxy environment variables, or uses raw sockets.

macOS Seatbelt proxy-only enforcement is not affected by this Linux seccomp-notify fallback issue.

Affected Versions

Known affected builds include nono-py versions that expose and use CapabilitySet.proxy_only() through sandboxed_exec() before the supervised fallback fix in this working tree.

Earlier versions that did not expose CapabilitySet.proxy_only() are not affected by this specific proxy-only enforcement bug, though they may have separate environment-inheritance risks if callers passed broad parent environment variables into sandboxed children.

CVSS Score Rationale

| Metric | Value | Rationale | |---|---|---| | Attack Vector (AV) | L — Local | Exploit is performed by a local process (unsetting env vars or opening raw sockets). Not remotely triggerable. | | Attack Complexity (AC) | H — High | All of the following must be true: Linux runtime; kernel < 6.7 (no Landlock ABI v4); sandboxed_exec() used; capability set calls proxy_only(); child actively bypasses proxy env vars or uses raw sockets. | | Privileges Required (PR) | L — Low | Attacker is already executing code inside the sandbox — some user-level privilege is required to get there. | | User Interaction (UI) | N — None | No action from a user or operator is needed once the sandboxed child is running. | | Scope (S) | C — Changed | The exploit crosses the sandbox security boundary, allowing the child to reach network resources outside the defined policy scope. | | Confidentiality (C) | H — High | Highest-impact path: direct TCP to cloud metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254) yields IAM / task credentials. | | Integrity (I) | L — Low | Attacker can make arbitrary outbound requests; no direct data modification from the bypass itself, but lateral credential use creates indirect risk. | | Availability (A) | N — None | No denial-of-service impact described or implied. |

Summary

nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived ProxyConfig did not automatically enforce CapabilitySet.proxy_only, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored.

Impact

A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and workload.

Older-kernel note

On Linux kernels without Landlock ABI v4 network rules, patched versions continue to support proxy-only enforcement through the seccomp supervisor fallback introduced in 807fb4b. Users on older kernels should ensure policy-resolved proxy configurations are coupled to CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy); merely injecting proxy environment variables is not sufficient.

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Summary

On Linux kernels that do not support Landlock network rules, nono_py.sandboxed_exec() could run CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy) without supervising the seccomp-notify proxy-only fallback returned by the Rust core.

In that configuration, a sandboxed child process could remove HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY environment variables or use raw sockets and then open direct TCP connections that should have been denied by proxy-only policy.

The issue affects proxy-only enforcement. It does not mean that all nono-py network blocking is ineffective. ECS validation showed caps.block_network() denied regular TCP and ECS metadata TCP on the tested Linux 6.1 host.

Impact

The intended proxy_only() security property is:

• child processes may connect only to the local nono proxy port
• the proxy enforces host allowlists and metadata/link-local denial
• direct TCP to any other target is denied

Before the fix, on kernels without Landlock AccessNet, the Python binding applied the sandbox and then executed the child, but did not install and supervise the proxy-only seccomp-notify fallback. A child could therefore bypass the proxy layer in that old-kernel path.

The highest-impact scenario is a sandboxed workload with access to cloud metadata discovery inputs, where direct TCP to a metadata endpoint could retrieve task or instance credentials after proxy environment variables are removed.

Affected Conditions

The issue requires all of the following:

• Linux runtime.
• Kernel without Landlock network support, such as Linux 6.1. Landlock network rules require Landlock ABI v4 / Linux 6.7 or newer.
• nono_py.sandboxed_exec() is used.
• The capability set uses caps.proxy_only(proxy).
• The child process removes or ignores proxy environment variables, or uses raw sockets.

macOS Seatbelt proxy-only enforcement is not affected by this Linux seccomp-notify fallback issue.

Affected Versions

Known affected builds include nono-py versions that expose and use CapabilitySet.proxy_only() through sandboxed_exec() before the supervised fallback fix in this working tree.

Earlier versions that did not expose CapabilitySet.proxy_only() are not affected by this specific proxy-only enforcement bug, though they may have separate environment-inheritance risks if callers passed broad parent environment variables into sandboxed children.

CVSS Score Rationale

| Metric | Value | Rationale | |---|---|---| | Attack Vector (AV) | L — Local | Exploit is performed by a local process (unsetting env vars or opening raw sockets). Not remotely triggerable. | | Attack Complexity (AC) | H — High | All of the following must be true: Linux runtime; kernel < 6.7 (no Landlock ABI v4); sandboxed_exec() used; capability set calls proxy_only(); child actively bypasses proxy env vars or uses raw sockets. | | Privileges Required (PR) | L — Low | Attacker is already executing code inside the sandbox — some user-level privilege is required to get there. | | User Interaction (UI) | N — None | No action from a user or operator is needed once the sandboxed child is running. | | Scope (S) | C — Changed | The exploit crosses the sandbox security boundary, allowing the child to reach network resources outside the defined policy scope. | | Confidentiality (C) | H — High | Highest-impact path: direct TCP to cloud metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254) yields IAM / task credentials. | | Integrity (I) | L — Low | Attacker can make arbitrary outbound requests; no direct data modification from the bypass itself, but lateral credential use creates indirect risk. | | Availability (A) | N — None | No denial-of-service impact described or implied. |

Summary

nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived ProxyConfig did not automatically enforce CapabilitySet.proxy_only, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored.

Impact

A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and workload.

Older-kernel note

On Linux kernels without Landlock ABI v4 network rules, patched versions continue to support proxy-only enforcement through the seccomp supervisor fallback introduced in 807fb4b. Users on older kernels should ensure policy-resolved proxy configurations are coupled to CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy); merely injecting proxy environment variables is not sufficient.

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Summary

On Linux kernels that do not support Landlock network rules, nono_py.sandboxed_exec() could run CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy) without supervising the seccomp-notify proxy-only fallback returned by the Rust core.

In that configuration, a sandboxed child process could remove HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY environment variables or use raw sockets and then open direct TCP connections that should have been denied by proxy-only policy.

The issue affects proxy-only enforcement. It does not mean that all nono-py network blocking is ineffective. ECS validation showed caps.block_network() denied regular TCP and ECS metadata TCP on the tested Linux 6.1 host.

Impact

The intended proxy_only() security property is:

• child processes may connect only to the local nono proxy port
• the proxy enforces host allowlists and metadata/link-local denial
• direct TCP to any other target is denied

Before the fix, on kernels without Landlock AccessNet, the Python binding applied the sandbox and then executed the child, but did not install and supervise the proxy-only seccomp-notify fallback. A child could therefore bypass the proxy layer in that old-kernel path.

The highest-impact scenario is a sandboxed workload with access to cloud metadata discovery inputs, where direct TCP to a metadata endpoint could retrieve task or instance credentials after proxy environment variables are removed.

Affected Conditions

The issue requires all of the following:

• Linux runtime.
• Kernel without Landlock network support, such as Linux 6.1. Landlock network rules require Landlock ABI v4 / Linux 6.7 or newer.
• nono_py.sandboxed_exec() is used.
• The capability set uses caps.proxy_only(proxy).
• The child process removes or ignores proxy environment variables, or uses raw sockets.

macOS Seatbelt proxy-only enforcement is not affected by this Linux seccomp-notify fallback issue.

Affected Versions

Known affected builds include nono-py versions that expose and use CapabilitySet.proxy_only() through sandboxed_exec() before the supervised fallback fix in this working tree.

Earlier versions that did not expose CapabilitySet.proxy_only() are not affected by this specific proxy-only enforcement bug, though they may have separate environment-inheritance risks if callers passed broad parent environment variables into sandboxed children.

CVSS Score Rationale

| Metric | Value | Rationale | |---|---|---| | Attack Vector (AV) | L — Local | Exploit is performed by a local process (unsetting env vars or opening raw sockets). Not remotely triggerable. | | Attack Complexity (AC) | H — High | All of the following must be true: Linux runtime; kernel < 6.7 (no Landlock ABI v4); sandboxed_exec() used; capability set calls proxy_only(); child actively bypasses proxy env vars or uses raw sockets. | | Privileges Required (PR) | L — Low | Attacker is already executing code inside the sandbox — some user-level privilege is required to get there. | | User Interaction (UI) | N — None | No action from a user or operator is needed once the sandboxed child is running. | | Scope (S) | C — Changed | The exploit crosses the sandbox security boundary, allowing the child to reach network resources outside the defined policy scope. | | Confidentiality (C) | H — High | Highest-impact path: direct TCP to cloud metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254) yields IAM / task credentials. | | Integrity (I) | L — Low | Attacker can make arbitrary outbound requests; no direct data modification from the bypass itself, but lateral credential use creates indirect risk. | | Availability (A) | N — None | No denial-of-service impact described or implied. |

Summary

nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived ProxyConfig did not automatically enforce CapabilitySet.proxy_only, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored.

Impact

A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and workload.

Older-kernel note

On Linux kernels without Landlock ABI v4 network rules, patched versions continue to support proxy-only enforcement through the seccomp supervisor fallback introduced in 807fb4b. Users on older kernels should ensure policy-resolved proxy configurations are coupled to CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy); merely injecting proxy environment variables is not sufficient.

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Summary

nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived ProxyConfig did not automatically enforce CapabilitySet.proxy_only, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored.

Impact

A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and workload.

Older-kernel note

On Linux kernels without Landlock ABI v4 network rules, patched versions continue to support proxy-only enforcement through the seccomp supervisor fallback introduced in 807fb4b. Users on older kernels should ensure policy-resolved proxy configurations are coupled to CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy); merely injecting proxy environment variables is not sufficient.

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Summary

nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived ProxyConfig did not automatically enforce CapabilitySet.proxy_only, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored.

Impact

A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and workload.

Older-kernel note

On Linux kernels without Landlock ABI v4 network rules, patched versions continue to support proxy-only enforcement through the seccomp supervisor fallback introduced in 807fb4b. Users on older kernels should ensure policy-resolved proxy configurations are coupled to CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy); merely injecting proxy environment variables is not sufficient.

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Summary

nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived ProxyConfig did not automatically enforce CapabilitySet.proxy_only, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored.

Impact

A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and workload.

Older-kernel note

On Linux kernels without Landlock ABI v4 network rules, patched versions continue to support proxy-only enforcement through the seccomp supervisor fallback introduced in 807fb4b. Users on older kernels should ensure policy-resolved proxy configurations are coupled to CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy); merely injecting proxy environment variables is not sufficient.

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Summary

nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived ProxyConfig did not automatically enforce CapabilitySet.proxy_only, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored.

Impact

A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and workload.

Older-kernel note

On Linux kernels without Landlock ABI v4 network rules, patched versions continue to support proxy-only enforcement through the seccomp supervisor fallback introduced in 807fb4b. Users on older kernels should ensure policy-resolved proxy configurations are coupled to CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy); merely injecting proxy environment variables is not sufficient.

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Summary

nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived ProxyConfig did not automatically enforce CapabilitySet.proxy_only, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored.

Impact

A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and workload.

Older-kernel note

On Linux kernels without Landlock ABI v4 network rules, patched versions continue to support proxy-only enforcement through the seccomp supervisor fallback introduced in 807fb4b. Users on older kernels should ensure policy-resolved proxy configurations are coupled to CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy); merely injecting proxy environment variables is not sufficient.

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Summary

nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived ProxyConfig did not automatically enforce CapabilitySet.proxy_only, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored.

Impact

A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and workload.

Older-kernel note

On Linux kernels without Landlock ABI v4 network rules, patched versions continue to support proxy-only enforcement through the seccomp supervisor fallback introduced in 807fb4b. Users on older kernels should ensure policy-resolved proxy configurations are coupled to CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy); merely injecting proxy environment variables is not sufficient.

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Summary

nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived ProxyConfig did not automatically enforce CapabilitySet.proxy_only, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored.

Impact

A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and workload.

Older-kernel note

On Linux kernels without Landlock ABI v4 network rules, patched versions continue to support proxy-only enforcement through the seccomp supervisor fallback introduced in 807fb4b. Users on older kernels should ensure policy-resolved proxy configurations are coupled to CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy); merely injecting proxy environment variables is not sufficient.

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Summary

nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived ProxyConfig did not automatically enforce CapabilitySet.proxy_only, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored.

Impact

A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and workload.

Older-kernel note

On Linux kernels without Landlock ABI v4 network rules, patched versions continue to support proxy-only enforcement through the seccomp supervisor fallback introduced in 807fb4b. Users on older kernels should ensure policy-resolved proxy configurations are coupled to CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy); merely injecting proxy environment variables is not sufficient.

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.

Summary

nono-py policy handling could fail open in two ways. First, resolving a policy-derived ProxyConfig did not automatically enforce CapabilitySet.proxy_only, allowing sandboxed children to bypass a resolved domain allowlist by using direct network access. Second, policy JSON accepted unknown security-sensitive fields, so misspelled or unsupported restrictions could be silently ignored.

Impact

A sandboxed child may receive broader network access than the policy author intended. This can allow outbound requests outside the configured proxy allowlist and may expose sensitive data depending on the execution environment and workload.

Older-kernel note

On Linux kernels without Landlock ABI v4 network rules, patched versions continue to support proxy-only enforcement through the seccomp supervisor fallback introduced in 807fb4b. Users on older kernels should ensure policy-resolved proxy configurations are coupled to CapabilitySet.proxy_only(proxy); merely injecting proxy environment variables is not sufficient.

The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).

That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:

• Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
• Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
• Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
• Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.

This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.