lfx

Langflow Executor - A lightweight CLI tool for executing and serving Langflow AI flows

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Activity

Latest release: 12h ago
Total releases: 256
Cadence: ~daily
Last 12 months: 243

Details

First release: Jul 29, 2025

Releases

Version	Released
`1.14.0.dev9` pre	Oct 29, 2026
`1.13.1rc1` pre	Oct 28, 2026
`1.14.0.dev8` pre	Oct 28, 2026
`1.14.0.dev7` pre	Oct 27, 2026
`1.14.0.dev6` pre	Oct 26, 2026
`1.13.1rc0` pre	Oct 25, 2026
`1.14.0.dev5` pre	Oct 25, 2026
`1.14.0.dev4` pre	Oct 24, 2026
`1.14.0.dev3` pre	Oct 23, 2026
`1.13.0` minor	Oct 22, 2026
`1.12.8` patch	Oct 22, 2026
`1.14.0.dev2` pre	Oct 22, 2026
`1.13.0rc4` pre	Oct 22, 2026
`1.12.8rc0` pre	Oct 21, 2026
`1.13.0rc3` pre	Oct 21, 2026
`1.14.0.dev1` pre	Oct 21, 2026
`1.12.7` patch	Oct 21, 2026
`1.12.7rc0` pre	Oct 20, 2026
`1.14.0.dev0` pre	Oct 20, 2026
`1.13.0rc2` pre	Oct 19, 2026
`1.13.0.dev47` pre	Oct 19, 2026
`1.13.0.dev46` pre	Oct 18, 2026
`1.13.0.dev45` pre	Oct 17, 2026
`1.13.0rc1` pre	Oct 16, 2026
`1.13.0.dev44` pre	Oct 16, 2026
`1.13.0.dev43` pre	Oct 15, 2026
`1.13.0.dev42` pre	Oct 14, 2026
`1.13.0rc0` pre	Oct 13, 2026
`1.12.6` patch	Oct 13, 2026
`1.13.0.dev41` pre	Oct 13, 2026
`1.12.6rc3` pre	Oct 12, 2026
`1.12.5rc2` pre	Oct 12, 2026
`1.13.0.dev40` pre	Oct 12, 2026
`1.13.0.dev39` pre	Oct 11, 2026
`1.13.0.dev38` pre	Oct 10, 2026
`1.13.0.dev37` pre	Oct 09, 2026
`1.13.0.dev36` pre	Oct 08, 2026
`1.13.0.dev35` pre	Oct 07, 2026
`1.12.5` patch	Oct 06, 2026
`1.13.0.dev34` pre	Oct 06, 2026
`1.12.5rc1` pre	Oct 05, 2026
`1.13.0.dev33` pre	Oct 05, 2026
`1.12.5rc0` pre	Oct 05, 2026
`1.13.0.dev32` pre	Oct 04, 2026
`1.13.0.dev31` pre	Oct 03, 2026
`1.13.0.dev30` pre	Oct 02, 2026
`1.13.0.dev29` pre	Oct 01, 2026
`1.13.0.dev28` pre	Sep 30, 2026
`1.12.4` patch	Sep 29, 2026
`1.13.0.dev27` pre	Sep 29, 2026

1–50 of 256

Dependencies (67)

Depends on

1.14.0.dev9

Used by

Supply-chain exposure

53 tracked projects depend on this, <1% of every package we track.

A known CVE here directly exposes every one of them.

Known CVEs (2)

CVE-2026-105697 PYSEC-2026-4241 GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45 PYSEC-2026-4237 PYSEC-2026-4239 Oct 15, 2026

Langflow: OS command injection (RCE) via arbitrary command in MCP stdio server configuration

9.9 / 10
Critical
Network Low Low None Changed High High High

Summary

Before Langflow 1.10.3, the MCP stdio transport launched whatever command / args a user put in an MCP server configuration, with no allowlist and (before 1.10.3) wrapped in bash -c "exec {command} ...". Any user able to reach the MCP server settings ("Settings → MCP Servers → Add MCP Server", POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name}) or to build a flow with the MCP Tools component could add a "server" whose command is an arbitrary OS command (touch, rm -rf, a reverse shell, ...). The command runs on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user as soon as Langflow tries to connect to the server (listing servers, loading tools, running the flow) — even when the UI then reports that the stdio server failed to start.

With the default LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true, GET /api/v1/auto_login hands out a token without credentials, so on an exposed instance running the default configuration this is reachable without an account. AUTO_LOGIN is documented as a development-only setting; with it disabled, any authenticated (non-admin) user can exploit it.

The issue was fixed in two steps and is fully fixed in Langflow 1.10.3 (and 1.11.0+):

1.9.0 — #12290 added a command allowlist and argument/env validation to the REST model (MCPServerConfig), blocking the "Add MCP Server" vector reported here.

1.10.3 — #14036 applied the same policy at the execution sink (lfx.base.mcp.util), including configs embedded in flows / tweaks and the final pre-spawn boundary, and removed the bash -c wrapper (the process is now exec'd directly, without a shell).

Affected versions

| Package (PyPI) | Vulnerable | Patched | |---|---|---| | langflow | >= 1.1.2, < 1.10.3 | 1.10.3 | | langflow-base | >= 0.1.2, < 0.10.3 | 0.10.3 | | lfx | < 1.10.3 | 1.10.3 |

| Release | State | |---|---| | 1.1.2 – 1.4.x | MCP Stdio component (added in #5148) runs StdioServerParameters(command=..., args=...) from the component's command field with no validation. | | 1.5.0 – 1.8.x | "Add MCP Server" settings page and /api/v2/mcp/servers API added (#8388). Stored stdio configs are launched via bash -c "exec {command_str} ..." with no validation. The PoC below works as-is. | | 1.9.0 – 1.10.2 | #12290: POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers reject commands outside the allowlist. The execution sink still has no validation and still uses bash -c, so configs that do not go through MCPServerConfig (for example an MCP Tools component value embedded in a flow or passed as a tweak) can still execute arbitrary commands. | | 1.10.3+ | #14036: one shared policy (lfx.base.mcp.security.validate_mcp_stdio_config) is enforced at the API, at flow execution and right before the process is spawned; no shell is used. Fixed. |

Details

Vulnerable sink (src/lfx/src/lfx/base/mcp/util.py, MCPStdioClient._connect_to_server, before 1.10.3):

server_params = StdioServerParameters( command="bash", args=["-c", f"exec {command_str} || echo 'Command failed with exit code $?' >&2"], env=env_data, )

command_str is built from the user's command + args. The only "validation" before 1.9.0 was _validate_node_installation, which only checks that Node.js is installed when the command contains npx. The MCP SDK then starts the process with anyio.open_process, so the command runs before any MCP handshake — which is why it executes even if the UI shows "failed to start".

PoC (as reported, Langflow 1.5.0 – 1.8.x)

In "Add MCP Server" → STDIO, add:

Name - Test Command - touch Arguments - /tmp/pwn

Or through the API, using a token from auto_login (default configuration):

TOKEN=$(curl -s http://127.0.0.1:7860/api/v1/auto_login | python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)["access_token"])') curl -s -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:7860/api/v2/mcp/servers/testing' \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data-raw '{"command":"touch","args":["/tmp/pwned_langflow"]}'

/tmp/pwned_langflow gets created on the server. On 1.10.3+ the request is rejected with Command 'touch' is not allowed for security reasons. Allowed commands: bash, cmd, docker, node, npx, python, python3, uvx, and the same payload fails at the sink (MCPStdioClient.connect_to_server("touch /tmp/pwned_langflow") raises MCPStdioSecurityError, and no file is created). Wrappers such as bash -c "touch ...", sh -c ..., python3 -c ... and node -e ... are also rejected.

Fix

#12290 (1.9.0) — MCPServerConfig validators: command allowlist (node, python, python3, npx, uvx, docker, and cmd/sh/bash only to wrap one of those), shell-metacharacter and dangerous-keyword checks on arguments, env var blocklist (LD_PRELOAD, NODE_OPTIONS, PYTHONPATH, BASH_ENV, ...), and Docker isolation checks.

#14036 (1.10.3) — moves the policy into lfx.base.mcp.security.validate_mcp_stdio_config and enforces it at every entry point (API, embedded flow / tweak configs, the deprecated MCP Stdio component and just before spawn); it also launches the process without a shell:

command_parts = shlex.split(command_str) command, args = command_parts[0], command_parts[1:] validate_mcp_stdio_config(command, args, env) # final pre-spawn enforcement server_params = StdioServerParameters(command=command, args=final_args, env=env_data)

Later hardening (1.11.0, #13530) adds optional stricter modes for multi-tenant deployments.

Workarounds (if you cannot upgrade)

Set LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=false and do not expose Langflow directly to untrusted networks.

Only give Langflow accounts to trusted users.

Hardening recommendations for 1.10.3+

The allowlist still lets npx / uvx run any package by default, which is how MCP servers are normally distributed. On multi-tenant deployments, operators should also set:

LANGFLOW_MCP_SERVER_ALLOWED_PACKAGES — the exact packages npx / uvx may run.

LANGFLOW_MCP_SERVER_INTERPRETER_HARDENING=true and LANGFLOW_MCP_SERVER_DOCKER_HARDENING=true.

On 1.11.1+ (#14150), restricting custom code (LANGFLOW_ALLOW_CUSTOM_COMPONENTS=false, LANGFLOW_CUSTOM_COMPONENT_ADMIN_ONLY=true or LANGFLOW_BLOCK_CODE_INTERPRETER_COMPONENTS=true) also limits MCP stdio servers to superusers.

Impact

Remote code execution on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user (CWE-78). Any exposed instance on a vulnerable version is affected, whether the attacker has an account or uses the default AUTO_LOGIN. The reporter found several internet-facing Langflow servers that were vulnerable.

Affected versions

0.1.00.1.10.1.100.1.110.1.130.1.20.1.30.1.40.1.50.1.60.1.70.1.8

+ 34 more Show less

0.1.90.2.00.2.10.2.20.3.00.3.0rc00.3.0rc10.3.0rc20.3.0rc30.3.0rc40.3.0rc50.3.0rc60.3.10.3.20.3.30.3.3rc00.3.40.4.00.4.10.4.20.4.30.4.3rc00.4.40.4.50.4.60.4.6rc01.10.01.10.0rc01.10.11.10.1rc01.10.1rc31.10.21.10.2rc41.10.3rc0

Fixed in

1.10.3

References

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-7w94-79vh-5mr2
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105697
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/12290
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/14036
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/eba285edf1dd4a33bf23a9cb8113c991fcdf3d1d

Updated Oct 15, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-j8f7-x8jm-wmm4 Oct 06, 2026

Langflow: SSRF in URL-taking components (protection disabled by default / warn-only, not applied to RSS, SearXNG, Web Search, Home Assistant, Glean, Docling)

Medium
Network Low Low None

Summary

Before Langflow 1.10.3, several built-in components sent server-side HTTP requests to URLs the flow author controls, with no SSRF enforcement. An authenticated user who can build or run flows could make the Langflow server reach loopback, RFC 1918 / private networks, link-local addresses and cloud metadata endpoints (for example http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/), and in many cases read the response back through the component output.

Two things combined to cause this:

Protection disabled / warn-only. The SSRF guard (lfx/utils/ssrf_protection.py, added in 1.7.0 by #10544) shipped with ssrf_protection_enabled = False, and its only caller, the API Request component, called validate_url_for_ssrf(url, warn_only=True). So even with protection turned on, blocked URLs were only logged.

Inconsistent coverage. Other components that take a user-supplied URL or base URL did not call the guard at all: RSS Reader, SearXNG, Web Search (fetching result / RSS URLs), Home Assistant, Glean Search and Docling Serve (remote).

The problem was fixed across several PRs and is fully fixed in Langflow 1.10.3 (and 1.11.0+). With the default settings, outbound requests from these components are now validated after DNS resolution, pinned to the validated IP (to prevent DNS rebinding) and blocked when they target private, loopback, link-local or metadata addresses, unless the operator allowlists the host.

Affected versions

| Package (PyPI) | Vulnerable | Patched | |---|---|---| | langflow | < 1.10.3 | 1.10.3 | | langflow-base | < 0.10.3 | 0.10.3 | | lfx | < 1.10.3 | 1.10.3 | | lfx-docling (Docling Serve component) | < 0.1.2 | 0.1.2 |

How the fix rolled out:

| Release | Change | |---|---| | < 1.7.0 | No SSRF guard. All URL-taking components make unrestricted requests. | | 1.7.0 – 1.9.2 | Guard exists, but ssrf_protection_enabled=False by default and API Request uses warn_only=True. | | 1.9.3 | #13016: protection on by default, API Request blocks (DNS pinning / anti-rebinding). Other components still unprotected. | | 1.10.1 | #13395 (RSS Reader, SearXNG) and #13643 (Home Assistant, Glean, plus model-provider URL components) route requests through SSRF-safe helpers. | | 1.10.3 | #14033 (Docling Serve) and #14071 (Web Search result/RSS fetching). All components cited in this report are protected. |

Details

Vulnerable pattern (for example rss.py before #13395):

response = requests.get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout)

API Request before #13016:

# TODO: In next major version (2.0), remove warn_only=True to enforce blocking validate_url_for_ssrf(url, warn_only=True)

with ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = False in the settings.

Clarifications on the original report. Some sinks in the report are not exploitable SSRF:

web_search.py: the DuckDuckGo search request and the Google News RSS request, and news_search.py:131. The host is hard-coded (html.duckduckgo.com / news.google.com) and user input only goes into quote_plus-encoded path and query segments, so the destination cannot be redirected. The real Web Search sink was fetching the result URLs, which is fixed in #14071.

langflow/load/utils.py get_flow(): this is a client-side SDK helper (from langflow.load import get_flow) that the caller runs against their own Langflow URL. No API route calls it, so it is not a backend SSRF endpoint.

PoC (vulnerable versions)

Log in as any user who can create flows.

Add an RSS Reader (or SearXNG / Home Assistant / Glean / Docling Serve) component and set its URL to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ (or an internal host such as http://10.0.0.1/).

Run the component. The Langflow server issues the request, and the response or error is shown in the component output.

On patched versions the same run fails with SSRFProtectionError: Access to IP address 169.254.169.254 is blocked by SSRF protection.

Impact

Access to cloud instance metadata (IAM credentials / tokens) on AWS, GCP and Azure deployments.

Probing and interaction with internal services and private networks reachable from the Langflow host.

Requires an authenticated account with permission to build or run flows. Deployments where every user is already fully trusted are less affected.

Fix

#13016: sets ssrf_protection_enabled = True by default, changes warn_only to default False, drops warn_only=True from API Request, and adds validate_and_resolve_url() plus SSRFProtectedTransport (DNS pinning).

- ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = False + ssrf_protection_enabled: bool = True

#13395: adds lfx.utils.ssrf_requests.ssrf_safe_get (per-hop validation and pinning for requests) and uses it in RSS Reader and SearXNG.

- response = requests.get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout) + response = ssrf_safe_get(self.rss_url, timeout=self.timeout)

#13643: adds lfx.utils.ssrf_httpx (ssrf_safe_httpx_get/post, protected client kwargs) and applies it to Home Assistant, Glean and the model-provider base-URL components.

#14033: Docling Serve builds its httpx.Client with ssrf_protected_httpx_client_kwargs_for_url(base_url).

#14071 (release-1.10.3) / #14073 (forward-port to 1.11.0): Web Search validates and pins each result URL before fetching it, with redirects disabled.

Note: connector-style components (for example Home Assistant, Ollama, LM Studio) keep a documented loopback exemption (#14146), so a self-hosted user can reach a local service on localhost. Private-network and metadata addresses stay blocked. Operators can tighten or relax this with LANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS and LANGFLOW_CONNECTOR_SSRF_VALIDATION_ENABLED.

Remediation

Upgrade to langflow >= 1.10.3 (or langflow-base >= 0.10.3 / lfx >= 1.10.3 / lfx-docling >= 0.1.2).

Do not set LANGFLOW_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=false. If you need to reach internal hosts on purpose, allowlist only those hosts with LANGFLOW_SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS.

On versions that cannot be upgraded right away, restrict outbound network access from the Langflow host (for example, block 169.254.169.254 and use IMDSv2 on AWS).

Affected versions

0.1.00.1.10.1.100.1.110.1.130.1.20.1.30.1.40.1.50.1.60.1.70.1.8

+ 34 more Show less

0.1.90.2.00.2.10.2.20.3.00.3.0rc00.3.0rc10.3.0rc20.3.0rc30.3.0rc40.3.0rc50.3.0rc60.3.10.3.20.3.30.3.3rc00.3.40.4.00.4.10.4.20.4.30.4.3rc00.4.40.4.50.4.60.4.6rc01.10.01.10.0rc01.10.11.10.1rc01.10.1rc31.10.21.10.2rc41.10.3rc0

Fixed in

1.10.3

References

https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-j8f7-x8jm-wmm4
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/13016
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/13395
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/13643
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/14033
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/14071

Updated Oct 06, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

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Releases per month

last 12 months

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major 1
minor 6
patch 41
pre 207

256 releases

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2026

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