easycorp/easyadmin-bundle

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

EasyAdmin's FileField and ImageField accept browser-executable file types by default (FileField applies no MIME/extension restrictions; ImageField's default Image constraint accepts SVG). When the upload directory is configured inside the public web root — as shown in the documentation — EasyAdmin links to the stored file inline (no download attribute or Content-Disposition: attachment).

An attacker with access to a form using these fields can upload an .html (FileField) or .svg (ImageField) file containing JavaScript. When another user opens it from the backend, it is served from the same origin and the script executes in the context of their authenticated admin session, enabling session/CSRF-token theft or privilege escalation.

Exploitation requires the developer to store uploads in the public directory and a privilege gap between the uploading user and the viewing administrator. This is stored XSS only — it does not allow remote code execution, because uploaded filenames are derived from Symfony's guessExtension(), which never produces .php/.phtml.

Credit

We would like to thank Emre Dogan for reporting the issue.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

EasyAdmin's FileField and ImageField accept browser-executable file types by default (FileField applies no MIME/extension restrictions; ImageField's default Image constraint accepts SVG). When the upload directory is configured inside the public web root — as shown in the documentation — EasyAdmin links to the stored file inline (no download attribute or Content-Disposition: attachment).

An attacker with access to a form using these fields can upload an .html (FileField) or .svg (ImageField) file containing JavaScript. When another user opens it from the backend, it is served from the same origin and the script executes in the context of their authenticated admin session, enabling session/CSRF-token theft or privilege escalation.

Exploitation requires the developer to store uploads in the public directory and a privilege gap between the uploading user and the viewing administrator. This is stored XSS only — it does not allow remote code execution, because uploaded filenames are derived from Symfony's guessExtension(), which never produces .php/.phtml.

Credit

We would like to thank Emre Dogan for reporting the issue.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

EasyAdmin's FileField and ImageField accept browser-executable file types by default (FileField applies no MIME/extension restrictions; ImageField's default Image constraint accepts SVG). When the upload directory is configured inside the public web root — as shown in the documentation — EasyAdmin links to the stored file inline (no download attribute or Content-Disposition: attachment).

An attacker with access to a form using these fields can upload an .html (FileField) or .svg (ImageField) file containing JavaScript. When another user opens it from the backend, it is served from the same origin and the script executes in the context of their authenticated admin session, enabling session/CSRF-token theft or privilege escalation.

Exploitation requires the developer to store uploads in the public directory and a privilege gap between the uploading user and the viewing administrator. This is stored XSS only — it does not allow remote code execution, because uploaded filenames are derived from Symfony's guessExtension(), which never produces .php/.phtml.

Credit

We would like to thank Emre Dogan for reporting the issue.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

EasyAdmin's FileField and ImageField accept browser-executable file types by default (FileField applies no MIME/extension restrictions; ImageField's default Image constraint accepts SVG). When the upload directory is configured inside the public web root — as shown in the documentation — EasyAdmin links to the stored file inline (no download attribute or Content-Disposition: attachment).

An attacker with access to a form using these fields can upload an .html (FileField) or .svg (ImageField) file containing JavaScript. When another user opens it from the backend, it is served from the same origin and the script executes in the context of their authenticated admin session, enabling session/CSRF-token theft or privilege escalation.

Exploitation requires the developer to store uploads in the public directory and a privilege gap between the uploading user and the viewing administrator. This is stored XSS only — it does not allow remote code execution, because uploaded filenames are derived from Symfony's guessExtension(), which never produces .php/.phtml.

Credit

We would like to thank Emre Dogan for reporting the issue.

EasyAdminBundle ships two public Twig components — <twig:ea:Flag countryCode="..."> and <twig:ea:Icon name="..."> — that load SVG files from disk using a path built directly from a public component property, and then render the resulting markup with the Twig |raw filter.

When an application binds either of those properties to data that is influenced by an end user, the lack of validation on the property value leads to two distinct issues:

• Arbitrary .svg file disclosure (both components) — the property value is concatenated into a filesystem path without normalizing or constraining it, so .. segments are preserved and resolved by PHP. Any file on the server whose absolute path ends in .svg (for example, user-uploaded SVG icons stored elsewhere on the host) can be read and embedded into the rendered page.
• Reflected XSS in the admin UI (Flag component only) — when the requested flag file does not exist, the Flag component falls back to a hard-coded SVG string that interpolates the raw countryCode value twice, and the parent template renders that string with |raw. An attacker who controls countryCode can therefore inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that will execute inside the authenticated admin context that rendered the component.

The first-party usage shipped by EasyAdminBundle itself is not affected: the bundle only passes ISO 3166 alpha-2 codes validated through Symfony\Component\Intl\Countries to the Flag component, and only hard-coded internal:.. names or values previously set in PHP via MenuItem::setIcon() to the Icon component. The vulnerability is reachable only in third-party templates that pass attacker-controlled data into these properties.

Impact

Path traversal is information disclosure bounded by the .svg extension; reflected XSS in Flag runs in the admin context and is therefore more sensitive but requires a vulnerable template wiring and user interaction.

Affected components

• EasyCorp\Bundle\EasyAdminBundle\Twig\Component\Flag — public Twig tag <twig:ea:Flag>, property countryCode.
• EasyCorp\Bundle\EasyAdminBundle\Twig\Component\Icon — public Twig tag <twig:ea:Icon>, property name when the value starts with the internal: prefix.

Credit

EasyAdmin would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing and The PHP Foundation) for reporting the issue and providing the fix.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

EasyAdminBundle ships two public Twig components — <twig:ea:Flag countryCode="..."> and <twig:ea:Icon name="..."> — that load SVG files from disk using a path built directly from a public component property, and then render the resulting markup with the Twig |raw filter.

When an application binds either of those properties to data that is influenced by an end user, the lack of validation on the property value leads to two distinct issues:

• Arbitrary .svg file disclosure (both components) — the property value is concatenated into a filesystem path without normalizing or constraining it, so .. segments are preserved and resolved by PHP. Any file on the server whose absolute path ends in .svg (for example, user-uploaded SVG icons stored elsewhere on the host) can be read and embedded into the rendered page.
• Reflected XSS in the admin UI (Flag component only) — when the requested flag file does not exist, the Flag component falls back to a hard-coded SVG string that interpolates the raw countryCode value twice, and the parent template renders that string with |raw. An attacker who controls countryCode can therefore inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that will execute inside the authenticated admin context that rendered the component.

The first-party usage shipped by EasyAdminBundle itself is not affected: the bundle only passes ISO 3166 alpha-2 codes validated through Symfony\Component\Intl\Countries to the Flag component, and only hard-coded internal:.. names or values previously set in PHP via MenuItem::setIcon() to the Icon component. The vulnerability is reachable only in third-party templates that pass attacker-controlled data into these properties.

Impact

Path traversal is information disclosure bounded by the .svg extension; reflected XSS in Flag runs in the admin context and is therefore more sensitive but requires a vulnerable template wiring and user interaction.

Affected components

• EasyCorp\Bundle\EasyAdminBundle\Twig\Component\Flag — public Twig tag <twig:ea:Flag>, property countryCode.
• EasyCorp\Bundle\EasyAdminBundle\Twig\Component\Icon — public Twig tag <twig:ea:Icon>, property name when the value starts with the internal: prefix.

Credit

EasyAdmin would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing and The PHP Foundation) for reporting the issue and providing the fix.

Summary

EasyAdmin serves all backend requests through a single dashboard route and, for custom actions (Action::linkToRoute() / MenuItem::linkToRoute()), swaps the executed controller based on the routeName query parameter on the kernel.controller event.

That swap happens after Symfony's security firewall has already evaluated access_control against the original dashboard URL, and the routeName value was not validated. As a result, a path-based access_control rule protecting the target route was never evaluated, so a low-privilege backend user could reach a more restricted route by name.

Impact

Any application where access_control (or another path-based Symfony security rule) protects some routes more strictly than the dashboard URL used to reach EasyAdmin. An attacker who can reach a single EasyAdmin URL and knows a target route's name can execute that route's controller, bypassing the path-based rule.

Only path-based protections are bypassed. Routes whose controller enforces its own authorization with #[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted() remain protected, because those checks are recomputed against the swapped-in controller.

Patches

Fixed in 4.29.16 and 5.5.1. Before dispatching a custom-action route, EasyAdmin now re-evaluates the target route's access_control rule and denies the request if the current user is not granted access.

Workarounds

Add controller-level authorization (#[IsGranted] / denyAccessUnlessGranted()) to any sensitive route, since controller-level checks are still enforced. Upgrading is the recommended fix.

Credits

Reported by @TungNGo02.

EasyAdmin's FileField and ImageField accept browser-executable file types by default (FileField applies no MIME/extension restrictions; ImageField's default Image constraint accepts SVG). When the upload directory is configured inside the public web root — as shown in the documentation — EasyAdmin links to the stored file inline (no download attribute or Content-Disposition: attachment).

An attacker with access to a form using these fields can upload an .html (FileField) or .svg (ImageField) file containing JavaScript. When another user opens it from the backend, it is served from the same origin and the script executes in the context of their authenticated admin session, enabling session/CSRF-token theft or privilege escalation.

Exploitation requires the developer to store uploads in the public directory and a privilege gap between the uploading user and the viewing administrator. This is stored XSS only — it does not allow remote code execution, because uploaded filenames are derived from Symfony's guessExtension(), which never produces .php/.phtml.

Credit

We would like to thank Emre Dogan for reporting the issue.

EasyAdminBundle ships two public Twig components — <twig:ea:Flag countryCode="..."> and <twig:ea:Icon name="..."> — that load SVG files from disk using a path built directly from a public component property, and then render the resulting markup with the Twig |raw filter.

When an application binds either of those properties to data that is influenced by an end user, the lack of validation on the property value leads to two distinct issues:

• Arbitrary .svg file disclosure (both components) — the property value is concatenated into a filesystem path without normalizing or constraining it, so .. segments are preserved and resolved by PHP. Any file on the server whose absolute path ends in .svg (for example, user-uploaded SVG icons stored elsewhere on the host) can be read and embedded into the rendered page.
• Reflected XSS in the admin UI (Flag component only) — when the requested flag file does not exist, the Flag component falls back to a hard-coded SVG string that interpolates the raw countryCode value twice, and the parent template renders that string with |raw. An attacker who controls countryCode can therefore inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that will execute inside the authenticated admin context that rendered the component.

The first-party usage shipped by EasyAdminBundle itself is not affected: the bundle only passes ISO 3166 alpha-2 codes validated through Symfony\Component\Intl\Countries to the Flag component, and only hard-coded internal:.. names or values previously set in PHP via MenuItem::setIcon() to the Icon component. The vulnerability is reachable only in third-party templates that pass attacker-controlled data into these properties.

Impact

Path traversal is information disclosure bounded by the .svg extension; reflected XSS in Flag runs in the admin context and is therefore more sensitive but requires a vulnerable template wiring and user interaction.

Affected components

• EasyCorp\Bundle\EasyAdminBundle\Twig\Component\Flag — public Twig tag <twig:ea:Flag>, property countryCode.
• EasyCorp\Bundle\EasyAdminBundle\Twig\Component\Icon — public Twig tag <twig:ea:Icon>, property name when the value starts with the internal: prefix.

Credit

EasyAdmin would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing and The PHP Foundation) for reporting the issue and providing the fix.