Wire

Due to how Wire handles type information in its serialization format, malicious payloads can be passed to a deserializer. e.g. using a surrogate on the sender end, an attacker can pass information about a different type for the receiving end. And by doing so allowing the serializer to create any type on the deserializing end.

This is the same issue that exists for .NET BinaryFormatter https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/code-quality/ca2300?view=vs-2019

This also applies to the fork of Wire, AkkaDotNet/Hyperion.

Due to how Wire handles type information in its serialization format, malicious payloads can be passed to a deserializer. e.g. using a surrogate on the sender end, an attacker can pass information about a different type for the receiving end. And by doing so allowing the serializer to create any type on the deserializing end.

This is the same issue that exists for .NET BinaryFormatter https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/code-quality/ca2300?view=vs-2019

This also applies to the fork of Wire, AkkaDotNet/Hyperion.

Due to how Wire handles type information in its serialization format, malicious payloads can be passed to a deserializer. e.g. using a surrogate on the sender end, an attacker can pass information about a different type for the receiving end. And by doing so allowing the serializer to create any type on the deserializing end.

This is the same issue that exists for .NET BinaryFormatter https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/code-quality/ca2300?view=vs-2019

This also applies to the fork of Wire, AkkaDotNet/Hyperion.

Due to how Wire handles type information in its serialization format, malicious payloads can be passed to a deserializer. e.g. using a surrogate on the sender end, an attacker can pass information about a different type for the receiving end. And by doing so allowing the serializer to create any type on the deserializing end.

This is the same issue that exists for .NET BinaryFormatter https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/code-quality/ca2300?view=vs-2019

This also applies to the fork of Wire, AkkaDotNet/Hyperion.

Due to how Wire handles type information in its serialization format, malicious payloads can be passed to a deserializer. e.g. using a surrogate on the sender end, an attacker can pass information about a different type for the receiving end. And by doing so allowing the serializer to create any type on the deserializing end.

This is the same issue that exists for .NET BinaryFormatter https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/code-quality/ca2300?view=vs-2019

This also applies to the fork of Wire, AkkaDotNet/Hyperion.

Due to how Wire handles type information in its serialization format, malicious payloads can be passed to a deserializer. e.g. using a surrogate on the sender end, an attacker can pass information about a different type for the receiving end. And by doing so allowing the serializer to create any type on the deserializing end.

This is the same issue that exists for .NET BinaryFormatter https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/code-quality/ca2300?view=vs-2019

This also applies to the fork of Wire, AkkaDotNet/Hyperion.

Due to how Wire handles type information in its serialization format, malicious payloads can be passed to a deserializer. e.g. using a surrogate on the sender end, an attacker can pass information about a different type for the receiving end. And by doing so allowing the serializer to create any type on the deserializing end.

This is the same issue that exists for .NET BinaryFormatter https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/code-quality/ca2300?view=vs-2019

This also applies to the fork of Wire, AkkaDotNet/Hyperion.

Due to how Wire handles type information in its serialization format, malicious payloads can be passed to a deserializer. e.g. using a surrogate on the sender end, an attacker can pass information about a different type for the receiving end. And by doing so allowing the serializer to create any type on the deserializing end.

This is the same issue that exists for .NET BinaryFormatter https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/code-quality/ca2300?view=vs-2019

This also applies to the fork of Wire, AkkaDotNet/Hyperion.

Due to how Wire handles type information in its serialization format, malicious payloads can be passed to a deserializer. e.g. using a surrogate on the sender end, an attacker can pass information about a different type for the receiving end. And by doing so allowing the serializer to create any type on the deserializing end.

This is the same issue that exists for .NET BinaryFormatter https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/code-quality/ca2300?view=vs-2019

This also applies to the fork of Wire, AkkaDotNet/Hyperion.

Due to how Wire handles type information in its serialization format, malicious payloads can be passed to a deserializer. e.g. using a surrogate on the sender end, an attacker can pass information about a different type for the receiving end. And by doing so allowing the serializer to create any type on the deserializing end.

This is the same issue that exists for .NET BinaryFormatter https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/code-quality/ca2300?view=vs-2019

This also applies to the fork of Wire, AkkaDotNet/Hyperion.

Due to how Wire handles type information in its serialization format, malicious payloads can be passed to a deserializer. e.g. using a surrogate on the sender end, an attacker can pass information about a different type for the receiving end. And by doing so allowing the serializer to create any type on the deserializing end.

This is the same issue that exists for .NET BinaryFormatter https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/code-quality/ca2300?view=vs-2019

This also applies to the fork of Wire, AkkaDotNet/Hyperion.