samly

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

Summary

Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it.

Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

Summary

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to establish an authenticated session using a SAML response the service provider never requested.

Samly.SPHandler.validate_authresp/3 in lib/samly/sp_handler.ex validates a SAML response for the SP-initiated flow by comparing only the RelayState value, the IdP identifier, and the presence of a target URL held in the session. It never compares SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo against the ID of the AuthnRequest the service provider issued, and that request ID is never persisted, so no comparison is possible. SAML 2.0 Core section 4.1.4.3 requires a service provider to reject a response whose InResponseTo does not match a request it made. The underlying esaml library checks status, signature, recipient, audience, and staleness, but likewise never inspects InResponseTo, so nothing else closes the gap. Exploitation requires a validly signed assertion from the trusted IdP, which an attacker can obtain for their own account, and a RelayState matching the victim's session; the assertion signature itself remains intact, so this is not a signature-forgery issue.

This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.

In the Samly package before 1.4.0 for Elixir, Samly.State.Store.get_assertion/3 can return an expired session, which interferes with access control because Samly.AuthHandler uses a cached session and does not replace it, even after expiry.