mdex

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows denial of service via deeply nested Markdown input.

mdex converts between an Elixir %MDEx.Document{} struct and Comrak's internal AST using two mutually recursive Rust functions, ex_document_to_comrak_ast and comrak_ast_to_ex_document, in the NIF source file document.rs. Neither function enforces a maximum nesting depth, so the recursion depth is bounded only by the structure of the input. An attacker who can get a Markdown document rendered (for example through MDEx.parse_document!/1 or MDEx.to_html/1) can supply a document with thousands of nested block quotes, which drives unbounded recursion across the NIF boundary and exhausts the native C stack.

Because the resulting stack overflow is an uncatchable SIGSEGV raised inside a NIF, it cannot be contained by the Erlang runtime. It terminates the operating system process running the BEAM, killing every Elixir and Erlang process on the node, not just the caller that triggered the render. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable conversion code was extracted from mdex into the separate mdex_native package starting in mdex 0.12.3. This issue affects mdex from 0.3.0 before 0.12.3 and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in leandrocp mdex and mdex_native allows an attacker who controls a rendered document to cause a denial of service through unbounded native memory exhaustion.

The native rendering code permanently leaks memory when rendering a document that contains escaped-tag nodes. The conversion of each %MDEx.EscapedTag{} node into its native representation (From for NodeValue in the Rust NIF) calls Box::leak on the caller-supplied literal string, which surrenders the backing allocation so that it lives for the entire lifetime of the operating system process and is never freed.

Both the byte length of each literal and the number of escaped-tag nodes in a document are attacker-controlled, and there is no size cap, rate limit, or string interning on this path. Every render of a document containing escaped-tag nodes therefore leaks literal_size x node_count bytes that can never be reclaimed, and repeated renders accumulate without bound. Rendering reaches this path through the public MDEx.to_html/1 entry point and any other API that renders a supplied %MDEx.Document{}.

Any application that uses mdex (or mdex_native directly) to render documents derived from user-supplied content is affected. Because the leaked memory is never reclaimed for the life of the BEAM process, an attacker can drive resident memory upward without limit until the node exhausts memory and crashes, taking down every process on it.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/types/document.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/types/document.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through unbounded memory allocation.

comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_highlight_lines in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs eagerly expands a user-controlled inclusive line range from a fenced code block's highlight_lines decorator into a Vec, pushing one element per integer in the range with no upper bound on the range size. An attacker who can supply Markdown that an application renders with MDEx.to_html/2 (for example a comment, chat message, or wiki page) can embed a code block whose info string is rust highlight_lines="1-100000000", forcing the native adapter to allocate roughly 8 bytes per line in the range.

A payload that differs by only a few bytes can therefore allocate hundreds of megabytes, and a sufficiently large range (for example 1-2000000000) exhausts host memory and aborts the BEAM, denying service to every user of the rendering process. The per-line write loop additionally tests membership with a linear scan over the same vector, degrading rendering to a quadratic cost even for ranges that do not immediately exhaust memory.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable code-block decorators: leave the github_pre_lang and full_info_string render options unset, or avoid configuring an inline syntax-highlight formatter, so that highlight_lines specifications are never parsed.

Configurations

Exploitation requires the application to enable code-block decorators. Decorators are active only when the render options github_pre_lang and full_info_string are both set and an inline syntax-highlight formatter (for example {:html_inline, ...}) is configured. Applications that render Markdown with the default options do not parse highlight_lines specifications and are not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows stored or reflected cross-site scripting via attacker-controlled Markdown.

When syntax highlighting and full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) are enabled, the Lumis adapter copies the value of a code fence's highlight_lines_class info-string attribute, unescaped, into the class attribute of every rendered line. comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_custom_attributes in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs shlex-parses the info string and stores each key=value pair verbatim, highlight_lines_config pulls highlight_lines_class into the per-line class value, and write_highlighted interpolates that value directly into the class attribute of the per-line . A single-quoted shell token preserves an inner double quote through shlex parsing, so a value such as '">alert(1)' terminates the class attribute early and the markup that follows is emitted as live HTML.

An attacker who can submit Markdown (through comments, posts, wiki pages, documentation, or any user-generated content) can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript that runs in the browser of every user who views the rendered output, enabling session theft, account takeover, and other client-side attacks. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.3 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) when rendering untrusted Markdown, which prevents the highlight_lines_class attribute from reaching the highlighter. Alternatively, restrict highlight_lines_class values to a safe character set (for example [A-Za-z0-9_- ]) before rendering.

Configurations

The vulnerable code path is only reachable when MDEx is configured with a syntax-highlighting formatter (for example syntax_highlight: [formatter: {:html_inline, ...}] or {:html_linked, ...}) and with full info-string forwarding enabled (render: [full_info_string: true]). Full info-string forwarding is required for comrak to hand the highlight_lines_class attribute to the highlighter, so any application that uses the line-highlighting attributes already has it enabled.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows denial of service via deeply nested Markdown input.

mdex converts between an Elixir %MDEx.Document{} struct and Comrak's internal AST using two mutually recursive Rust functions, ex_document_to_comrak_ast and comrak_ast_to_ex_document, in the NIF source file document.rs. Neither function enforces a maximum nesting depth, so the recursion depth is bounded only by the structure of the input. An attacker who can get a Markdown document rendered (for example through MDEx.parse_document!/1 or MDEx.to_html/1) can supply a document with thousands of nested block quotes, which drives unbounded recursion across the NIF boundary and exhausts the native C stack.

Because the resulting stack overflow is an uncatchable SIGSEGV raised inside a NIF, it cannot be contained by the Erlang runtime. It terminates the operating system process running the BEAM, killing every Elixir and Erlang process on the node, not just the caller that triggered the render. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable conversion code was extracted from mdex into the separate mdex_native package starting in mdex 0.12.3. This issue affects mdex from 0.3.0 before 0.12.3 and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in leandrocp mdex and mdex_native allows an attacker who controls a rendered document to cause a denial of service through unbounded native memory exhaustion.

The native rendering code permanently leaks memory when rendering a document that contains escaped-tag nodes. The conversion of each %MDEx.EscapedTag{} node into its native representation (From for NodeValue in the Rust NIF) calls Box::leak on the caller-supplied literal string, which surrenders the backing allocation so that it lives for the entire lifetime of the operating system process and is never freed.

Both the byte length of each literal and the number of escaped-tag nodes in a document are attacker-controlled, and there is no size cap, rate limit, or string interning on this path. Every render of a document containing escaped-tag nodes therefore leaks literal_size x node_count bytes that can never be reclaimed, and repeated renders accumulate without bound. Rendering reaches this path through the public MDEx.to_html/1 entry point and any other API that renders a supplied %MDEx.Document{}.

Any application that uses mdex (or mdex_native directly) to render documents derived from user-supplied content is affected. Because the leaked memory is never reclaimed for the life of the BEAM process, an attacker can drive resident memory upward without limit until the node exhausts memory and crashes, taking down every process on it.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/types/document.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/types/document.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through unbounded memory allocation.

comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_highlight_lines in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs eagerly expands a user-controlled inclusive line range from a fenced code block's highlight_lines decorator into a Vec, pushing one element per integer in the range with no upper bound on the range size. An attacker who can supply Markdown that an application renders with MDEx.to_html/2 (for example a comment, chat message, or wiki page) can embed a code block whose info string is rust highlight_lines="1-100000000", forcing the native adapter to allocate roughly 8 bytes per line in the range.

A payload that differs by only a few bytes can therefore allocate hundreds of megabytes, and a sufficiently large range (for example 1-2000000000) exhausts host memory and aborts the BEAM, denying service to every user of the rendering process. The per-line write loop additionally tests membership with a linear scan over the same vector, degrading rendering to a quadratic cost even for ranges that do not immediately exhaust memory.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable code-block decorators: leave the github_pre_lang and full_info_string render options unset, or avoid configuring an inline syntax-highlight formatter, so that highlight_lines specifications are never parsed.

Configurations

Exploitation requires the application to enable code-block decorators. Decorators are active only when the render options github_pre_lang and full_info_string are both set and an inline syntax-highlight formatter (for example {:html_inline, ...}) is configured. Applications that render Markdown with the default options do not parse highlight_lines specifications and are not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows stored or reflected cross-site scripting via attacker-controlled Markdown.

When syntax highlighting and full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) are enabled, the Lumis adapter copies the value of a code fence's highlight_lines_class info-string attribute, unescaped, into the class attribute of every rendered line. comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_custom_attributes in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs shlex-parses the info string and stores each key=value pair verbatim, highlight_lines_config pulls highlight_lines_class into the per-line class value, and write_highlighted interpolates that value directly into the class attribute of the per-line . A single-quoted shell token preserves an inner double quote through shlex parsing, so a value such as '">alert(1)' terminates the class attribute early and the markup that follows is emitted as live HTML.

An attacker who can submit Markdown (through comments, posts, wiki pages, documentation, or any user-generated content) can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript that runs in the browser of every user who views the rendered output, enabling session theft, account takeover, and other client-side attacks. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.3 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) when rendering untrusted Markdown, which prevents the highlight_lines_class attribute from reaching the highlighter. Alternatively, restrict highlight_lines_class values to a safe character set (for example [A-Za-z0-9_- ]) before rendering.

Configurations

The vulnerable code path is only reachable when MDEx is configured with a syntax-highlighting formatter (for example syntax_highlight: [formatter: {:html_inline, ...}] or {:html_linked, ...}) and with full info-string forwarding enabled (render: [full_info_string: true]). Full info-string forwarding is required for comrak to hand the highlight_lines_class attribute to the highlighter, so any application that uses the line-highlighting attributes already has it enabled.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows denial of service via deeply nested Markdown input.

mdex converts between an Elixir %MDEx.Document{} struct and Comrak's internal AST using two mutually recursive Rust functions, ex_document_to_comrak_ast and comrak_ast_to_ex_document, in the NIF source file document.rs. Neither function enforces a maximum nesting depth, so the recursion depth is bounded only by the structure of the input. An attacker who can get a Markdown document rendered (for example through MDEx.parse_document!/1 or MDEx.to_html/1) can supply a document with thousands of nested block quotes, which drives unbounded recursion across the NIF boundary and exhausts the native C stack.

Because the resulting stack overflow is an uncatchable SIGSEGV raised inside a NIF, it cannot be contained by the Erlang runtime. It terminates the operating system process running the BEAM, killing every Elixir and Erlang process on the node, not just the caller that triggered the render. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable conversion code was extracted from mdex into the separate mdex_native package starting in mdex 0.12.3. This issue affects mdex from 0.3.0 before 0.12.3 and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in leandrocp mdex and mdex_native allows an attacker who controls a rendered document to cause a denial of service through unbounded native memory exhaustion.

The native rendering code permanently leaks memory when rendering a document that contains escaped-tag nodes. The conversion of each %MDEx.EscapedTag{} node into its native representation (From for NodeValue in the Rust NIF) calls Box::leak on the caller-supplied literal string, which surrenders the backing allocation so that it lives for the entire lifetime of the operating system process and is never freed.

Both the byte length of each literal and the number of escaped-tag nodes in a document are attacker-controlled, and there is no size cap, rate limit, or string interning on this path. Every render of a document containing escaped-tag nodes therefore leaks literal_size x node_count bytes that can never be reclaimed, and repeated renders accumulate without bound. Rendering reaches this path through the public MDEx.to_html/1 entry point and any other API that renders a supplied %MDEx.Document{}.

Any application that uses mdex (or mdex_native directly) to render documents derived from user-supplied content is affected. Because the leaked memory is never reclaimed for the life of the BEAM process, an attacker can drive resident memory upward without limit until the node exhausts memory and crashes, taking down every process on it.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/types/document.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/types/document.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through unbounded memory allocation.

comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_highlight_lines in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs eagerly expands a user-controlled inclusive line range from a fenced code block's highlight_lines decorator into a Vec, pushing one element per integer in the range with no upper bound on the range size. An attacker who can supply Markdown that an application renders with MDEx.to_html/2 (for example a comment, chat message, or wiki page) can embed a code block whose info string is rust highlight_lines="1-100000000", forcing the native adapter to allocate roughly 8 bytes per line in the range.

A payload that differs by only a few bytes can therefore allocate hundreds of megabytes, and a sufficiently large range (for example 1-2000000000) exhausts host memory and aborts the BEAM, denying service to every user of the rendering process. The per-line write loop additionally tests membership with a linear scan over the same vector, degrading rendering to a quadratic cost even for ranges that do not immediately exhaust memory.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable code-block decorators: leave the github_pre_lang and full_info_string render options unset, or avoid configuring an inline syntax-highlight formatter, so that highlight_lines specifications are never parsed.

Configurations

Exploitation requires the application to enable code-block decorators. Decorators are active only when the render options github_pre_lang and full_info_string are both set and an inline syntax-highlight formatter (for example {:html_inline, ...}) is configured. Applications that render Markdown with the default options do not parse highlight_lines specifications and are not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows stored or reflected cross-site scripting via attacker-controlled Markdown.

When syntax highlighting and full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) are enabled, the Lumis adapter copies the value of a code fence's highlight_lines_class info-string attribute, unescaped, into the class attribute of every rendered line. comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_custom_attributes in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs shlex-parses the info string and stores each key=value pair verbatim, highlight_lines_config pulls highlight_lines_class into the per-line class value, and write_highlighted interpolates that value directly into the class attribute of the per-line . A single-quoted shell token preserves an inner double quote through shlex parsing, so a value such as '">alert(1)' terminates the class attribute early and the markup that follows is emitted as live HTML.

An attacker who can submit Markdown (through comments, posts, wiki pages, documentation, or any user-generated content) can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript that runs in the browser of every user who views the rendered output, enabling session theft, account takeover, and other client-side attacks. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.3 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) when rendering untrusted Markdown, which prevents the highlight_lines_class attribute from reaching the highlighter. Alternatively, restrict highlight_lines_class values to a safe character set (for example [A-Za-z0-9_- ]) before rendering.

Configurations

The vulnerable code path is only reachable when MDEx is configured with a syntax-highlighting formatter (for example syntax_highlight: [formatter: {:html_inline, ...}] or {:html_linked, ...}) and with full info-string forwarding enabled (render: [full_info_string: true]). Full info-string forwarding is required for comrak to hand the highlight_lines_class attribute to the highlighter, so any application that uses the line-highlighting attributes already has it enabled.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows denial of service via deeply nested Markdown input.

mdex converts between an Elixir %MDEx.Document{} struct and Comrak's internal AST using two mutually recursive Rust functions, ex_document_to_comrak_ast and comrak_ast_to_ex_document, in the NIF source file document.rs. Neither function enforces a maximum nesting depth, so the recursion depth is bounded only by the structure of the input. An attacker who can get a Markdown document rendered (for example through MDEx.parse_document!/1 or MDEx.to_html/1) can supply a document with thousands of nested block quotes, which drives unbounded recursion across the NIF boundary and exhausts the native C stack.

Because the resulting stack overflow is an uncatchable SIGSEGV raised inside a NIF, it cannot be contained by the Erlang runtime. It terminates the operating system process running the BEAM, killing every Elixir and Erlang process on the node, not just the caller that triggered the render. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable conversion code was extracted from mdex into the separate mdex_native package starting in mdex 0.12.3. This issue affects mdex from 0.3.0 before 0.12.3 and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in leandrocp mdex and mdex_native allows an attacker who controls a rendered document to cause a denial of service through unbounded native memory exhaustion.

The native rendering code permanently leaks memory when rendering a document that contains escaped-tag nodes. The conversion of each %MDEx.EscapedTag{} node into its native representation (From for NodeValue in the Rust NIF) calls Box::leak on the caller-supplied literal string, which surrenders the backing allocation so that it lives for the entire lifetime of the operating system process and is never freed.

Both the byte length of each literal and the number of escaped-tag nodes in a document are attacker-controlled, and there is no size cap, rate limit, or string interning on this path. Every render of a document containing escaped-tag nodes therefore leaks literal_size x node_count bytes that can never be reclaimed, and repeated renders accumulate without bound. Rendering reaches this path through the public MDEx.to_html/1 entry point and any other API that renders a supplied %MDEx.Document{}.

Any application that uses mdex (or mdex_native directly) to render documents derived from user-supplied content is affected. Because the leaked memory is never reclaimed for the life of the BEAM process, an attacker can drive resident memory upward without limit until the node exhausts memory and crashes, taking down every process on it.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/types/document.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/types/document.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through unbounded memory allocation.

comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_highlight_lines in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs eagerly expands a user-controlled inclusive line range from a fenced code block's highlight_lines decorator into a Vec, pushing one element per integer in the range with no upper bound on the range size. An attacker who can supply Markdown that an application renders with MDEx.to_html/2 (for example a comment, chat message, or wiki page) can embed a code block whose info string is rust highlight_lines="1-100000000", forcing the native adapter to allocate roughly 8 bytes per line in the range.

A payload that differs by only a few bytes can therefore allocate hundreds of megabytes, and a sufficiently large range (for example 1-2000000000) exhausts host memory and aborts the BEAM, denying service to every user of the rendering process. The per-line write loop additionally tests membership with a linear scan over the same vector, degrading rendering to a quadratic cost even for ranges that do not immediately exhaust memory.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable code-block decorators: leave the github_pre_lang and full_info_string render options unset, or avoid configuring an inline syntax-highlight formatter, so that highlight_lines specifications are never parsed.

Configurations

Exploitation requires the application to enable code-block decorators. Decorators are active only when the render options github_pre_lang and full_info_string are both set and an inline syntax-highlight formatter (for example {:html_inline, ...}) is configured. Applications that render Markdown with the default options do not parse highlight_lines specifications and are not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows stored or reflected cross-site scripting via attacker-controlled Markdown.

When syntax highlighting and full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) are enabled, the Lumis adapter copies the value of a code fence's highlight_lines_class info-string attribute, unescaped, into the class attribute of every rendered line. comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_custom_attributes in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs shlex-parses the info string and stores each key=value pair verbatim, highlight_lines_config pulls highlight_lines_class into the per-line class value, and write_highlighted interpolates that value directly into the class attribute of the per-line . A single-quoted shell token preserves an inner double quote through shlex parsing, so a value such as '">alert(1)' terminates the class attribute early and the markup that follows is emitted as live HTML.

An attacker who can submit Markdown (through comments, posts, wiki pages, documentation, or any user-generated content) can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript that runs in the browser of every user who views the rendered output, enabling session theft, account takeover, and other client-side attacks. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.3 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) when rendering untrusted Markdown, which prevents the highlight_lines_class attribute from reaching the highlighter. Alternatively, restrict highlight_lines_class values to a safe character set (for example [A-Za-z0-9_- ]) before rendering.

Configurations

The vulnerable code path is only reachable when MDEx is configured with a syntax-highlighting formatter (for example syntax_highlight: [formatter: {:html_inline, ...}] or {:html_linked, ...}) and with full info-string forwarding enabled (render: [full_info_string: true]). Full info-string forwarding is required for comrak to hand the highlight_lines_class attribute to the highlighter, so any application that uses the line-highlighting attributes already has it enabled.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows denial of service via deeply nested Markdown input.

mdex converts between an Elixir %MDEx.Document{} struct and Comrak's internal AST using two mutually recursive Rust functions, ex_document_to_comrak_ast and comrak_ast_to_ex_document, in the NIF source file document.rs. Neither function enforces a maximum nesting depth, so the recursion depth is bounded only by the structure of the input. An attacker who can get a Markdown document rendered (for example through MDEx.parse_document!/1 or MDEx.to_html/1) can supply a document with thousands of nested block quotes, which drives unbounded recursion across the NIF boundary and exhausts the native C stack.

Because the resulting stack overflow is an uncatchable SIGSEGV raised inside a NIF, it cannot be contained by the Erlang runtime. It terminates the operating system process running the BEAM, killing every Elixir and Erlang process on the node, not just the caller that triggered the render. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable conversion code was extracted from mdex into the separate mdex_native package starting in mdex 0.12.3. This issue affects mdex from 0.3.0 before 0.12.3 and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in leandrocp mdex and mdex_native allows an attacker who controls a rendered document to cause a denial of service through unbounded native memory exhaustion.

The native rendering code permanently leaks memory when rendering a document that contains escaped-tag nodes. The conversion of each %MDEx.EscapedTag{} node into its native representation (From for NodeValue in the Rust NIF) calls Box::leak on the caller-supplied literal string, which surrenders the backing allocation so that it lives for the entire lifetime of the operating system process and is never freed.

Both the byte length of each literal and the number of escaped-tag nodes in a document are attacker-controlled, and there is no size cap, rate limit, or string interning on this path. Every render of a document containing escaped-tag nodes therefore leaks literal_size x node_count bytes that can never be reclaimed, and repeated renders accumulate without bound. Rendering reaches this path through the public MDEx.to_html/1 entry point and any other API that renders a supplied %MDEx.Document{}.

Any application that uses mdex (or mdex_native directly) to render documents derived from user-supplied content is affected. Because the leaked memory is never reclaimed for the life of the BEAM process, an attacker can drive resident memory upward without limit until the node exhausts memory and crashes, taking down every process on it.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/types/document.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/types/document.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through unbounded memory allocation.

comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_highlight_lines in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs eagerly expands a user-controlled inclusive line range from a fenced code block's highlight_lines decorator into a Vec, pushing one element per integer in the range with no upper bound on the range size. An attacker who can supply Markdown that an application renders with MDEx.to_html/2 (for example a comment, chat message, or wiki page) can embed a code block whose info string is rust highlight_lines="1-100000000", forcing the native adapter to allocate roughly 8 bytes per line in the range.

A payload that differs by only a few bytes can therefore allocate hundreds of megabytes, and a sufficiently large range (for example 1-2000000000) exhausts host memory and aborts the BEAM, denying service to every user of the rendering process. The per-line write loop additionally tests membership with a linear scan over the same vector, degrading rendering to a quadratic cost even for ranges that do not immediately exhaust memory.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable code-block decorators: leave the github_pre_lang and full_info_string render options unset, or avoid configuring an inline syntax-highlight formatter, so that highlight_lines specifications are never parsed.

Configurations

Exploitation requires the application to enable code-block decorators. Decorators are active only when the render options github_pre_lang and full_info_string are both set and an inline syntax-highlight formatter (for example {:html_inline, ...}) is configured. Applications that render Markdown with the default options do not parse highlight_lines specifications and are not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows stored or reflected cross-site scripting via attacker-controlled Markdown.

When syntax highlighting and full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) are enabled, the Lumis adapter copies the value of a code fence's highlight_lines_class info-string attribute, unescaped, into the class attribute of every rendered line. comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_custom_attributes in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs shlex-parses the info string and stores each key=value pair verbatim, highlight_lines_config pulls highlight_lines_class into the per-line class value, and write_highlighted interpolates that value directly into the class attribute of the per-line . A single-quoted shell token preserves an inner double quote through shlex parsing, so a value such as '">alert(1)' terminates the class attribute early and the markup that follows is emitted as live HTML.

An attacker who can submit Markdown (through comments, posts, wiki pages, documentation, or any user-generated content) can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript that runs in the browser of every user who views the rendered output, enabling session theft, account takeover, and other client-side attacks. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.3 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) when rendering untrusted Markdown, which prevents the highlight_lines_class attribute from reaching the highlighter. Alternatively, restrict highlight_lines_class values to a safe character set (for example [A-Za-z0-9_- ]) before rendering.

Configurations

The vulnerable code path is only reachable when MDEx is configured with a syntax-highlighting formatter (for example syntax_highlight: [formatter: {:html_inline, ...}] or {:html_linked, ...}) and with full info-string forwarding enabled (render: [full_info_string: true]). Full info-string forwarding is required for comrak to hand the highlight_lines_class attribute to the highlighter, so any application that uses the line-highlighting attributes already has it enabled.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows denial of service via deeply nested Markdown input.

mdex converts between an Elixir %MDEx.Document{} struct and Comrak's internal AST using two mutually recursive Rust functions, ex_document_to_comrak_ast and comrak_ast_to_ex_document, in the NIF source file document.rs. Neither function enforces a maximum nesting depth, so the recursion depth is bounded only by the structure of the input. An attacker who can get a Markdown document rendered (for example through MDEx.parse_document!/1 or MDEx.to_html/1) can supply a document with thousands of nested block quotes, which drives unbounded recursion across the NIF boundary and exhausts the native C stack.

Because the resulting stack overflow is an uncatchable SIGSEGV raised inside a NIF, it cannot be contained by the Erlang runtime. It terminates the operating system process running the BEAM, killing every Elixir and Erlang process on the node, not just the caller that triggered the render. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable conversion code was extracted from mdex into the separate mdex_native package starting in mdex 0.12.3. This issue affects mdex from 0.3.0 before 0.12.3 and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in leandrocp mdex and mdex_native allows an attacker who controls a rendered document to cause a denial of service through unbounded native memory exhaustion.

The native rendering code permanently leaks memory when rendering a document that contains escaped-tag nodes. The conversion of each %MDEx.EscapedTag{} node into its native representation (From for NodeValue in the Rust NIF) calls Box::leak on the caller-supplied literal string, which surrenders the backing allocation so that it lives for the entire lifetime of the operating system process and is never freed.

Both the byte length of each literal and the number of escaped-tag nodes in a document are attacker-controlled, and there is no size cap, rate limit, or string interning on this path. Every render of a document containing escaped-tag nodes therefore leaks literal_size x node_count bytes that can never be reclaimed, and repeated renders accumulate without bound. Rendering reaches this path through the public MDEx.to_html/1 entry point and any other API that renders a supplied %MDEx.Document{}.

Any application that uses mdex (or mdex_native directly) to render documents derived from user-supplied content is affected. Because the leaked memory is never reclaimed for the life of the BEAM process, an attacker can drive resident memory upward without limit until the node exhausts memory and crashes, taking down every process on it.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/types/document.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/types/document.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through unbounded memory allocation.

comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_highlight_lines in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs eagerly expands a user-controlled inclusive line range from a fenced code block's highlight_lines decorator into a Vec, pushing one element per integer in the range with no upper bound on the range size. An attacker who can supply Markdown that an application renders with MDEx.to_html/2 (for example a comment, chat message, or wiki page) can embed a code block whose info string is rust highlight_lines="1-100000000", forcing the native adapter to allocate roughly 8 bytes per line in the range.

A payload that differs by only a few bytes can therefore allocate hundreds of megabytes, and a sufficiently large range (for example 1-2000000000) exhausts host memory and aborts the BEAM, denying service to every user of the rendering process. The per-line write loop additionally tests membership with a linear scan over the same vector, degrading rendering to a quadratic cost even for ranges that do not immediately exhaust memory.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable code-block decorators: leave the github_pre_lang and full_info_string render options unset, or avoid configuring an inline syntax-highlight formatter, so that highlight_lines specifications are never parsed.

Configurations

Exploitation requires the application to enable code-block decorators. Decorators are active only when the render options github_pre_lang and full_info_string are both set and an inline syntax-highlight formatter (for example {:html_inline, ...}) is configured. Applications that render Markdown with the default options do not parse highlight_lines specifications and are not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows stored or reflected cross-site scripting via attacker-controlled Markdown.

When syntax highlighting and full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) are enabled, the Lumis adapter copies the value of a code fence's highlight_lines_class info-string attribute, unescaped, into the class attribute of every rendered line. comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_custom_attributes in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs shlex-parses the info string and stores each key=value pair verbatim, highlight_lines_config pulls highlight_lines_class into the per-line class value, and write_highlighted interpolates that value directly into the class attribute of the per-line . A single-quoted shell token preserves an inner double quote through shlex parsing, so a value such as '">alert(1)' terminates the class attribute early and the markup that follows is emitted as live HTML.

An attacker who can submit Markdown (through comments, posts, wiki pages, documentation, or any user-generated content) can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript that runs in the browser of every user who views the rendered output, enabling session theft, account takeover, and other client-side attacks. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.3 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) when rendering untrusted Markdown, which prevents the highlight_lines_class attribute from reaching the highlighter. Alternatively, restrict highlight_lines_class values to a safe character set (for example [A-Za-z0-9_- ]) before rendering.

Configurations

The vulnerable code path is only reachable when MDEx is configured with a syntax-highlighting formatter (for example syntax_highlight: [formatter: {:html_inline, ...}] or {:html_linked, ...}) and with full info-string forwarding enabled (render: [full_info_string: true]). Full info-string forwarding is required for comrak to hand the highlight_lines_class attribute to the highlighter, so any application that uses the line-highlighting attributes already has it enabled.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows denial of service via deeply nested Markdown input.

mdex converts between an Elixir %MDEx.Document{} struct and Comrak's internal AST using two mutually recursive Rust functions, ex_document_to_comrak_ast and comrak_ast_to_ex_document, in the NIF source file document.rs. Neither function enforces a maximum nesting depth, so the recursion depth is bounded only by the structure of the input. An attacker who can get a Markdown document rendered (for example through MDEx.parse_document!/1 or MDEx.to_html/1) can supply a document with thousands of nested block quotes, which drives unbounded recursion across the NIF boundary and exhausts the native C stack.

Because the resulting stack overflow is an uncatchable SIGSEGV raised inside a NIF, it cannot be contained by the Erlang runtime. It terminates the operating system process running the BEAM, killing every Elixir and Erlang process on the node, not just the caller that triggered the render. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable conversion code was extracted from mdex into the separate mdex_native package starting in mdex 0.12.3. This issue affects mdex from 0.3.0 before 0.12.3 and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in leandrocp mdex and mdex_native allows an attacker who controls a rendered document to cause a denial of service through unbounded native memory exhaustion.

The native rendering code permanently leaks memory when rendering a document that contains escaped-tag nodes. The conversion of each %MDEx.EscapedTag{} node into its native representation (From for NodeValue in the Rust NIF) calls Box::leak on the caller-supplied literal string, which surrenders the backing allocation so that it lives for the entire lifetime of the operating system process and is never freed.

Both the byte length of each literal and the number of escaped-tag nodes in a document are attacker-controlled, and there is no size cap, rate limit, or string interning on this path. Every render of a document containing escaped-tag nodes therefore leaks literal_size x node_count bytes that can never be reclaimed, and repeated renders accumulate without bound. Rendering reaches this path through the public MDEx.to_html/1 entry point and any other API that renders a supplied %MDEx.Document{}.

Any application that uses mdex (or mdex_native directly) to render documents derived from user-supplied content is affected. Because the leaked memory is never reclaimed for the life of the BEAM process, an attacker can drive resident memory upward without limit until the node exhausts memory and crashes, taking down every process on it.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/types/document.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/types/document.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through unbounded memory allocation.

comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_highlight_lines in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs eagerly expands a user-controlled inclusive line range from a fenced code block's highlight_lines decorator into a Vec, pushing one element per integer in the range with no upper bound on the range size. An attacker who can supply Markdown that an application renders with MDEx.to_html/2 (for example a comment, chat message, or wiki page) can embed a code block whose info string is rust highlight_lines="1-100000000", forcing the native adapter to allocate roughly 8 bytes per line in the range.

A payload that differs by only a few bytes can therefore allocate hundreds of megabytes, and a sufficiently large range (for example 1-2000000000) exhausts host memory and aborts the BEAM, denying service to every user of the rendering process. The per-line write loop additionally tests membership with a linear scan over the same vector, degrading rendering to a quadratic cost even for ranges that do not immediately exhaust memory.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable code-block decorators: leave the github_pre_lang and full_info_string render options unset, or avoid configuring an inline syntax-highlight formatter, so that highlight_lines specifications are never parsed.

Configurations

Exploitation requires the application to enable code-block decorators. Decorators are active only when the render options github_pre_lang and full_info_string are both set and an inline syntax-highlight formatter (for example {:html_inline, ...}) is configured. Applications that render Markdown with the default options do not parse highlight_lines specifications and are not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows stored or reflected cross-site scripting via attacker-controlled Markdown.

When syntax highlighting and full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) are enabled, the Lumis adapter copies the value of a code fence's highlight_lines_class info-string attribute, unescaped, into the class attribute of every rendered line. comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_custom_attributes in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs shlex-parses the info string and stores each key=value pair verbatim, highlight_lines_config pulls highlight_lines_class into the per-line class value, and write_highlighted interpolates that value directly into the class attribute of the per-line . A single-quoted shell token preserves an inner double quote through shlex parsing, so a value such as '">alert(1)' terminates the class attribute early and the markup that follows is emitted as live HTML.

An attacker who can submit Markdown (through comments, posts, wiki pages, documentation, or any user-generated content) can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript that runs in the browser of every user who views the rendered output, enabling session theft, account takeover, and other client-side attacks. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.3 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) when rendering untrusted Markdown, which prevents the highlight_lines_class attribute from reaching the highlighter. Alternatively, restrict highlight_lines_class values to a safe character set (for example [A-Za-z0-9_- ]) before rendering.

Configurations

The vulnerable code path is only reachable when MDEx is configured with a syntax-highlighting formatter (for example syntax_highlight: [formatter: {:html_inline, ...}] or {:html_linked, ...}) and with full info-string forwarding enabled (render: [full_info_string: true]). Full info-string forwarding is required for comrak to hand the highlight_lines_class attribute to the highlighter, so any application that uses the line-highlighting attributes already has it enabled.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows denial of service via deeply nested Markdown input.

mdex converts between an Elixir %MDEx.Document{} struct and Comrak's internal AST using two mutually recursive Rust functions, ex_document_to_comrak_ast and comrak_ast_to_ex_document, in the NIF source file document.rs. Neither function enforces a maximum nesting depth, so the recursion depth is bounded only by the structure of the input. An attacker who can get a Markdown document rendered (for example through MDEx.parse_document!/1 or MDEx.to_html/1) can supply a document with thousands of nested block quotes, which drives unbounded recursion across the NIF boundary and exhausts the native C stack.

Because the resulting stack overflow is an uncatchable SIGSEGV raised inside a NIF, it cannot be contained by the Erlang runtime. It terminates the operating system process running the BEAM, killing every Elixir and Erlang process on the node, not just the caller that triggered the render. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable conversion code was extracted from mdex into the separate mdex_native package starting in mdex 0.12.3. This issue affects mdex from 0.3.0 before 0.12.3 and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in leandrocp mdex and mdex_native allows an attacker who controls a rendered document to cause a denial of service through unbounded native memory exhaustion.

The native rendering code permanently leaks memory when rendering a document that contains escaped-tag nodes. The conversion of each %MDEx.EscapedTag{} node into its native representation (From for NodeValue in the Rust NIF) calls Box::leak on the caller-supplied literal string, which surrenders the backing allocation so that it lives for the entire lifetime of the operating system process and is never freed.

Both the byte length of each literal and the number of escaped-tag nodes in a document are attacker-controlled, and there is no size cap, rate limit, or string interning on this path. Every render of a document containing escaped-tag nodes therefore leaks literal_size x node_count bytes that can never be reclaimed, and repeated renders accumulate without bound. Rendering reaches this path through the public MDEx.to_html/1 entry point and any other API that renders a supplied %MDEx.Document{}.

Any application that uses mdex (or mdex_native directly) to render documents derived from user-supplied content is affected. Because the leaked memory is never reclaimed for the life of the BEAM process, an attacker can drive resident memory upward without limit until the node exhausts memory and crashes, taking down every process on it.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/types/document.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/types/document.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through unbounded memory allocation.

comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_highlight_lines in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs eagerly expands a user-controlled inclusive line range from a fenced code block's highlight_lines decorator into a Vec, pushing one element per integer in the range with no upper bound on the range size. An attacker who can supply Markdown that an application renders with MDEx.to_html/2 (for example a comment, chat message, or wiki page) can embed a code block whose info string is rust highlight_lines="1-100000000", forcing the native adapter to allocate roughly 8 bytes per line in the range.

A payload that differs by only a few bytes can therefore allocate hundreds of megabytes, and a sufficiently large range (for example 1-2000000000) exhausts host memory and aborts the BEAM, denying service to every user of the rendering process. The per-line write loop additionally tests membership with a linear scan over the same vector, degrading rendering to a quadratic cost even for ranges that do not immediately exhaust memory.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable code-block decorators: leave the github_pre_lang and full_info_string render options unset, or avoid configuring an inline syntax-highlight formatter, so that highlight_lines specifications are never parsed.

Configurations

Exploitation requires the application to enable code-block decorators. Decorators are active only when the render options github_pre_lang and full_info_string are both set and an inline syntax-highlight formatter (for example {:html_inline, ...}) is configured. Applications that render Markdown with the default options do not parse highlight_lines specifications and are not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows stored or reflected cross-site scripting via attacker-controlled Markdown.

When syntax highlighting and full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) are enabled, the Lumis adapter copies the value of a code fence's highlight_lines_class info-string attribute, unescaped, into the class attribute of every rendered line. comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_custom_attributes in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs shlex-parses the info string and stores each key=value pair verbatim, highlight_lines_config pulls highlight_lines_class into the per-line class value, and write_highlighted interpolates that value directly into the class attribute of the per-line . A single-quoted shell token preserves an inner double quote through shlex parsing, so a value such as '">alert(1)' terminates the class attribute early and the markup that follows is emitted as live HTML.

An attacker who can submit Markdown (through comments, posts, wiki pages, documentation, or any user-generated content) can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript that runs in the browser of every user who views the rendered output, enabling session theft, account takeover, and other client-side attacks. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.3 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable full info-string forwarding (render: [full_info_string: true]) when rendering untrusted Markdown, which prevents the highlight_lines_class attribute from reaching the highlighter. Alternatively, restrict highlight_lines_class values to a safe character set (for example [A-Za-z0-9_- ]) before rendering.

Configurations

The vulnerable code path is only reachable when MDEx is configured with a syntax-highlighting formatter (for example syntax_highlight: [formatter: {:html_inline, ...}] or {:html_linked, ...}) and with full info-string forwarding enabled (render: [full_info_string: true]). Full info-string forwarding is required for comrak to hand the highlight_lines_class attribute to the highlighter, so any application that uses the line-highlighting attributes already has it enabled.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows denial of service via deeply nested Markdown input.

mdex converts between an Elixir %MDEx.Document{} struct and Comrak's internal AST using two mutually recursive Rust functions, ex_document_to_comrak_ast and comrak_ast_to_ex_document, in the NIF source file document.rs. Neither function enforces a maximum nesting depth, so the recursion depth is bounded only by the structure of the input. An attacker who can get a Markdown document rendered (for example through MDEx.parse_document!/1 or MDEx.to_html/1) can supply a document with thousands of nested block quotes, which drives unbounded recursion across the NIF boundary and exhausts the native C stack.

Because the resulting stack overflow is an uncatchable SIGSEGV raised inside a NIF, it cannot be contained by the Erlang runtime. It terminates the operating system process running the BEAM, killing every Elixir and Erlang process on the node, not just the caller that triggered the render. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable conversion code was extracted from mdex into the separate mdex_native package starting in mdex 0.12.3. This issue affects mdex from 0.3.0 before 0.12.3 and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in leandrocp mdex and mdex_native allows an attacker who controls a rendered document to cause a denial of service through unbounded native memory exhaustion.

The native rendering code permanently leaks memory when rendering a document that contains escaped-tag nodes. The conversion of each %MDEx.EscapedTag{} node into its native representation (From for NodeValue in the Rust NIF) calls Box::leak on the caller-supplied literal string, which surrenders the backing allocation so that it lives for the entire lifetime of the operating system process and is never freed.

Both the byte length of each literal and the number of escaped-tag nodes in a document are attacker-controlled, and there is no size cap, rate limit, or string interning on this path. Every render of a document containing escaped-tag nodes therefore leaks literal_size x node_count bytes that can never be reclaimed, and repeated renders accumulate without bound. Rendering reaches this path through the public MDEx.to_html/1 entry point and any other API that renders a supplied %MDEx.Document{}.

Any application that uses mdex (or mdex_native directly) to render documents derived from user-supplied content is affected. Because the leaked memory is never reclaimed for the life of the BEAM process, an attacker can drive resident memory upward without limit until the node exhausts memory and crashes, taking down every process on it.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/types/document.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/types/document.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through unbounded memory allocation.

comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_highlight_lines in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs eagerly expands a user-controlled inclusive line range from a fenced code block's highlight_lines decorator into a Vec, pushing one element per integer in the range with no upper bound on the range size. An attacker who can supply Markdown that an application renders with MDEx.to_html/2 (for example a comment, chat message, or wiki page) can embed a code block whose info string is rust highlight_lines="1-100000000", forcing the native adapter to allocate roughly 8 bytes per line in the range.

A payload that differs by only a few bytes can therefore allocate hundreds of megabytes, and a sufficiently large range (for example 1-2000000000) exhausts host memory and aborts the BEAM, denying service to every user of the rendering process. The per-line write loop additionally tests membership with a linear scan over the same vector, degrading rendering to a quadratic cost even for ranges that do not immediately exhaust memory.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable code-block decorators: leave the github_pre_lang and full_info_string render options unset, or avoid configuring an inline syntax-highlight formatter, so that highlight_lines specifications are never parsed.

Configurations

Exploitation requires the application to enable code-block decorators. Decorators are active only when the render options github_pre_lang and full_info_string are both set and an inline syntax-highlight formatter (for example {:html_inline, ...}) is configured. Applications that render Markdown with the default options do not parse highlight_lines specifications and are not affected.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows denial of service via deeply nested Markdown input.

mdex converts between an Elixir %MDEx.Document{} struct and Comrak's internal AST using two mutually recursive Rust functions, ex_document_to_comrak_ast and comrak_ast_to_ex_document, in the NIF source file document.rs. Neither function enforces a maximum nesting depth, so the recursion depth is bounded only by the structure of the input. An attacker who can get a Markdown document rendered (for example through MDEx.parse_document!/1 or MDEx.to_html/1) can supply a document with thousands of nested block quotes, which drives unbounded recursion across the NIF boundary and exhausts the native C stack.

Because the resulting stack overflow is an uncatchable SIGSEGV raised inside a NIF, it cannot be contained by the Erlang runtime. It terminates the operating system process running the BEAM, killing every Elixir and Erlang process on the node, not just the caller that triggered the render. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable conversion code was extracted from mdex into the separate mdex_native package starting in mdex 0.12.3. This issue affects mdex from 0.3.0 before 0.12.3 and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in leandrocp mdex and mdex_native allows an attacker who controls a rendered document to cause a denial of service through unbounded native memory exhaustion.

The native rendering code permanently leaks memory when rendering a document that contains escaped-tag nodes. The conversion of each %MDEx.EscapedTag{} node into its native representation (From for NodeValue in the Rust NIF) calls Box::leak on the caller-supplied literal string, which surrenders the backing allocation so that it lives for the entire lifetime of the operating system process and is never freed.

Both the byte length of each literal and the number of escaped-tag nodes in a document are attacker-controlled, and there is no size cap, rate limit, or string interning on this path. Every render of a document containing escaped-tag nodes therefore leaks literal_size x node_count bytes that can never be reclaimed, and repeated renders accumulate without bound. Rendering reaches this path through the public MDEx.to_html/1 entry point and any other API that renders a supplied %MDEx.Document{}.

Any application that uses mdex (or mdex_native directly) to render documents derived from user-supplied content is affected. Because the leaked memory is never reclaimed for the life of the BEAM process, an attacker can drive resident memory upward without limit until the node exhausts memory and crashes, taking down every process on it.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/types/document.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/types/document.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through unbounded memory allocation.

comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_highlight_lines in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs eagerly expands a user-controlled inclusive line range from a fenced code block's highlight_lines decorator into a Vec, pushing one element per integer in the range with no upper bound on the range size. An attacker who can supply Markdown that an application renders with MDEx.to_html/2 (for example a comment, chat message, or wiki page) can embed a code block whose info string is rust highlight_lines="1-100000000", forcing the native adapter to allocate roughly 8 bytes per line in the range.

A payload that differs by only a few bytes can therefore allocate hundreds of megabytes, and a sufficiently large range (for example 1-2000000000) exhausts host memory and aborts the BEAM, denying service to every user of the rendering process. The per-line write loop additionally tests membership with a linear scan over the same vector, degrading rendering to a quadratic cost even for ranges that do not immediately exhaust memory.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable code-block decorators: leave the github_pre_lang and full_info_string render options unset, or avoid configuring an inline syntax-highlight formatter, so that highlight_lines specifications are never parsed.

Configurations

Exploitation requires the application to enable code-block decorators. Decorators are active only when the render options github_pre_lang and full_info_string are both set and an inline syntax-highlight formatter (for example {:html_inline, ...}) is configured. Applications that render Markdown with the default options do not parse highlight_lines specifications and are not affected.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows denial of service via deeply nested Markdown input.

mdex converts between an Elixir %MDEx.Document{} struct and Comrak's internal AST using two mutually recursive Rust functions, ex_document_to_comrak_ast and comrak_ast_to_ex_document, in the NIF source file document.rs. Neither function enforces a maximum nesting depth, so the recursion depth is bounded only by the structure of the input. An attacker who can get a Markdown document rendered (for example through MDEx.parse_document!/1 or MDEx.to_html/1) can supply a document with thousands of nested block quotes, which drives unbounded recursion across the NIF boundary and exhausts the native C stack.

Because the resulting stack overflow is an uncatchable SIGSEGV raised inside a NIF, it cannot be contained by the Erlang runtime. It terminates the operating system process running the BEAM, killing every Elixir and Erlang process on the node, not just the caller that triggered the render. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable conversion code was extracted from mdex into the separate mdex_native package starting in mdex 0.12.3. This issue affects mdex from 0.3.0 before 0.12.3 and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime vulnerability in leandrocp mdex and mdex_native allows an attacker who controls a rendered document to cause a denial of service through unbounded native memory exhaustion.

The native rendering code permanently leaks memory when rendering a document that contains escaped-tag nodes. The conversion of each %MDEx.EscapedTag{} node into its native representation (From for NodeValue in the Rust NIF) calls Box::leak on the caller-supplied literal string, which surrenders the backing allocation so that it lives for the entire lifetime of the operating system process and is never freed.

Both the byte length of each literal and the number of escaped-tag nodes in a document are attacker-controlled, and there is no size cap, rate limit, or string interning on this path. Every render of a document containing escaped-tag nodes therefore leaks literal_size x node_count bytes that can never be reclaimed, and repeated renders accumulate without bound. Rendering reaches this path through the public MDEx.to_html/1 entry point and any other API that renders a supplied %MDEx.Document{}.

Any application that uses mdex (or mdex_native directly) to render documents derived from user-supplied content is affected. Because the leaked memory is never reclaimed for the life of the BEAM process, an attacker can drive resident memory upward without limit until the node exhausts memory and crashes, taking down every process on it.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/types/document.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/types/document.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through unbounded memory allocation.

comrak_nif::lumis_adapter::LumisAdapter::parse_highlight_lines in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs eagerly expands a user-controlled inclusive line range from a fenced code block's highlight_lines decorator into a Vec, pushing one element per integer in the range with no upper bound on the range size. An attacker who can supply Markdown that an application renders with MDEx.to_html/2 (for example a comment, chat message, or wiki page) can embed a code block whose info string is rust highlight_lines="1-100000000", forcing the native adapter to allocate roughly 8 bytes per line in the range.

A payload that differs by only a few bytes can therefore allocate hundreds of megabytes, and a sufficiently large range (for example 1-2000000000) exhausts host memory and aborts the BEAM, denying service to every user of the rendering process. The per-line write loop additionally tests membership with a linear scan over the same vector, degrading rendering to a quadratic cost even for ranges that do not immediately exhaust memory.

The vulnerable native code originally shipped inside mdex (in native/comrak_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs) and was later extracted into the separate mdex_native package (native/mdex_native_nif/src/lumis_adapter.rs), where it remains unpatched.

This issue affects mdex from 0.11.0 before 0.12.3, and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Workarounds

Do not enable code-block decorators: leave the github_pre_lang and full_info_string render options unset, or avoid configuring an inline syntax-highlight formatter, so that highlight_lines specifications are never parsed.

Configurations

Exploitation requires the application to enable code-block decorators. Decorators are active only when the render options github_pre_lang and full_info_string are both set and an inline syntax-highlight formatter (for example {:html_inline, ...}) is configured. Applications that render Markdown with the default options do not parse highlight_lines specifications and are not affected.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows denial of service via deeply nested Markdown input.

mdex converts between an Elixir %MDEx.Document{} struct and Comrak's internal AST using two mutually recursive Rust functions, ex_document_to_comrak_ast and comrak_ast_to_ex_document, in the NIF source file document.rs. Neither function enforces a maximum nesting depth, so the recursion depth is bounded only by the structure of the input. An attacker who can get a Markdown document rendered (for example through MDEx.parse_document!/1 or MDEx.to_html/1) can supply a document with thousands of nested block quotes, which drives unbounded recursion across the NIF boundary and exhausts the native C stack.

Because the resulting stack overflow is an uncatchable SIGSEGV raised inside a NIF, it cannot be contained by the Erlang runtime. It terminates the operating system process running the BEAM, killing every Elixir and Erlang process on the node, not just the caller that triggered the render. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable conversion code was extracted from mdex into the separate mdex_native package starting in mdex 0.12.3. This issue affects mdex from 0.3.0 before 0.12.3 and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).

Summary

Uncontrolled Recursion vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows denial of service via deeply nested Markdown input.

mdex converts between an Elixir %MDEx.Document{} struct and Comrak's internal AST using two mutually recursive Rust functions, ex_document_to_comrak_ast and comrak_ast_to_ex_document, in the NIF source file document.rs. Neither function enforces a maximum nesting depth, so the recursion depth is bounded only by the structure of the input. An attacker who can get a Markdown document rendered (for example through MDEx.parse_document!/1 or MDEx.to_html/1) can supply a document with thousands of nested block quotes, which drives unbounded recursion across the NIF boundary and exhausts the native C stack.

Because the resulting stack overflow is an uncatchable SIGSEGV raised inside a NIF, it cannot be contained by the Erlang runtime. It terminates the operating system process running the BEAM, killing every Elixir and Erlang process on the node, not just the caller that triggered the render. No authentication or special privileges are required.

The vulnerable conversion code was extracted from mdex into the separate mdex_native package starting in mdex 0.12.3. This issue affects mdex from 0.3.0 before 0.12.3 and mdex_native from 0.1.0 before 0.2.3.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in leandrocp MDEx allows Excessive Allocation.

MDEx.parse_document/2 accepts a {:json, json} source. In lib/mdex.ex, the private json_to_node/1 function passes the attacker-controlled node_type value to Module.concat/1, which calls String.to_atom/1 and interns a brand-new atom for every distinct value. Atoms are never garbage collected on the BEAM, so a crafted JSON document carrying a unique node_type at each (deeply nested) node mints one permanent atom per node.

A single document can intern hundreds of thousands of atoms, and a large enough document exhausts the default atom table (around 1,048,576 atoms) and aborts the entire Erlang VM, taking down every process on the node. Any application that passes untrusted input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document is exposed to an unauthenticated denial-of-service.

This issue affects mdex from 0.4.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or attacker-controlled input to the {:json, ...} source of MDEx.parse_document/2. The {:markdown, ...} source is not affected.

Summary

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in leandrocp mdex allows cross-site scripting via unsanitized URL schemes in Quill Delta output.

'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 converts Markdown into a Quill Delta. 'Elixir.MDEx.DeltaConverter':default_convert_node/3 in lib/mdex/delta_converter.ex copies the URL of a link, wikilink, or image node directly from the parsed Markdown into the Delta "link" or "image" attribute without applying a scheme allowlist or any normalization.

An attacker who controls the Markdown text can supply a javascript: URL (for example [click](javascript:alert(document.cookie))) that survives verbatim into the Delta attribute. When the Delta is rendered to HTML by a downstream renderer (such as quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client), the attribute becomes an or , and the javascript: scheme executes in the browser of anyone who views the rendered content. The link and wikilink cases are the strongest vectors because javascript: in an href executes on click; the image case is lower impact because javascript: in generally does not execute in modern browsers.

This issue affects mdex: from 0.8.3 before 0.13.2.

Workarounds

Sanitize the Quill Delta produced by 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 before rendering it: drop or blank any "link" or "image" value whose URL scheme is not in a safe allowlist (http, https, mailto, tel).

Configurations

The application must pass untrusted Markdown to 'Elixir.MDEx':to_delta/2 and then render the resulting Quill Delta to HTML with a renderer that maps the "link" and "image" attributes to href and src without applying its own URL scheme sanitization (for example quill-delta-to-html or the Quill client).