ash_admin

Summary

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin allows writing attacker-controlled bytes to arbitrary paths on the server.

AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Form.consume_file_uploads/1 builds the destination as Path.join([tmp_dir, entry.client_name]) and writes it with File.cp!/2. entry.client_name is the browser-supplied filename and is not sanitized, and Path.join/1 does not normalize ... An upload named ../../../../var/www/app/priv/static/x.png therefore escapes the random temp directory and lands anywhere the BEAM user can write, enabling arbitrary file write and potentially remote code execution by overwriting application assets, configuration, or cron/ssh files. The only guard is an extension allowlist defaulting to :any that checks only the extension. The fix strips path components with Path.basename/1 before joining.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.7 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.

AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The resource has a composite primary key, and the deployment relies on AshAdmin's authorization (a custom actor plug and policies) so that reading otherwise-restricted attribute values crosses a boundary.

Summary

Use of Insufficiently Random Values vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin ships a hardcoded, publicly known CSP nonce, defeating nonce-based Content-Security-Policy protection.

When mounted without :csp_nonce_assign_key, AshAdmin.Router.ash_admin/2 defaulted the img, style, and script nonces to the literal constant ash_admin-Ed55GFnX, which AshAdmin.Layouts wrote verbatim into the nonce attribute of its inline <style> and <script> tags on every response. The value is a compile-time constant published in the repository and is never rotated per request. If an application's CSP script-src allow-lists that documented default, any HTML-injection sink on an admin page can reuse the known nonce to run inline scripts the policy was meant to block. The fix generates a fresh random nonce per request.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.10.8 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The application mounts AshAdmin without :csp_nonce_assign_key and enforces a nonce-based CSP whose script-src allow-lists the default ash_admin-Ed55GFnX value, and has a separate HTML-injection sink on an admin page.

Summary

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a record's string primary key rewrite the target of AshAdmin's row-action links.

The Table, DataTable, and Show components built row-action URLs by raw string interpolation, splicing the primary key (and table, domain, and resource names) into the query string without URL-encoding. Ash resources routinely use user-settable string primary keys (slugs, emails). Because Plug.Conn.Query resolves duplicate parameters last-wins and primary_key is interpolated last, a stored key such as foo&action_type=destroy injects parameters that override the link, so an admin clicking edit is sent to a destroy form or an arbitrary resource; a # truncates the query into a fragment. The fix builds every link with URI.encode_query/1, encoding all interpolated values.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.3.0-rc.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin executes attacker-supplied record content as script in an administrator's browser.

The relationship typeahead components AshAdmin.Components.Resource.RelationshipField and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.ManagedRelationshipSelectField highlight the matched search term by wrapping it in <b> tags and rendering the whole string with Phoenix.HTML.raw/1. The highlighted value is the destination record's label_field, ordinary database content that is often written by lower-privileged users. Because raw/1 disables output escaping for the entire string, a stored label such as <img src=x onerror=...> runs as JavaScript in the admin's session as soon as a matching record appears in the dropdown, giving the attacker the admin's privileges over everything AshAdmin exposes. The fix HTML-escapes the label before inserting the highlight markup.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets any client that can reach the admin LiveView exhaust the BEAM atom table and crash the entire node.

Two LiveView event handlers interned atoms from unvalidated client input: AshAdmin.PageLive's set_actor built modules from the resource/domain payload with Module.concat/1, and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Show's calculate converted every submitted form key with String.to_atom/1. Atoms are never garbage collected and the table is capped, so flooding either event with random names mints a new atom per request until the VM aborts, taking down every application on the node. The fix resolves the submitted resource/domain against the known shown resources and maps calculation keys to declared arguments, so no client-supplied string is interned.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a sibling subdomain rebind an admin's session to a different actor, tenant, or authorization mode.

AshAdmin's client JavaScript read its state cookies (tenant, actor_resource, actor_primary_key, actor_action, actor_domain, actor_authorizing, actor_paused) by matching the cookie name with an unanchored regular expression (new RegExp(name + "=([^;]+)")) against the whole document.cookie. Any cookie whose name merely ends with the requested name therefore matches, and whichever is serialized first wins. Because cookies are shared across a registrable domain, a compromised sibling subdomain can set a shadowing cookie (for example xactor_authorizing) with Domain=.example.com that flows unvalidated into the admin's LiveSocket connect params. The fix matches cookie names by exact equality.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.9.1 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin allows writing attacker-controlled bytes to arbitrary paths on the server.

AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Form.consume_file_uploads/1 builds the destination as Path.join([tmp_dir, entry.client_name]) and writes it with File.cp!/2. entry.client_name is the browser-supplied filename and is not sanitized, and Path.join/1 does not normalize ... An upload named ../../../../var/www/app/priv/static/x.png therefore escapes the random temp directory and lands anywhere the BEAM user can write, enabling arbitrary file write and potentially remote code execution by overwriting application assets, configuration, or cron/ssh files. The only guard is an extension allowlist defaulting to :any that checks only the extension. The fix strips path components with Path.basename/1 before joining.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.7 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.

AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The resource has a composite primary key, and the deployment relies on AshAdmin's authorization (a custom actor plug and policies) so that reading otherwise-restricted attribute values crosses a boundary.

Summary

Use of Insufficiently Random Values vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin ships a hardcoded, publicly known CSP nonce, defeating nonce-based Content-Security-Policy protection.

When mounted without :csp_nonce_assign_key, AshAdmin.Router.ash_admin/2 defaulted the img, style, and script nonces to the literal constant ash_admin-Ed55GFnX, which AshAdmin.Layouts wrote verbatim into the nonce attribute of its inline <style> and <script> tags on every response. The value is a compile-time constant published in the repository and is never rotated per request. If an application's CSP script-src allow-lists that documented default, any HTML-injection sink on an admin page can reuse the known nonce to run inline scripts the policy was meant to block. The fix generates a fresh random nonce per request.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.10.8 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The application mounts AshAdmin without :csp_nonce_assign_key and enforces a nonce-based CSP whose script-src allow-lists the default ash_admin-Ed55GFnX value, and has a separate HTML-injection sink on an admin page.

Summary

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a record's string primary key rewrite the target of AshAdmin's row-action links.

The Table, DataTable, and Show components built row-action URLs by raw string interpolation, splicing the primary key (and table, domain, and resource names) into the query string without URL-encoding. Ash resources routinely use user-settable string primary keys (slugs, emails). Because Plug.Conn.Query resolves duplicate parameters last-wins and primary_key is interpolated last, a stored key such as foo&action_type=destroy injects parameters that override the link, so an admin clicking edit is sent to a destroy form or an arbitrary resource; a # truncates the query into a fragment. The fix builds every link with URI.encode_query/1, encoding all interpolated values.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.3.0-rc.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin executes attacker-supplied record content as script in an administrator's browser.

The relationship typeahead components AshAdmin.Components.Resource.RelationshipField and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.ManagedRelationshipSelectField highlight the matched search term by wrapping it in <b> tags and rendering the whole string with Phoenix.HTML.raw/1. The highlighted value is the destination record's label_field, ordinary database content that is often written by lower-privileged users. Because raw/1 disables output escaping for the entire string, a stored label such as <img src=x onerror=...> runs as JavaScript in the admin's session as soon as a matching record appears in the dropdown, giving the attacker the admin's privileges over everything AshAdmin exposes. The fix HTML-escapes the label before inserting the highlight markup.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets any client that can reach the admin LiveView exhaust the BEAM atom table and crash the entire node.

Two LiveView event handlers interned atoms from unvalidated client input: AshAdmin.PageLive's set_actor built modules from the resource/domain payload with Module.concat/1, and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Show's calculate converted every submitted form key with String.to_atom/1. Atoms are never garbage collected and the table is capped, so flooding either event with random names mints a new atom per request until the VM aborts, taking down every application on the node. The fix resolves the submitted resource/domain against the known shown resources and maps calculation keys to declared arguments, so no client-supplied string is interned.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a sibling subdomain rebind an admin's session to a different actor, tenant, or authorization mode.

AshAdmin's client JavaScript read its state cookies (tenant, actor_resource, actor_primary_key, actor_action, actor_domain, actor_authorizing, actor_paused) by matching the cookie name with an unanchored regular expression (new RegExp(name + "=([^;]+)")) against the whole document.cookie. Any cookie whose name merely ends with the requested name therefore matches, and whichever is serialized first wins. Because cookies are shared across a registrable domain, a compromised sibling subdomain can set a shadowing cookie (for example xactor_authorizing) with Domain=.example.com that flows unvalidated into the admin's LiveSocket connect params. The fix matches cookie names by exact equality.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.9.1 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin allows writing attacker-controlled bytes to arbitrary paths on the server.

AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Form.consume_file_uploads/1 builds the destination as Path.join([tmp_dir, entry.client_name]) and writes it with File.cp!/2. entry.client_name is the browser-supplied filename and is not sanitized, and Path.join/1 does not normalize ... An upload named ../../../../var/www/app/priv/static/x.png therefore escapes the random temp directory and lands anywhere the BEAM user can write, enabling arbitrary file write and potentially remote code execution by overwriting application assets, configuration, or cron/ssh files. The only guard is an extension allowlist defaulting to :any that checks only the extension. The fix strips path components with Path.basename/1 before joining.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.7 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.

AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The resource has a composite primary key, and the deployment relies on AshAdmin's authorization (a custom actor plug and policies) so that reading otherwise-restricted attribute values crosses a boundary.

Summary

Use of Insufficiently Random Values vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin ships a hardcoded, publicly known CSP nonce, defeating nonce-based Content-Security-Policy protection.

When mounted without :csp_nonce_assign_key, AshAdmin.Router.ash_admin/2 defaulted the img, style, and script nonces to the literal constant ash_admin-Ed55GFnX, which AshAdmin.Layouts wrote verbatim into the nonce attribute of its inline <style> and <script> tags on every response. The value is a compile-time constant published in the repository and is never rotated per request. If an application's CSP script-src allow-lists that documented default, any HTML-injection sink on an admin page can reuse the known nonce to run inline scripts the policy was meant to block. The fix generates a fresh random nonce per request.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.10.8 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The application mounts AshAdmin without :csp_nonce_assign_key and enforces a nonce-based CSP whose script-src allow-lists the default ash_admin-Ed55GFnX value, and has a separate HTML-injection sink on an admin page.

Summary

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a record's string primary key rewrite the target of AshAdmin's row-action links.

The Table, DataTable, and Show components built row-action URLs by raw string interpolation, splicing the primary key (and table, domain, and resource names) into the query string without URL-encoding. Ash resources routinely use user-settable string primary keys (slugs, emails). Because Plug.Conn.Query resolves duplicate parameters last-wins and primary_key is interpolated last, a stored key such as foo&action_type=destroy injects parameters that override the link, so an admin clicking edit is sent to a destroy form or an arbitrary resource; a # truncates the query into a fragment. The fix builds every link with URI.encode_query/1, encoding all interpolated values.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.3.0-rc.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin executes attacker-supplied record content as script in an administrator's browser.

The relationship typeahead components AshAdmin.Components.Resource.RelationshipField and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.ManagedRelationshipSelectField highlight the matched search term by wrapping it in <b> tags and rendering the whole string with Phoenix.HTML.raw/1. The highlighted value is the destination record's label_field, ordinary database content that is often written by lower-privileged users. Because raw/1 disables output escaping for the entire string, a stored label such as <img src=x onerror=...> runs as JavaScript in the admin's session as soon as a matching record appears in the dropdown, giving the attacker the admin's privileges over everything AshAdmin exposes. The fix HTML-escapes the label before inserting the highlight markup.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets any client that can reach the admin LiveView exhaust the BEAM atom table and crash the entire node.

Two LiveView event handlers interned atoms from unvalidated client input: AshAdmin.PageLive's set_actor built modules from the resource/domain payload with Module.concat/1, and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Show's calculate converted every submitted form key with String.to_atom/1. Atoms are never garbage collected and the table is capped, so flooding either event with random names mints a new atom per request until the VM aborts, taking down every application on the node. The fix resolves the submitted resource/domain against the known shown resources and maps calculation keys to declared arguments, so no client-supplied string is interned.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a sibling subdomain rebind an admin's session to a different actor, tenant, or authorization mode.

AshAdmin's client JavaScript read its state cookies (tenant, actor_resource, actor_primary_key, actor_action, actor_domain, actor_authorizing, actor_paused) by matching the cookie name with an unanchored regular expression (new RegExp(name + "=([^;]+)")) against the whole document.cookie. Any cookie whose name merely ends with the requested name therefore matches, and whichever is serialized first wins. Because cookies are shared across a registrable domain, a compromised sibling subdomain can set a shadowing cookie (for example xactor_authorizing) with Domain=.example.com that flows unvalidated into the admin's LiveSocket connect params. The fix matches cookie names by exact equality.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.9.1 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin allows writing attacker-controlled bytes to arbitrary paths on the server.

AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Form.consume_file_uploads/1 builds the destination as Path.join([tmp_dir, entry.client_name]) and writes it with File.cp!/2. entry.client_name is the browser-supplied filename and is not sanitized, and Path.join/1 does not normalize ... An upload named ../../../../var/www/app/priv/static/x.png therefore escapes the random temp directory and lands anywhere the BEAM user can write, enabling arbitrary file write and potentially remote code execution by overwriting application assets, configuration, or cron/ssh files. The only guard is an extension allowlist defaulting to :any that checks only the extension. The fix strips path components with Path.basename/1 before joining.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.7 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.

AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The resource has a composite primary key, and the deployment relies on AshAdmin's authorization (a custom actor plug and policies) so that reading otherwise-restricted attribute values crosses a boundary.

Summary

Use of Insufficiently Random Values vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin ships a hardcoded, publicly known CSP nonce, defeating nonce-based Content-Security-Policy protection.

When mounted without :csp_nonce_assign_key, AshAdmin.Router.ash_admin/2 defaulted the img, style, and script nonces to the literal constant ash_admin-Ed55GFnX, which AshAdmin.Layouts wrote verbatim into the nonce attribute of its inline <style> and <script> tags on every response. The value is a compile-time constant published in the repository and is never rotated per request. If an application's CSP script-src allow-lists that documented default, any HTML-injection sink on an admin page can reuse the known nonce to run inline scripts the policy was meant to block. The fix generates a fresh random nonce per request.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.10.8 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The application mounts AshAdmin without :csp_nonce_assign_key and enforces a nonce-based CSP whose script-src allow-lists the default ash_admin-Ed55GFnX value, and has a separate HTML-injection sink on an admin page.

Summary

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a record's string primary key rewrite the target of AshAdmin's row-action links.

The Table, DataTable, and Show components built row-action URLs by raw string interpolation, splicing the primary key (and table, domain, and resource names) into the query string without URL-encoding. Ash resources routinely use user-settable string primary keys (slugs, emails). Because Plug.Conn.Query resolves duplicate parameters last-wins and primary_key is interpolated last, a stored key such as foo&action_type=destroy injects parameters that override the link, so an admin clicking edit is sent to a destroy form or an arbitrary resource; a # truncates the query into a fragment. The fix builds every link with URI.encode_query/1, encoding all interpolated values.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.3.0-rc.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin executes attacker-supplied record content as script in an administrator's browser.

The relationship typeahead components AshAdmin.Components.Resource.RelationshipField and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.ManagedRelationshipSelectField highlight the matched search term by wrapping it in <b> tags and rendering the whole string with Phoenix.HTML.raw/1. The highlighted value is the destination record's label_field, ordinary database content that is often written by lower-privileged users. Because raw/1 disables output escaping for the entire string, a stored label such as <img src=x onerror=...> runs as JavaScript in the admin's session as soon as a matching record appears in the dropdown, giving the attacker the admin's privileges over everything AshAdmin exposes. The fix HTML-escapes the label before inserting the highlight markup.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets any client that can reach the admin LiveView exhaust the BEAM atom table and crash the entire node.

Two LiveView event handlers interned atoms from unvalidated client input: AshAdmin.PageLive's set_actor built modules from the resource/domain payload with Module.concat/1, and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Show's calculate converted every submitted form key with String.to_atom/1. Atoms are never garbage collected and the table is capped, so flooding either event with random names mints a new atom per request until the VM aborts, taking down every application on the node. The fix resolves the submitted resource/domain against the known shown resources and maps calculation keys to declared arguments, so no client-supplied string is interned.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a sibling subdomain rebind an admin's session to a different actor, tenant, or authorization mode.

AshAdmin's client JavaScript read its state cookies (tenant, actor_resource, actor_primary_key, actor_action, actor_domain, actor_authorizing, actor_paused) by matching the cookie name with an unanchored regular expression (new RegExp(name + "=([^;]+)")) against the whole document.cookie. Any cookie whose name merely ends with the requested name therefore matches, and whichever is serialized first wins. Because cookies are shared across a registrable domain, a compromised sibling subdomain can set a shadowing cookie (for example xactor_authorizing) with Domain=.example.com that flows unvalidated into the admin's LiveSocket connect params. The fix matches cookie names by exact equality.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.9.1 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin allows writing attacker-controlled bytes to arbitrary paths on the server.

AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Form.consume_file_uploads/1 builds the destination as Path.join([tmp_dir, entry.client_name]) and writes it with File.cp!/2. entry.client_name is the browser-supplied filename and is not sanitized, and Path.join/1 does not normalize ... An upload named ../../../../var/www/app/priv/static/x.png therefore escapes the random temp directory and lands anywhere the BEAM user can write, enabling arbitrary file write and potentially remote code execution by overwriting application assets, configuration, or cron/ssh files. The only guard is an extension allowlist defaulting to :any that checks only the extension. The fix strips path components with Path.basename/1 before joining.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.7 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.

AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The resource has a composite primary key, and the deployment relies on AshAdmin's authorization (a custom actor plug and policies) so that reading otherwise-restricted attribute values crosses a boundary.

Summary

Use of Insufficiently Random Values vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin ships a hardcoded, publicly known CSP nonce, defeating nonce-based Content-Security-Policy protection.

When mounted without :csp_nonce_assign_key, AshAdmin.Router.ash_admin/2 defaulted the img, style, and script nonces to the literal constant ash_admin-Ed55GFnX, which AshAdmin.Layouts wrote verbatim into the nonce attribute of its inline <style> and <script> tags on every response. The value is a compile-time constant published in the repository and is never rotated per request. If an application's CSP script-src allow-lists that documented default, any HTML-injection sink on an admin page can reuse the known nonce to run inline scripts the policy was meant to block. The fix generates a fresh random nonce per request.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.10.8 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The application mounts AshAdmin without :csp_nonce_assign_key and enforces a nonce-based CSP whose script-src allow-lists the default ash_admin-Ed55GFnX value, and has a separate HTML-injection sink on an admin page.

Summary

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a record's string primary key rewrite the target of AshAdmin's row-action links.

The Table, DataTable, and Show components built row-action URLs by raw string interpolation, splicing the primary key (and table, domain, and resource names) into the query string without URL-encoding. Ash resources routinely use user-settable string primary keys (slugs, emails). Because Plug.Conn.Query resolves duplicate parameters last-wins and primary_key is interpolated last, a stored key such as foo&action_type=destroy injects parameters that override the link, so an admin clicking edit is sent to a destroy form or an arbitrary resource; a # truncates the query into a fragment. The fix builds every link with URI.encode_query/1, encoding all interpolated values.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.3.0-rc.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin executes attacker-supplied record content as script in an administrator's browser.

The relationship typeahead components AshAdmin.Components.Resource.RelationshipField and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.ManagedRelationshipSelectField highlight the matched search term by wrapping it in <b> tags and rendering the whole string with Phoenix.HTML.raw/1. The highlighted value is the destination record's label_field, ordinary database content that is often written by lower-privileged users. Because raw/1 disables output escaping for the entire string, a stored label such as <img src=x onerror=...> runs as JavaScript in the admin's session as soon as a matching record appears in the dropdown, giving the attacker the admin's privileges over everything AshAdmin exposes. The fix HTML-escapes the label before inserting the highlight markup.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets any client that can reach the admin LiveView exhaust the BEAM atom table and crash the entire node.

Two LiveView event handlers interned atoms from unvalidated client input: AshAdmin.PageLive's set_actor built modules from the resource/domain payload with Module.concat/1, and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Show's calculate converted every submitted form key with String.to_atom/1. Atoms are never garbage collected and the table is capped, so flooding either event with random names mints a new atom per request until the VM aborts, taking down every application on the node. The fix resolves the submitted resource/domain against the known shown resources and maps calculation keys to declared arguments, so no client-supplied string is interned.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a sibling subdomain rebind an admin's session to a different actor, tenant, or authorization mode.

AshAdmin's client JavaScript read its state cookies (tenant, actor_resource, actor_primary_key, actor_action, actor_domain, actor_authorizing, actor_paused) by matching the cookie name with an unanchored regular expression (new RegExp(name + "=([^;]+)")) against the whole document.cookie. Any cookie whose name merely ends with the requested name therefore matches, and whichever is serialized first wins. Because cookies are shared across a registrable domain, a compromised sibling subdomain can set a shadowing cookie (for example xactor_authorizing) with Domain=.example.com that flows unvalidated into the admin's LiveSocket connect params. The fix matches cookie names by exact equality.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.9.1 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin allows writing attacker-controlled bytes to arbitrary paths on the server.

AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Form.consume_file_uploads/1 builds the destination as Path.join([tmp_dir, entry.client_name]) and writes it with File.cp!/2. entry.client_name is the browser-supplied filename and is not sanitized, and Path.join/1 does not normalize ... An upload named ../../../../var/www/app/priv/static/x.png therefore escapes the random temp directory and lands anywhere the BEAM user can write, enabling arbitrary file write and potentially remote code execution by overwriting application assets, configuration, or cron/ssh files. The only guard is an extension allowlist defaulting to :any that checks only the extension. The fix strips path components with Path.basename/1 before joining.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.7 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.

AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The resource has a composite primary key, and the deployment relies on AshAdmin's authorization (a custom actor plug and policies) so that reading otherwise-restricted attribute values crosses a boundary.

Summary

Use of Insufficiently Random Values vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin ships a hardcoded, publicly known CSP nonce, defeating nonce-based Content-Security-Policy protection.

When mounted without :csp_nonce_assign_key, AshAdmin.Router.ash_admin/2 defaulted the img, style, and script nonces to the literal constant ash_admin-Ed55GFnX, which AshAdmin.Layouts wrote verbatim into the nonce attribute of its inline <style> and <script> tags on every response. The value is a compile-time constant published in the repository and is never rotated per request. If an application's CSP script-src allow-lists that documented default, any HTML-injection sink on an admin page can reuse the known nonce to run inline scripts the policy was meant to block. The fix generates a fresh random nonce per request.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.10.8 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The application mounts AshAdmin without :csp_nonce_assign_key and enforces a nonce-based CSP whose script-src allow-lists the default ash_admin-Ed55GFnX value, and has a separate HTML-injection sink on an admin page.

Summary

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a record's string primary key rewrite the target of AshAdmin's row-action links.

The Table, DataTable, and Show components built row-action URLs by raw string interpolation, splicing the primary key (and table, domain, and resource names) into the query string without URL-encoding. Ash resources routinely use user-settable string primary keys (slugs, emails). Because Plug.Conn.Query resolves duplicate parameters last-wins and primary_key is interpolated last, a stored key such as foo&action_type=destroy injects parameters that override the link, so an admin clicking edit is sent to a destroy form or an arbitrary resource; a # truncates the query into a fragment. The fix builds every link with URI.encode_query/1, encoding all interpolated values.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.3.0-rc.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin executes attacker-supplied record content as script in an administrator's browser.

The relationship typeahead components AshAdmin.Components.Resource.RelationshipField and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.ManagedRelationshipSelectField highlight the matched search term by wrapping it in <b> tags and rendering the whole string with Phoenix.HTML.raw/1. The highlighted value is the destination record's label_field, ordinary database content that is often written by lower-privileged users. Because raw/1 disables output escaping for the entire string, a stored label such as <img src=x onerror=...> runs as JavaScript in the admin's session as soon as a matching record appears in the dropdown, giving the attacker the admin's privileges over everything AshAdmin exposes. The fix HTML-escapes the label before inserting the highlight markup.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets any client that can reach the admin LiveView exhaust the BEAM atom table and crash the entire node.

Two LiveView event handlers interned atoms from unvalidated client input: AshAdmin.PageLive's set_actor built modules from the resource/domain payload with Module.concat/1, and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Show's calculate converted every submitted form key with String.to_atom/1. Atoms are never garbage collected and the table is capped, so flooding either event with random names mints a new atom per request until the VM aborts, taking down every application on the node. The fix resolves the submitted resource/domain against the known shown resources and maps calculation keys to declared arguments, so no client-supplied string is interned.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a sibling subdomain rebind an admin's session to a different actor, tenant, or authorization mode.

AshAdmin's client JavaScript read its state cookies (tenant, actor_resource, actor_primary_key, actor_action, actor_domain, actor_authorizing, actor_paused) by matching the cookie name with an unanchored regular expression (new RegExp(name + "=([^;]+)")) against the whole document.cookie. Any cookie whose name merely ends with the requested name therefore matches, and whichever is serialized first wins. Because cookies are shared across a registrable domain, a compromised sibling subdomain can set a shadowing cookie (for example xactor_authorizing) with Domain=.example.com that flows unvalidated into the admin's LiveSocket connect params. The fix matches cookie names by exact equality.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.9.1 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin allows writing attacker-controlled bytes to arbitrary paths on the server.

AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Form.consume_file_uploads/1 builds the destination as Path.join([tmp_dir, entry.client_name]) and writes it with File.cp!/2. entry.client_name is the browser-supplied filename and is not sanitized, and Path.join/1 does not normalize ... An upload named ../../../../var/www/app/priv/static/x.png therefore escapes the random temp directory and lands anywhere the BEAM user can write, enabling arbitrary file write and potentially remote code execution by overwriting application assets, configuration, or cron/ssh files. The only guard is an extension allowlist defaulting to :any that checks only the extension. The fix strips path components with Path.basename/1 before joining.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.7 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.

AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The resource has a composite primary key, and the deployment relies on AshAdmin's authorization (a custom actor plug and policies) so that reading otherwise-restricted attribute values crosses a boundary.

Summary

Use of Insufficiently Random Values vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin ships a hardcoded, publicly known CSP nonce, defeating nonce-based Content-Security-Policy protection.

When mounted without :csp_nonce_assign_key, AshAdmin.Router.ash_admin/2 defaulted the img, style, and script nonces to the literal constant ash_admin-Ed55GFnX, which AshAdmin.Layouts wrote verbatim into the nonce attribute of its inline <style> and <script> tags on every response. The value is a compile-time constant published in the repository and is never rotated per request. If an application's CSP script-src allow-lists that documented default, any HTML-injection sink on an admin page can reuse the known nonce to run inline scripts the policy was meant to block. The fix generates a fresh random nonce per request.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.10.8 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The application mounts AshAdmin without :csp_nonce_assign_key and enforces a nonce-based CSP whose script-src allow-lists the default ash_admin-Ed55GFnX value, and has a separate HTML-injection sink on an admin page.

Summary

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a record's string primary key rewrite the target of AshAdmin's row-action links.

The Table, DataTable, and Show components built row-action URLs by raw string interpolation, splicing the primary key (and table, domain, and resource names) into the query string without URL-encoding. Ash resources routinely use user-settable string primary keys (slugs, emails). Because Plug.Conn.Query resolves duplicate parameters last-wins and primary_key is interpolated last, a stored key such as foo&action_type=destroy injects parameters that override the link, so an admin clicking edit is sent to a destroy form or an arbitrary resource; a # truncates the query into a fragment. The fix builds every link with URI.encode_query/1, encoding all interpolated values.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.3.0-rc.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin executes attacker-supplied record content as script in an administrator's browser.

The relationship typeahead components AshAdmin.Components.Resource.RelationshipField and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.ManagedRelationshipSelectField highlight the matched search term by wrapping it in <b> tags and rendering the whole string with Phoenix.HTML.raw/1. The highlighted value is the destination record's label_field, ordinary database content that is often written by lower-privileged users. Because raw/1 disables output escaping for the entire string, a stored label such as <img src=x onerror=...> runs as JavaScript in the admin's session as soon as a matching record appears in the dropdown, giving the attacker the admin's privileges over everything AshAdmin exposes. The fix HTML-escapes the label before inserting the highlight markup.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets any client that can reach the admin LiveView exhaust the BEAM atom table and crash the entire node.

Two LiveView event handlers interned atoms from unvalidated client input: AshAdmin.PageLive's set_actor built modules from the resource/domain payload with Module.concat/1, and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Show's calculate converted every submitted form key with String.to_atom/1. Atoms are never garbage collected and the table is capped, so flooding either event with random names mints a new atom per request until the VM aborts, taking down every application on the node. The fix resolves the submitted resource/domain against the known shown resources and maps calculation keys to declared arguments, so no client-supplied string is interned.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a sibling subdomain rebind an admin's session to a different actor, tenant, or authorization mode.

AshAdmin's client JavaScript read its state cookies (tenant, actor_resource, actor_primary_key, actor_action, actor_domain, actor_authorizing, actor_paused) by matching the cookie name with an unanchored regular expression (new RegExp(name + "=([^;]+)")) against the whole document.cookie. Any cookie whose name merely ends with the requested name therefore matches, and whichever is serialized first wins. Because cookies are shared across a registrable domain, a compromised sibling subdomain can set a shadowing cookie (for example xactor_authorizing) with Domain=.example.com that flows unvalidated into the admin's LiveSocket connect params. The fix matches cookie names by exact equality.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.9.1 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin allows writing attacker-controlled bytes to arbitrary paths on the server.

AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Form.consume_file_uploads/1 builds the destination as Path.join([tmp_dir, entry.client_name]) and writes it with File.cp!/2. entry.client_name is the browser-supplied filename and is not sanitized, and Path.join/1 does not normalize ... An upload named ../../../../var/www/app/priv/static/x.png therefore escapes the random temp directory and lands anywhere the BEAM user can write, enabling arbitrary file write and potentially remote code execution by overwriting application assets, configuration, or cron/ssh files. The only guard is an extension allowlist defaulting to :any that checks only the extension. The fix strips path components with Path.basename/1 before joining.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.7 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.

AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus __struct__ key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The resource has a composite primary key, and the deployment relies on AshAdmin's authorization (a custom actor plug and policies) so that reading otherwise-restricted attribute values crosses a boundary.

Summary

Use of Insufficiently Random Values vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin ships a hardcoded, publicly known CSP nonce, defeating nonce-based Content-Security-Policy protection.

When mounted without :csp_nonce_assign_key, AshAdmin.Router.ash_admin/2 defaulted the img, style, and script nonces to the literal constant ash_admin-Ed55GFnX, which AshAdmin.Layouts wrote verbatim into the nonce attribute of its inline <style> and <script> tags on every response. The value is a compile-time constant published in the repository and is never rotated per request. If an application's CSP script-src allow-lists that documented default, any HTML-injection sink on an admin page can reuse the known nonce to run inline scripts the policy was meant to block. The fix generates a fresh random nonce per request.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.10.8 before 1.3.1.

Configurations

The application mounts AshAdmin without :csp_nonce_assign_key and enforces a nonce-based CSP whose script-src allow-lists the default ash_admin-Ed55GFnX value, and has a separate HTML-injection sink on an admin page.

Summary

Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets an attacker who controls a record's string primary key rewrite the target of AshAdmin's row-action links.

The Table, DataTable, and Show components built row-action URLs by raw string interpolation, splicing the primary key (and table, domain, and resource names) into the query string without URL-encoding. Ash resources routinely use user-settable string primary keys (slugs, emails). Because Plug.Conn.Query resolves duplicate parameters last-wins and primary_key is interpolated last, a stored key such as foo&action_type=destroy injects parameters that override the link, so an admin clicking edit is sent to a destroy form or an arbitrary resource; a # truncates the query into a fragment. The fix builds every link with URI.encode_query/1, encoding all interpolated values.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.3.0-rc.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin executes attacker-supplied record content as script in an administrator's browser.

The relationship typeahead components AshAdmin.Components.Resource.RelationshipField and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.ManagedRelationshipSelectField highlight the matched search term by wrapping it in <b> tags and rendering the whole string with Phoenix.HTML.raw/1. The highlighted value is the destination record's label_field, ordinary database content that is often written by lower-privileged users. Because raw/1 disables output escaping for the entire string, a stored label such as <img src=x onerror=...> runs as JavaScript in the admin's session as soon as a matching record appears in the dropdown, giving the attacker the admin's privileges over everything AshAdmin exposes. The fix HTML-escapes the label before inserting the highlight markup.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.13.0 before 1.3.1.

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin lets any client that can reach the admin LiveView exhaust the BEAM atom table and crash the entire node.

Two LiveView event handlers interned atoms from unvalidated client input: AshAdmin.PageLive's set_actor built modules from the resource/domain payload with Module.concat/1, and AshAdmin.Components.Resource.Show's calculate converted every submitted form key with String.to_atom/1. Atoms are never garbage collected and the table is capped, so flooding either event with random names mints a new atom per request until the VM aborts, taking down every application on the node. The fix resolves the submitted resource/domain against the known shown resources and maps calculation keys to declared arguments, so no client-supplied string is interned.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.