gitea.dev

Gitea: draft release attachment disclosure via missing web authorization in gitea.dev

Gitea LFS Deploy-Key Privilege Escalation in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private Repository Existence Disclosure via go-get Meta Endpoint in gitea.dev

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session in gitea.dev

Gitea: REST API exposes organization membership of private organizations to public in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access in gitea.dev

Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private in gitea.dev

Gitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim in gitea.dev

Gitea CVE-2026-20800 sibling endpoints not covered: revoked user still reads private repo objects via /api/v1/user/starred and private issue titles via /api/v1/user/times in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass in gitea.dev

Gitea: OAuth token introspection returns metadata of tokens issued to other clients (RFC 7662 section 4 violation) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-only repository tokens can update private PR head branches in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private Repository Metadata Remains Accessible After Access Revocation in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Denial of Service via Unbounded io.ReadAll in NPM Package Tag Endpoint in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145 in gitea.dev

Gitea: OIDC userinfo Endpoint Returns Identity Claims Without Enforcing API Token Scopes in gitea.dev

Gitea: Null Pointer Dereference in AddTime API Causes Authenticated Denial of Service in gitea.dev

Gitea: SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs in gitea.dev

Gitea: Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Migration Restore in gitea.dev

Gitea: ParseAcceptLanguage quadratic-time DoS via Locale middleware on unauthenticated requests in gitea.dev

Gitea: Internal API HTTP client hardcodes InsecureSkipVerify:true with no config override in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration in gitea.dev

Gitea SSH Key Parser Denial of Service in gitea.dev

Gitea: Denial of Service (CPU & Memory Exhaustion) via O(N^2) String Concatenation in Debian Package Upload in gitea.dev

Gitea: Unbounded Arch package file metadata can cause resource amplification in Gitea package uploads in gitea.dev

Gitea: Release attachment extension allowlist bypass via web release edit form (variant of CVE-2025-68939) in gitea.dev

Gitea: RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository issue/comment attachment re-linking can expose private attachment content in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints in gitea.dev

Gitea: Token public-only scope bypassed on Limited-visibility owners (Repository

• Package categories) — residual after CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118 in gitea.dev

Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata in gitea.dev

Gitea: Two SSRF findings in gitea.dev

Gitea: Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Personal access token scope enforcement bypass on the repository home page (GET /{owner}/{repo}) discloses private repository contents in gitea.dev

Gitea: Webhooks created by a collaborator keep firing after their repo access is revoked → ongoing real-time exfiltration of private repo content in gitea.dev

Summary

A user with Code write access to one repository may be able to associate an existing Git LFS object from a private source repository with their target repository, even when they do not have Code access to the source repository that currently owns the LFS object.

The issue appears to be caused by the source-object authorization check using broad repository accessibility instead of requiring Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object.

Impact

This issue breaks the expected authorization boundary between repository units.

A user who does not have Code access to a private source repository should not be able to reuse or associate Git LFS objects owned by that repository. However, because the source-object accessibility check accepts broad repository access, non-Code access such as Issues access may be sufficient for the LFS object to be treated as accessible.

If the reused object becomes downloadable through the attacker-controlled target repository after metadata association, this can result in cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure.

The target repository write authorization is still enforced. The problem is specifically in the authorization decision for whether the source LFS object is accessible and may be reused.

Preconditions

The attacker needs:

• an authenticated Gitea account;
• Code write access to a target repository;
• non-Code access, such as Issues access, to a private source repository;
• knowledge of an existing Git LFS object OID and size from the private source repository.

Affected Area

The issue affects the Git LFS upload/object reuse path.

Relevant paths:

services/lfs/server.go

Relevant handlers:

BatchHandler
UploadHandler

Both paths can call:

git_model.LFSObjectAccessible(ctx, ctx.Doer, p.Oid)

The helper is located in:

models/git/lfs.go

The authorization check uses:

repo_model.AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, unit.TypeInvalid)

When unit.TypeInvalid is used, the repository access condition can include broad repository access, such as organization team membership through team_repo and team_user, without requiring that the user has access to the Code unit of the source repository.

By contrast, Code-specific repository access checks use a concrete unit type and include team_unit validation.

Validation

I reproduced this locally using Gitea's Go test harness.

Validated against commit:

dac41a124fd34820a3c8caf3b3592ba62cd514ff

The PoC creates the following scenario:

1. The attacker has Code write access to the target repository.
2. The source repository is private.
3. The attacker does not have Code access to the source repository.
4. The attacker only has Issues access to the source repository through an organization team.
5. An LFS object exists in the source repository.
6. LFSObjectAccessible(ctx, attacker, oid) returns true.
7. NewLFSMetaObject(ctx, targetRepo.ID, pointer) successfully creates LFS metadata for the target repository.

Test result:

=== RUN   TestLFSObjectAccessibleAllowsNonCodeSourceAccess
--- PASS: TestLFSObjectAccessibleAllowsNonCodeSourceAccess
PASS
ok  	gitea.dev/models/git

No live instance was tested. Validation was performed only against a local test database.

Security Expectation

A user should not be allowed to reuse or associate an LFS object from a private source repository unless they have Code access to that source repository, or another permission level explicitly intended to grant access to repository file contents.

Non-Code permissions such as Issues access should not authorize access to Git LFS object content or allow Git LFS object reuse.

Suggested Fix

LFSObjectAccessible should require Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object.

The check should avoid using unit.TypeInvalid for this source-object authorization decision. A Code-specific repository access condition should be used instead.

A regression test should cover:

• private source repository;
• user has Issues-only access to the source repository;
• user does not have Code access to the source repository;
• user has Code write access to the target repository;
• known LFS object exists in the source repository;
• object reuse must be rejected unless the user has Code access to the source repository.

Suggested Severity

Suggested severity: Medium to High.

The severity depends on whether the associated LFS object becomes downloadable through the target repository after reuse.

If the object becomes downloadable through the target repository, the issue should be considered High because it can lead to cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure.

Suggested CVSS v3.1 if content disclosure is confirmed:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Rationale:

• network reachable through Git LFS endpoints;
• requires authentication;
• requires knowledge of the LFS object OID and size;
• no user interaction required;
• breaks repository-level authorization expectations;
• primary impact is confidentiality of private Git LFS content;
• limited integrity impact through unauthorized LFS metadata association in the target repository.

Evidence

I can provide the local regression test and passing test log privately if needed.

Gitea: draft release attachment disclosure via missing web authorization in gitea.dev

Gitea LFS Deploy-Key Privilege Escalation in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private Repository Existence Disclosure via go-get Meta Endpoint in gitea.dev

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session in gitea.dev

Gitea: REST API exposes organization membership of private organizations to public in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access in gitea.dev

Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private in gitea.dev

Gitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim in gitea.dev

Gitea CVE-2026-20800 sibling endpoints not covered: revoked user still reads private repo objects via /api/v1/user/starred and private issue titles via /api/v1/user/times in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass in gitea.dev

Gitea: OAuth token introspection returns metadata of tokens issued to other clients (RFC 7662 section 4 violation) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-only repository tokens can update private PR head branches in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private Repository Metadata Remains Accessible After Access Revocation in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Denial of Service via Unbounded io.ReadAll in NPM Package Tag Endpoint in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145 in gitea.dev

Gitea: OIDC userinfo Endpoint Returns Identity Claims Without Enforcing API Token Scopes in gitea.dev

Gitea: Null Pointer Dereference in AddTime API Causes Authenticated Denial of Service in gitea.dev

Gitea: SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs in gitea.dev

Gitea: Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Migration Restore in gitea.dev

Gitea: ParseAcceptLanguage quadratic-time DoS via Locale middleware on unauthenticated requests in gitea.dev

Gitea: Internal API HTTP client hardcodes InsecureSkipVerify:true with no config override in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration in gitea.dev

Gitea SSH Key Parser Denial of Service in gitea.dev

Gitea: Denial of Service (CPU & Memory Exhaustion) via O(N^2) String Concatenation in Debian Package Upload in gitea.dev

Gitea: Unbounded Arch package file metadata can cause resource amplification in Gitea package uploads in gitea.dev

Gitea: Release attachment extension allowlist bypass via web release edit form (variant of CVE-2025-68939) in gitea.dev

Gitea: RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository issue/comment attachment re-linking can expose private attachment content in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints in gitea.dev

Gitea: Token public-only scope bypassed on Limited-visibility owners (Repository

• Package categories) — residual after CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118 in gitea.dev

Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata in gitea.dev

Gitea: Two SSRF findings in gitea.dev

Gitea: Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Personal access token scope enforcement bypass on the repository home page (GET /{owner}/{repo}) discloses private repository contents in gitea.dev

Gitea: Webhooks created by a collaborator keep firing after their repo access is revoked → ongoing real-time exfiltration of private repo content in gitea.dev

Summary

A user with Code write access to one repository may be able to associate an existing Git LFS object from a private source repository with their target repository, even when they do not have Code access to the source repository that currently owns the LFS object.

The issue appears to be caused by the source-object authorization check using broad repository accessibility instead of requiring Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object.

Impact

This issue breaks the expected authorization boundary between repository units.

A user who does not have Code access to a private source repository should not be able to reuse or associate Git LFS objects owned by that repository. However, because the source-object accessibility check accepts broad repository access, non-Code access such as Issues access may be sufficient for the LFS object to be treated as accessible.

If the reused object becomes downloadable through the attacker-controlled target repository after metadata association, this can result in cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure.

The target repository write authorization is still enforced. The problem is specifically in the authorization decision for whether the source LFS object is accessible and may be reused.

Preconditions

The attacker needs:

• an authenticated Gitea account;
• Code write access to a target repository;
• non-Code access, such as Issues access, to a private source repository;
• knowledge of an existing Git LFS object OID and size from the private source repository.

Affected Area

The issue affects the Git LFS upload/object reuse path.

Relevant paths:

services/lfs/server.go

Relevant handlers:

BatchHandler
UploadHandler

Both paths can call:

git_model.LFSObjectAccessible(ctx, ctx.Doer, p.Oid)

The helper is located in:

models/git/lfs.go

The authorization check uses:

repo_model.AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, unit.TypeInvalid)

When unit.TypeInvalid is used, the repository access condition can include broad repository access, such as organization team membership through team_repo and team_user, without requiring that the user has access to the Code unit of the source repository.

By contrast, Code-specific repository access checks use a concrete unit type and include team_unit validation.

Validation

I reproduced this locally using Gitea's Go test harness.

Validated against commit:

dac41a124fd34820a3c8caf3b3592ba62cd514ff

The PoC creates the following scenario:

1. The attacker has Code write access to the target repository.
2. The source repository is private.
3. The attacker does not have Code access to the source repository.
4. The attacker only has Issues access to the source repository through an organization team.
5. An LFS object exists in the source repository.
6. LFSObjectAccessible(ctx, attacker, oid) returns true.
7. NewLFSMetaObject(ctx, targetRepo.ID, pointer) successfully creates LFS metadata for the target repository.

Test result:

=== RUN   TestLFSObjectAccessibleAllowsNonCodeSourceAccess
--- PASS: TestLFSObjectAccessibleAllowsNonCodeSourceAccess
PASS
ok  	gitea.dev/models/git

No live instance was tested. Validation was performed only against a local test database.

Security Expectation

A user should not be allowed to reuse or associate an LFS object from a private source repository unless they have Code access to that source repository, or another permission level explicitly intended to grant access to repository file contents.

Non-Code permissions such as Issues access should not authorize access to Git LFS object content or allow Git LFS object reuse.

Suggested Fix

LFSObjectAccessible should require Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object.

The check should avoid using unit.TypeInvalid for this source-object authorization decision. A Code-specific repository access condition should be used instead.

A regression test should cover:

• private source repository;
• user has Issues-only access to the source repository;
• user does not have Code access to the source repository;
• user has Code write access to the target repository;
• known LFS object exists in the source repository;
• object reuse must be rejected unless the user has Code access to the source repository.

Suggested Severity

Suggested severity: Medium to High.

The severity depends on whether the associated LFS object becomes downloadable through the target repository after reuse.

If the object becomes downloadable through the target repository, the issue should be considered High because it can lead to cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure.

Suggested CVSS v3.1 if content disclosure is confirmed:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Rationale:

• network reachable through Git LFS endpoints;
• requires authentication;
• requires knowledge of the LFS object OID and size;
• no user interaction required;
• breaks repository-level authorization expectations;
• primary impact is confidentiality of private Git LFS content;
• limited integrity impact through unauthorized LFS metadata association in the target repository.

Evidence

I can provide the local regression test and passing test log privately if needed.

Gitea: draft release attachment disclosure via missing web authorization in gitea.dev

Gitea LFS Deploy-Key Privilege Escalation in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private Repository Existence Disclosure via go-get Meta Endpoint in gitea.dev

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session in gitea.dev

Gitea: REST API exposes organization membership of private organizations to public in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access in gitea.dev

Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private in gitea.dev

Gitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim in gitea.dev

Gitea CVE-2026-20800 sibling endpoints not covered: revoked user still reads private repo objects via /api/v1/user/starred and private issue titles via /api/v1/user/times in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass in gitea.dev

Gitea: OAuth token introspection returns metadata of tokens issued to other clients (RFC 7662 section 4 violation) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-only repository tokens can update private PR head branches in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private Repository Metadata Remains Accessible After Access Revocation in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Denial of Service via Unbounded io.ReadAll in NPM Package Tag Endpoint in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145 in gitea.dev

Gitea: OIDC userinfo Endpoint Returns Identity Claims Without Enforcing API Token Scopes in gitea.dev

Gitea: Null Pointer Dereference in AddTime API Causes Authenticated Denial of Service in gitea.dev

Gitea: SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs in gitea.dev

Gitea: Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Migration Restore in gitea.dev

Gitea: ParseAcceptLanguage quadratic-time DoS via Locale middleware on unauthenticated requests in gitea.dev

Gitea: Internal API HTTP client hardcodes InsecureSkipVerify:true with no config override in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration in gitea.dev

Gitea SSH Key Parser Denial of Service in gitea.dev

Gitea: Denial of Service (CPU & Memory Exhaustion) via O(N^2) String Concatenation in Debian Package Upload in gitea.dev

Gitea: Unbounded Arch package file metadata can cause resource amplification in Gitea package uploads in gitea.dev

Gitea: Release attachment extension allowlist bypass via web release edit form (variant of CVE-2025-68939) in gitea.dev

Gitea: RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository issue/comment attachment re-linking can expose private attachment content in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints in gitea.dev

Gitea: Token public-only scope bypassed on Limited-visibility owners (Repository

• Package categories) — residual after CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118 in gitea.dev

Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata in gitea.dev

Gitea: Two SSRF findings in gitea.dev

Gitea: Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Personal access token scope enforcement bypass on the repository home page (GET /{owner}/{repo}) discloses private repository contents in gitea.dev

Gitea: Webhooks created by a collaborator keep firing after their repo access is revoked → ongoing real-time exfiltration of private repo content in gitea.dev

Summary

A user with Code write access to one repository may be able to associate an existing Git LFS object from a private source repository with their target repository, even when they do not have Code access to the source repository that currently owns the LFS object.

The issue appears to be caused by the source-object authorization check using broad repository accessibility instead of requiring Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object.

Impact

This issue breaks the expected authorization boundary between repository units.

A user who does not have Code access to a private source repository should not be able to reuse or associate Git LFS objects owned by that repository. However, because the source-object accessibility check accepts broad repository access, non-Code access such as Issues access may be sufficient for the LFS object to be treated as accessible.

If the reused object becomes downloadable through the attacker-controlled target repository after metadata association, this can result in cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure.

The target repository write authorization is still enforced. The problem is specifically in the authorization decision for whether the source LFS object is accessible and may be reused.

Preconditions

The attacker needs:

• an authenticated Gitea account;
• Code write access to a target repository;
• non-Code access, such as Issues access, to a private source repository;
• knowledge of an existing Git LFS object OID and size from the private source repository.

Affected Area

The issue affects the Git LFS upload/object reuse path.

Relevant paths:

services/lfs/server.go

Relevant handlers:

BatchHandler
UploadHandler

Both paths can call:

git_model.LFSObjectAccessible(ctx, ctx.Doer, p.Oid)

The helper is located in:

models/git/lfs.go

The authorization check uses:

repo_model.AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, unit.TypeInvalid)

When unit.TypeInvalid is used, the repository access condition can include broad repository access, such as organization team membership through team_repo and team_user, without requiring that the user has access to the Code unit of the source repository.

By contrast, Code-specific repository access checks use a concrete unit type and include team_unit validation.

Validation

I reproduced this locally using Gitea's Go test harness.

Validated against commit:

dac41a124fd34820a3c8caf3b3592ba62cd514ff

The PoC creates the following scenario:

1. The attacker has Code write access to the target repository.
2. The source repository is private.
3. The attacker does not have Code access to the source repository.
4. The attacker only has Issues access to the source repository through an organization team.
5. An LFS object exists in the source repository.
6. LFSObjectAccessible(ctx, attacker, oid) returns true.
7. NewLFSMetaObject(ctx, targetRepo.ID, pointer) successfully creates LFS metadata for the target repository.

Test result:

=== RUN   TestLFSObjectAccessibleAllowsNonCodeSourceAccess
--- PASS: TestLFSObjectAccessibleAllowsNonCodeSourceAccess
PASS
ok  	gitea.dev/models/git

No live instance was tested. Validation was performed only against a local test database.

Security Expectation

A user should not be allowed to reuse or associate an LFS object from a private source repository unless they have Code access to that source repository, or another permission level explicitly intended to grant access to repository file contents.

Non-Code permissions such as Issues access should not authorize access to Git LFS object content or allow Git LFS object reuse.

Suggested Fix

LFSObjectAccessible should require Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object.

The check should avoid using unit.TypeInvalid for this source-object authorization decision. A Code-specific repository access condition should be used instead.

A regression test should cover:

• private source repository;
• user has Issues-only access to the source repository;
• user does not have Code access to the source repository;
• user has Code write access to the target repository;
• known LFS object exists in the source repository;
• object reuse must be rejected unless the user has Code access to the source repository.

Suggested Severity

Suggested severity: Medium to High.

The severity depends on whether the associated LFS object becomes downloadable through the target repository after reuse.

If the object becomes downloadable through the target repository, the issue should be considered High because it can lead to cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure.

Suggested CVSS v3.1 if content disclosure is confirmed:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Rationale:

• network reachable through Git LFS endpoints;
• requires authentication;
• requires knowledge of the LFS object OID and size;
• no user interaction required;
• breaks repository-level authorization expectations;
• primary impact is confidentiality of private Git LFS content;
• limited integrity impact through unauthorized LFS metadata association in the target repository.

Evidence

I can provide the local regression test and passing test log privately if needed.

Gitea: draft release attachment disclosure via missing web authorization in gitea.dev

Gitea LFS Deploy-Key Privilege Escalation in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private Repository Existence Disclosure via go-get Meta Endpoint in gitea.dev

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session in gitea.dev

Gitea: REST API exposes organization membership of private organizations to public in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access in gitea.dev

Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private in gitea.dev

Gitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim in gitea.dev

Gitea CVE-2026-20800 sibling endpoints not covered: revoked user still reads private repo objects via /api/v1/user/starred and private issue titles via /api/v1/user/times in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass in gitea.dev

Gitea: OAuth token introspection returns metadata of tokens issued to other clients (RFC 7662 section 4 violation) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-only repository tokens can update private PR head branches in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private Repository Metadata Remains Accessible After Access Revocation in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Denial of Service via Unbounded io.ReadAll in NPM Package Tag Endpoint in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145 in gitea.dev

Gitea: OIDC userinfo Endpoint Returns Identity Claims Without Enforcing API Token Scopes in gitea.dev

Gitea: Null Pointer Dereference in AddTime API Causes Authenticated Denial of Service in gitea.dev

Gitea: SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs in gitea.dev

Gitea: Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Migration Restore in gitea.dev

Gitea: ParseAcceptLanguage quadratic-time DoS via Locale middleware on unauthenticated requests in gitea.dev

Gitea: Internal API HTTP client hardcodes InsecureSkipVerify:true with no config override in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration in gitea.dev

Gitea SSH Key Parser Denial of Service in gitea.dev

Gitea: Denial of Service (CPU & Memory Exhaustion) via O(N^2) String Concatenation in Debian Package Upload in gitea.dev

Gitea: Unbounded Arch package file metadata can cause resource amplification in Gitea package uploads in gitea.dev

Gitea: Release attachment extension allowlist bypass via web release edit form (variant of CVE-2025-68939) in gitea.dev

Gitea: RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository issue/comment attachment re-linking can expose private attachment content in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints in gitea.dev

Gitea: Token public-only scope bypassed on Limited-visibility owners (Repository

• Package categories) — residual after CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118 in gitea.dev

Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata in gitea.dev

Gitea: Two SSRF findings in gitea.dev

Gitea: Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Personal access token scope enforcement bypass on the repository home page (GET /{owner}/{repo}) discloses private repository contents in gitea.dev

Gitea: Webhooks created by a collaborator keep firing after their repo access is revoked → ongoing real-time exfiltration of private repo content in gitea.dev

Summary

A user with Code write access to one repository may be able to associate an existing Git LFS object from a private source repository with their target repository, even when they do not have Code access to the source repository that currently owns the LFS object.

The issue appears to be caused by the source-object authorization check using broad repository accessibility instead of requiring Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object.

Impact

This issue breaks the expected authorization boundary between repository units.

A user who does not have Code access to a private source repository should not be able to reuse or associate Git LFS objects owned by that repository. However, because the source-object accessibility check accepts broad repository access, non-Code access such as Issues access may be sufficient for the LFS object to be treated as accessible.

If the reused object becomes downloadable through the attacker-controlled target repository after metadata association, this can result in cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure.

The target repository write authorization is still enforced. The problem is specifically in the authorization decision for whether the source LFS object is accessible and may be reused.

Preconditions

The attacker needs:

• an authenticated Gitea account;
• Code write access to a target repository;
• non-Code access, such as Issues access, to a private source repository;
• knowledge of an existing Git LFS object OID and size from the private source repository.

Affected Area

The issue affects the Git LFS upload/object reuse path.

Relevant paths:

services/lfs/server.go

Relevant handlers:

BatchHandler
UploadHandler

Both paths can call:

git_model.LFSObjectAccessible(ctx, ctx.Doer, p.Oid)

The helper is located in:

models/git/lfs.go

The authorization check uses:

repo_model.AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, unit.TypeInvalid)

When unit.TypeInvalid is used, the repository access condition can include broad repository access, such as organization team membership through team_repo and team_user, without requiring that the user has access to the Code unit of the source repository.

By contrast, Code-specific repository access checks use a concrete unit type and include team_unit validation.

Validation

I reproduced this locally using Gitea's Go test harness.

Validated against commit:

dac41a124fd34820a3c8caf3b3592ba62cd514ff

The PoC creates the following scenario:

1. The attacker has Code write access to the target repository.
2. The source repository is private.
3. The attacker does not have Code access to the source repository.
4. The attacker only has Issues access to the source repository through an organization team.
5. An LFS object exists in the source repository.
6. LFSObjectAccessible(ctx, attacker, oid) returns true.
7. NewLFSMetaObject(ctx, targetRepo.ID, pointer) successfully creates LFS metadata for the target repository.

Test result:

=== RUN   TestLFSObjectAccessibleAllowsNonCodeSourceAccess
--- PASS: TestLFSObjectAccessibleAllowsNonCodeSourceAccess
PASS
ok  	gitea.dev/models/git

No live instance was tested. Validation was performed only against a local test database.

Security Expectation

A user should not be allowed to reuse or associate an LFS object from a private source repository unless they have Code access to that source repository, or another permission level explicitly intended to grant access to repository file contents.

Non-Code permissions such as Issues access should not authorize access to Git LFS object content or allow Git LFS object reuse.

Suggested Fix

LFSObjectAccessible should require Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object.

The check should avoid using unit.TypeInvalid for this source-object authorization decision. A Code-specific repository access condition should be used instead.

A regression test should cover:

• private source repository;
• user has Issues-only access to the source repository;
• user does not have Code access to the source repository;
• user has Code write access to the target repository;
• known LFS object exists in the source repository;
• object reuse must be rejected unless the user has Code access to the source repository.

Suggested Severity

Suggested severity: Medium to High.

The severity depends on whether the associated LFS object becomes downloadable through the target repository after reuse.

If the object becomes downloadable through the target repository, the issue should be considered High because it can lead to cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure.

Suggested CVSS v3.1 if content disclosure is confirmed:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Rationale:

• network reachable through Git LFS endpoints;
• requires authentication;
• requires knowledge of the LFS object OID and size;
• no user interaction required;
• breaks repository-level authorization expectations;
• primary impact is confidentiality of private Git LFS content;
• limited integrity impact through unauthorized LFS metadata association in the target repository.

Evidence

I can provide the local regression test and passing test log privately if needed.

Gitea: draft release attachment disclosure via missing web authorization in gitea.dev

Gitea LFS Deploy-Key Privilege Escalation in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private Repository Existence Disclosure via go-get Meta Endpoint in gitea.dev

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session in gitea.dev

Gitea: REST API exposes organization membership of private organizations to public in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access in gitea.dev

Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private in gitea.dev

Gitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim in gitea.dev

Gitea CVE-2026-20800 sibling endpoints not covered: revoked user still reads private repo objects via /api/v1/user/starred and private issue titles via /api/v1/user/times in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass in gitea.dev

Gitea: OAuth token introspection returns metadata of tokens issued to other clients (RFC 7662 section 4 violation) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-only repository tokens can update private PR head branches in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private Repository Metadata Remains Accessible After Access Revocation in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Denial of Service via Unbounded io.ReadAll in NPM Package Tag Endpoint in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145 in gitea.dev

Gitea: OIDC userinfo Endpoint Returns Identity Claims Without Enforcing API Token Scopes in gitea.dev

Gitea: Null Pointer Dereference in AddTime API Causes Authenticated Denial of Service in gitea.dev

Gitea: SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs in gitea.dev

Gitea: Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Migration Restore in gitea.dev

Gitea: ParseAcceptLanguage quadratic-time DoS via Locale middleware on unauthenticated requests in gitea.dev

Gitea: Internal API HTTP client hardcodes InsecureSkipVerify:true with no config override in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration in gitea.dev

Gitea SSH Key Parser Denial of Service in gitea.dev

Gitea: Denial of Service (CPU & Memory Exhaustion) via O(N^2) String Concatenation in Debian Package Upload in gitea.dev

Gitea: Unbounded Arch package file metadata can cause resource amplification in Gitea package uploads in gitea.dev

Gitea: Release attachment extension allowlist bypass via web release edit form (variant of CVE-2025-68939) in gitea.dev

Gitea: RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository issue/comment attachment re-linking can expose private attachment content in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints in gitea.dev

Gitea: Token public-only scope bypassed on Limited-visibility owners (Repository

• Package categories) — residual after CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118 in gitea.dev

Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata in gitea.dev

Gitea: Two SSRF findings in gitea.dev

Gitea: Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Personal access token scope enforcement bypass on the repository home page (GET /{owner}/{repo}) discloses private repository contents in gitea.dev

Gitea: Webhooks created by a collaborator keep firing after their repo access is revoked → ongoing real-time exfiltration of private repo content in gitea.dev

Summary

A user with Code write access to one repository may be able to associate an existing Git LFS object from a private source repository with their target repository, even when they do not have Code access to the source repository that currently owns the LFS object.

The issue appears to be caused by the source-object authorization check using broad repository accessibility instead of requiring Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object.

Impact

This issue breaks the expected authorization boundary between repository units.

A user who does not have Code access to a private source repository should not be able to reuse or associate Git LFS objects owned by that repository. However, because the source-object accessibility check accepts broad repository access, non-Code access such as Issues access may be sufficient for the LFS object to be treated as accessible.

If the reused object becomes downloadable through the attacker-controlled target repository after metadata association, this can result in cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure.

The target repository write authorization is still enforced. The problem is specifically in the authorization decision for whether the source LFS object is accessible and may be reused.

Preconditions

The attacker needs:

• an authenticated Gitea account;
• Code write access to a target repository;
• non-Code access, such as Issues access, to a private source repository;
• knowledge of an existing Git LFS object OID and size from the private source repository.

Affected Area

The issue affects the Git LFS upload/object reuse path.

Relevant paths:

services/lfs/server.go

Relevant handlers:

BatchHandler
UploadHandler

Both paths can call:

git_model.LFSObjectAccessible(ctx, ctx.Doer, p.Oid)

The helper is located in:

models/git/lfs.go

The authorization check uses:

repo_model.AccessibleRepositoryCondition(user, unit.TypeInvalid)

When unit.TypeInvalid is used, the repository access condition can include broad repository access, such as organization team membership through team_repo and team_user, without requiring that the user has access to the Code unit of the source repository.

By contrast, Code-specific repository access checks use a concrete unit type and include team_unit validation.

Validation

I reproduced this locally using Gitea's Go test harness.

Validated against commit:

dac41a124fd34820a3c8caf3b3592ba62cd514ff

The PoC creates the following scenario:

1. The attacker has Code write access to the target repository.
2. The source repository is private.
3. The attacker does not have Code access to the source repository.
4. The attacker only has Issues access to the source repository through an organization team.
5. An LFS object exists in the source repository.
6. LFSObjectAccessible(ctx, attacker, oid) returns true.
7. NewLFSMetaObject(ctx, targetRepo.ID, pointer) successfully creates LFS metadata for the target repository.

Test result:

=== RUN   TestLFSObjectAccessibleAllowsNonCodeSourceAccess
--- PASS: TestLFSObjectAccessibleAllowsNonCodeSourceAccess
PASS
ok  	gitea.dev/models/git

No live instance was tested. Validation was performed only against a local test database.

Security Expectation

A user should not be allowed to reuse or associate an LFS object from a private source repository unless they have Code access to that source repository, or another permission level explicitly intended to grant access to repository file contents.

Non-Code permissions such as Issues access should not authorize access to Git LFS object content or allow Git LFS object reuse.

Suggested Fix

LFSObjectAccessible should require Code-unit access to at least one repository that owns the requested LFS object.

The check should avoid using unit.TypeInvalid for this source-object authorization decision. A Code-specific repository access condition should be used instead.

A regression test should cover:

• private source repository;
• user has Issues-only access to the source repository;
• user does not have Code access to the source repository;
• user has Code write access to the target repository;
• known LFS object exists in the source repository;
• object reuse must be rejected unless the user has Code access to the source repository.

Suggested Severity

Suggested severity: Medium to High.

The severity depends on whether the associated LFS object becomes downloadable through the target repository after reuse.

If the object becomes downloadable through the target repository, the issue should be considered High because it can lead to cross-repository Git LFS content disclosure.

Suggested CVSS v3.1 if content disclosure is confirmed:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Rationale:

• network reachable through Git LFS endpoints;
• requires authentication;
• requires knowledge of the LFS object OID and size;
• no user interaction required;
• breaks repository-level authorization expectations;
• primary impact is confidentiality of private Git LFS content;
• limited integrity impact through unauthorized LFS metadata association in the target repository.

Evidence

I can provide the local regression test and passing test log privately if needed.

Gitea: draft release attachment disclosure via missing web authorization in gitea.dev

Gitea LFS Deploy-Key Privilege Escalation in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private Repository Existence Disclosure via go-get Meta Endpoint in gitea.dev

Gitea Remember-Me Token Theft Not Invalidating Attacker Session in gitea.dev

Gitea: REST API exposes organization membership of private organizations to public in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access in gitea.dev

Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private in gitea.dev

Gitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim in gitea.dev

Gitea CVE-2026-20800 sibling endpoints not covered: revoked user still reads private repo objects via /api/v1/user/starred and private issue titles via /api/v1/user/times in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass in gitea.dev

Gitea: OAuth token introspection returns metadata of tokens issued to other clients (RFC 7662 section 4 violation) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-only repository tokens can update private PR head branches in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private Repository Metadata Remains Accessible After Access Revocation in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Denial of Service via Unbounded io.ReadAll in NPM Package Tag Endpoint in gitea.dev

Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145 in gitea.dev

Gitea: OIDC userinfo Endpoint Returns Identity Claims Without Enforcing API Token Scopes in gitea.dev

Gitea: Null Pointer Dereference in AddTime API Causes Authenticated Denial of Service in gitea.dev

Gitea: SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs in gitea.dev

Gitea: Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API in gitea.dev

Gitea: Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Migration Restore in gitea.dev

Gitea: ParseAcceptLanguage quadratic-time DoS via Locale middleware on unauthenticated requests in gitea.dev

Gitea: Internal API HTTP client hardcodes InsecureSkipVerify:true with no config override in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration in gitea.dev

Gitea SSH Key Parser Denial of Service in gitea.dev

Gitea: Denial of Service (CPU & Memory Exhaustion) via O(N^2) String Concatenation in Debian Package Upload in gitea.dev

Gitea: Unbounded Arch package file metadata can cause resource amplification in Gitea package uploads in gitea.dev

Gitea: Release attachment extension allowlist bypass via web release edit form (variant of CVE-2025-68939) in gitea.dev

Gitea: RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Cross-repository issue/comment attachment re-linking can expose private attachment content in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options in gitea.dev

Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints in gitea.dev

Gitea: Token public-only scope bypassed on Limited-visibility owners (Repository

• Package categories) — residual after CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118 in gitea.dev

Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata in gitea.dev

Gitea: Two SSRF findings in gitea.dev

Gitea: Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Personal access token scope enforcement bypass on the repository home page (GET /{owner}/{repo}) discloses private repository contents in gitea.dev

Gitea: Webhooks created by a collaborator keep firing after their repo access is revoked → ongoing real-time exfiltration of private repo content in gitea.dev