zaino-state

Version	Released
`0.8.0` minor	Aug 29, 2026
`0.7.0` minor	Aug 19, 2026
`0.6.0` minor	Aug 05, 2026
`0.5.0` unknown	Jul 13, 2026
`0.4.1` unknown	Jul 03, 2026
`0.3.1` unknown 1 CVE	Jun 30, 2026
`0.3.0` unknown 1 CVE	Jun 18, 2026
`0.2.0` unknown 1 CVE	May 22, 2026
`0.1.0` unknown 1 CVE	Mar 26, 2026
`0.1.2` unknown yanked 1 CVE	Aug 20, 2025

0.8.0 minor

Aug 29, 2026

0.7.0 minor

Aug 19, 2026

0.6.0 minor

Aug 05, 2026

0.5.0 unknown

Jul 13, 2026

0.4.1 unknown

Jul 03, 2026

0.3.1 unknown

1 CVE

GHSA-3whf-vgf2-9w6g Jul 31, 2026

zaino-state has a Non-Finalized State Reorg — No Cycle Detection or Depth Limit

Medium

Network Low None None

Summary

NonFinalizedState::handle_reorg is a recursive, unbounded async function that traverses parent blocks until it finds a common ancestor on the main chain. It has no recursion depth limit and no cycle detection. A malicious or buggy validator can serve a block whose previous_block_hash points back to itself (or forms a cycle with other blocks), causing handle_reorg to infinite-loop, consuming 100% CPU and never making sync progress. Additionally, update() contains an .expect("empty snapshot impossible") that panics if the non-finalized snapshot becomes empty after trimming finalized blocks.

Details

Location: packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:443-489

async fn handle_reorg(
    &self,
    working_snapshot: &mut NonfinalizedBlockCacheSnapshot,
    block: &impl Block,
) -> Result<IndexedBlock, SyncError> {
    let prev_block = match working_snapshot
        .get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order())
        .cloned()
    {
        Some(prev_block) => {
            if !working_snapshot
                .heights_to_hashes
                .values()
                .any(|hash| hash == prev_block.hash())
            {
                Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &prev_block)).await?  // <-- LINE 459
            } else {
                prev_block
            }
        }
        None => {
            let prev_block = self
                .source
                .get_block(HashOrHeight::Hash(
                    zebra_chain::block::Hash::from_bytes_in_serialized_order(
                        block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order(),
                    ),
                ))
                .await
                .map_err(|e| { ... })?
                .ok_or(SyncError::ValidatorConnectionError(...))?;
            Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &*prev_block)).await?  // <-- LINE 483
        }
    };
    let indexed_block = block.to_indexed_block(&prev_block, self).await?;
    working_snapshot.add_block_new_chaintip(indexed_block.clone());
    Ok(indexed_block)
}

Infinite loop via self-referencing block:

A compromised validator serves a block B where B.prev_hash == B.hash.
handle_reorg is called with B.
get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(B.prev_hash) finds B itself in working_snapshot.blocks.
Check: is B.hash in working_snapshot.heights_to_hashes? If B is a new chaintip not yet on the main chain, no.
Recurse with prev_block = B (the exact same block).
This repeats forever. The async recursion builds a new Box::pin future each iteration, consuming heap memory and CPU.

Stack exhaustion via deep reorg: A deep reorg of >1000 blocks would recurse >1000 times. Each async recursion creates a new Box::pin future on the heap. While this won't exhaust the native stack immediately, it will allocate unbounded heap memory and CPU time, effectively DoS-ing the sync task.

.expect("empty snapshot impossible") panic:

Location: packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:543-548

new_snapshot.remove_finalized_blocks(finalized_height);
let best_block = &new_snapshot
    .blocks
    .values()
    .max_by_key(|block| block.chainwork())
    .cloned()
    .expect("empty snapshot impossible"); // <-- LINE 548

If finalized_height is greater than or equal to all blocks in new_snapshot.blocks, remove_finalized_blocks retains only blocks at or above that height. If none exist, new_snapshot.blocks becomes empty. The .expect() then panics. While the comment claims this is "impossible," defensive programming dictates it is reachable under corruption or edge-case sync conditions.

PoC

Run a regtest.
Serve a block where header.previous_block_hash == block.hash().
Zaino's NonFinalizedState::sync enters handle_reorg and infinite-loops.
Sync never completes. CPU usage pegs to 100%. No new blocks are served to clients.

Fix

Add an explicit recursion depth limit (e.g., max 1000 iterations) and return SyncError::ReorgFailure if exceeded:
```
const MAX_REORG_DEPTH: usize = 1000;
```
Track visited hashes in a HashSet<BlockHash> during traversal to detect cycles and abort with an error.
Replace .expect("empty snapshot impossible") with a proper Err(UpdateError::DatabaseHole) or similar error return.

Additional Attack Vectors

Deep reorg DoS: A miner with significant hash power (or a compromised validator) triggers a deep reorg. Zaino spends excessive CPU and memory in handle_reorg, starving the async runtime and stalling response serving.
Fork-choice manipulation: By serving cyclic or very deep sidechains, an attacker can keep Zaino stuck in reorg handling indefinitely, preventing it from ever serving the real best chain.

Fixed in


          0.4.1

References

Updated Jul 31, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jun 30, 2026

0.3.0 unknown

1 CVE

GHSA-3whf-vgf2-9w6g Jul 31, 2026

zaino-state has a Non-Finalized State Reorg — No Cycle Detection or Depth Limit

Medium

Network Low None None

Summary

NonFinalizedState::handle_reorg is a recursive, unbounded async function that traverses parent blocks until it finds a common ancestor on the main chain. It has no recursion depth limit and no cycle detection. A malicious or buggy validator can serve a block whose previous_block_hash points back to itself (or forms a cycle with other blocks), causing handle_reorg to infinite-loop, consuming 100% CPU and never making sync progress. Additionally, update() contains an .expect("empty snapshot impossible") that panics if the non-finalized snapshot becomes empty after trimming finalized blocks.

Details

Location: packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:443-489

async fn handle_reorg(
    &self,
    working_snapshot: &mut NonfinalizedBlockCacheSnapshot,
    block: &impl Block,
) -> Result<IndexedBlock, SyncError> {
    let prev_block = match working_snapshot
        .get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order())
        .cloned()
    {
        Some(prev_block) => {
            if !working_snapshot
                .heights_to_hashes
                .values()
                .any(|hash| hash == prev_block.hash())
            {
                Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &prev_block)).await?  // <-- LINE 459
            } else {
                prev_block
            }
        }
        None => {
            let prev_block = self
                .source
                .get_block(HashOrHeight::Hash(
                    zebra_chain::block::Hash::from_bytes_in_serialized_order(
                        block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order(),
                    ),
                ))
                .await
                .map_err(|e| { ... })?
                .ok_or(SyncError::ValidatorConnectionError(...))?;
            Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &*prev_block)).await?  // <-- LINE 483
        }
    };
    let indexed_block = block.to_indexed_block(&prev_block, self).await?;
    working_snapshot.add_block_new_chaintip(indexed_block.clone());
    Ok(indexed_block)
}

Infinite loop via self-referencing block:

A compromised validator serves a block B where B.prev_hash == B.hash.
handle_reorg is called with B.
get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(B.prev_hash) finds B itself in working_snapshot.blocks.
Check: is B.hash in working_snapshot.heights_to_hashes? If B is a new chaintip not yet on the main chain, no.
Recurse with prev_block = B (the exact same block).
This repeats forever. The async recursion builds a new Box::pin future each iteration, consuming heap memory and CPU.

Stack exhaustion via deep reorg: A deep reorg of >1000 blocks would recurse >1000 times. Each async recursion creates a new Box::pin future on the heap. While this won't exhaust the native stack immediately, it will allocate unbounded heap memory and CPU time, effectively DoS-ing the sync task.

.expect("empty snapshot impossible") panic:

Location: packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:543-548

new_snapshot.remove_finalized_blocks(finalized_height);
let best_block = &new_snapshot
    .blocks
    .values()
    .max_by_key(|block| block.chainwork())
    .cloned()
    .expect("empty snapshot impossible"); // <-- LINE 548

If finalized_height is greater than or equal to all blocks in new_snapshot.blocks, remove_finalized_blocks retains only blocks at or above that height. If none exist, new_snapshot.blocks becomes empty. The .expect() then panics. While the comment claims this is "impossible," defensive programming dictates it is reachable under corruption or edge-case sync conditions.

PoC

Run a regtest.
Serve a block where header.previous_block_hash == block.hash().
Zaino's NonFinalizedState::sync enters handle_reorg and infinite-loops.
Sync never completes. CPU usage pegs to 100%. No new blocks are served to clients.

Fix

Add an explicit recursion depth limit (e.g., max 1000 iterations) and return SyncError::ReorgFailure if exceeded:
```
const MAX_REORG_DEPTH: usize = 1000;
```
Track visited hashes in a HashSet<BlockHash> during traversal to detect cycles and abort with an error.
Replace .expect("empty snapshot impossible") with a proper Err(UpdateError::DatabaseHole) or similar error return.

Additional Attack Vectors

Deep reorg DoS: A miner with significant hash power (or a compromised validator) triggers a deep reorg. Zaino spends excessive CPU and memory in handle_reorg, starving the async runtime and stalling response serving.
Fork-choice manipulation: By serving cyclic or very deep sidechains, an attacker can keep Zaino stuck in reorg handling indefinitely, preventing it from ever serving the real best chain.

Fixed in


          0.4.1

References

Updated Jul 31, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jun 18, 2026

0.2.0 unknown

1 CVE

GHSA-3whf-vgf2-9w6g Jul 31, 2026

zaino-state has a Non-Finalized State Reorg — No Cycle Detection or Depth Limit

Medium

Network Low None None

Summary

NonFinalizedState::handle_reorg is a recursive, unbounded async function that traverses parent blocks until it finds a common ancestor on the main chain. It has no recursion depth limit and no cycle detection. A malicious or buggy validator can serve a block whose previous_block_hash points back to itself (or forms a cycle with other blocks), causing handle_reorg to infinite-loop, consuming 100% CPU and never making sync progress. Additionally, update() contains an .expect("empty snapshot impossible") that panics if the non-finalized snapshot becomes empty after trimming finalized blocks.

Details

Location: packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:443-489

async fn handle_reorg(
    &self,
    working_snapshot: &mut NonfinalizedBlockCacheSnapshot,
    block: &impl Block,
) -> Result<IndexedBlock, SyncError> {
    let prev_block = match working_snapshot
        .get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order())
        .cloned()
    {
        Some(prev_block) => {
            if !working_snapshot
                .heights_to_hashes
                .values()
                .any(|hash| hash == prev_block.hash())
            {
                Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &prev_block)).await?  // <-- LINE 459
            } else {
                prev_block
            }
        }
        None => {
            let prev_block = self
                .source
                .get_block(HashOrHeight::Hash(
                    zebra_chain::block::Hash::from_bytes_in_serialized_order(
                        block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order(),
                    ),
                ))
                .await
                .map_err(|e| { ... })?
                .ok_or(SyncError::ValidatorConnectionError(...))?;
            Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &*prev_block)).await?  // <-- LINE 483
        }
    };
    let indexed_block = block.to_indexed_block(&prev_block, self).await?;
    working_snapshot.add_block_new_chaintip(indexed_block.clone());
    Ok(indexed_block)
}

Infinite loop via self-referencing block:

A compromised validator serves a block B where B.prev_hash == B.hash.
handle_reorg is called with B.
get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(B.prev_hash) finds B itself in working_snapshot.blocks.
Check: is B.hash in working_snapshot.heights_to_hashes? If B is a new chaintip not yet on the main chain, no.
Recurse with prev_block = B (the exact same block).
This repeats forever. The async recursion builds a new Box::pin future each iteration, consuming heap memory and CPU.

Stack exhaustion via deep reorg: A deep reorg of >1000 blocks would recurse >1000 times. Each async recursion creates a new Box::pin future on the heap. While this won't exhaust the native stack immediately, it will allocate unbounded heap memory and CPU time, effectively DoS-ing the sync task.

.expect("empty snapshot impossible") panic:

Location: packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:543-548

new_snapshot.remove_finalized_blocks(finalized_height);
let best_block = &new_snapshot
    .blocks
    .values()
    .max_by_key(|block| block.chainwork())
    .cloned()
    .expect("empty snapshot impossible"); // <-- LINE 548

If finalized_height is greater than or equal to all blocks in new_snapshot.blocks, remove_finalized_blocks retains only blocks at or above that height. If none exist, new_snapshot.blocks becomes empty. The .expect() then panics. While the comment claims this is "impossible," defensive programming dictates it is reachable under corruption or edge-case sync conditions.

PoC

Run a regtest.
Serve a block where header.previous_block_hash == block.hash().
Zaino's NonFinalizedState::sync enters handle_reorg and infinite-loops.
Sync never completes. CPU usage pegs to 100%. No new blocks are served to clients.

Fix

Add an explicit recursion depth limit (e.g., max 1000 iterations) and return SyncError::ReorgFailure if exceeded:
```
const MAX_REORG_DEPTH: usize = 1000;
```
Track visited hashes in a HashSet<BlockHash> during traversal to detect cycles and abort with an error.
Replace .expect("empty snapshot impossible") with a proper Err(UpdateError::DatabaseHole) or similar error return.

Additional Attack Vectors

Deep reorg DoS: A miner with significant hash power (or a compromised validator) triggers a deep reorg. Zaino spends excessive CPU and memory in handle_reorg, starving the async runtime and stalling response serving.
Fork-choice manipulation: By serving cyclic or very deep sidechains, an attacker can keep Zaino stuck in reorg handling indefinitely, preventing it from ever serving the real best chain.

Fixed in


          0.4.1

References

Updated Jul 31, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

May 22, 2026

0.1.0 unknown

1 CVE

GHSA-3whf-vgf2-9w6g Jul 31, 2026

zaino-state has a Non-Finalized State Reorg — No Cycle Detection or Depth Limit

Medium

Network Low None None

Summary

NonFinalizedState::handle_reorg is a recursive, unbounded async function that traverses parent blocks until it finds a common ancestor on the main chain. It has no recursion depth limit and no cycle detection. A malicious or buggy validator can serve a block whose previous_block_hash points back to itself (or forms a cycle with other blocks), causing handle_reorg to infinite-loop, consuming 100% CPU and never making sync progress. Additionally, update() contains an .expect("empty snapshot impossible") that panics if the non-finalized snapshot becomes empty after trimming finalized blocks.

Details

Location: packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:443-489

async fn handle_reorg(
    &self,
    working_snapshot: &mut NonfinalizedBlockCacheSnapshot,
    block: &impl Block,
) -> Result<IndexedBlock, SyncError> {
    let prev_block = match working_snapshot
        .get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order())
        .cloned()
    {
        Some(prev_block) => {
            if !working_snapshot
                .heights_to_hashes
                .values()
                .any(|hash| hash == prev_block.hash())
            {
                Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &prev_block)).await?  // <-- LINE 459
            } else {
                prev_block
            }
        }
        None => {
            let prev_block = self
                .source
                .get_block(HashOrHeight::Hash(
                    zebra_chain::block::Hash::from_bytes_in_serialized_order(
                        block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order(),
                    ),
                ))
                .await
                .map_err(|e| { ... })?
                .ok_or(SyncError::ValidatorConnectionError(...))?;
            Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &*prev_block)).await?  // <-- LINE 483
        }
    };
    let indexed_block = block.to_indexed_block(&prev_block, self).await?;
    working_snapshot.add_block_new_chaintip(indexed_block.clone());
    Ok(indexed_block)
}

Infinite loop via self-referencing block:

A compromised validator serves a block B where B.prev_hash == B.hash.
handle_reorg is called with B.
get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(B.prev_hash) finds B itself in working_snapshot.blocks.
Check: is B.hash in working_snapshot.heights_to_hashes? If B is a new chaintip not yet on the main chain, no.
Recurse with prev_block = B (the exact same block).
This repeats forever. The async recursion builds a new Box::pin future each iteration, consuming heap memory and CPU.

Stack exhaustion via deep reorg: A deep reorg of >1000 blocks would recurse >1000 times. Each async recursion creates a new Box::pin future on the heap. While this won't exhaust the native stack immediately, it will allocate unbounded heap memory and CPU time, effectively DoS-ing the sync task.

.expect("empty snapshot impossible") panic:

Location: packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:543-548

new_snapshot.remove_finalized_blocks(finalized_height);
let best_block = &new_snapshot
    .blocks
    .values()
    .max_by_key(|block| block.chainwork())
    .cloned()
    .expect("empty snapshot impossible"); // <-- LINE 548

If finalized_height is greater than or equal to all blocks in new_snapshot.blocks, remove_finalized_blocks retains only blocks at or above that height. If none exist, new_snapshot.blocks becomes empty. The .expect() then panics. While the comment claims this is "impossible," defensive programming dictates it is reachable under corruption or edge-case sync conditions.

PoC

Run a regtest.
Serve a block where header.previous_block_hash == block.hash().
Zaino's NonFinalizedState::sync enters handle_reorg and infinite-loops.
Sync never completes. CPU usage pegs to 100%. No new blocks are served to clients.

Fix

Add an explicit recursion depth limit (e.g., max 1000 iterations) and return SyncError::ReorgFailure if exceeded:
```
const MAX_REORG_DEPTH: usize = 1000;
```
Track visited hashes in a HashSet<BlockHash> during traversal to detect cycles and abort with an error.
Replace .expect("empty snapshot impossible") with a proper Err(UpdateError::DatabaseHole) or similar error return.

Additional Attack Vectors

Deep reorg DoS: A miner with significant hash power (or a compromised validator) triggers a deep reorg. Zaino spends excessive CPU and memory in handle_reorg, starving the async runtime and stalling response serving.
Fork-choice manipulation: By serving cyclic or very deep sidechains, an attacker can keep Zaino stuck in reorg handling indefinitely, preventing it from ever serving the real best chain.

Fixed in


          0.4.1

References

Updated Jul 31, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Mar 26, 2026

0.1.2 unknown yanked

1 CVE

GHSA-3whf-vgf2-9w6g Jul 31, 2026

zaino-state has a Non-Finalized State Reorg — No Cycle Detection or Depth Limit

Medium

Network Low None None

Summary

NonFinalizedState::handle_reorg is a recursive, unbounded async function that traverses parent blocks until it finds a common ancestor on the main chain. It has no recursion depth limit and no cycle detection. A malicious or buggy validator can serve a block whose previous_block_hash points back to itself (or forms a cycle with other blocks), causing handle_reorg to infinite-loop, consuming 100% CPU and never making sync progress. Additionally, update() contains an .expect("empty snapshot impossible") that panics if the non-finalized snapshot becomes empty after trimming finalized blocks.

Details

Location: packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:443-489

async fn handle_reorg(
    &self,
    working_snapshot: &mut NonfinalizedBlockCacheSnapshot,
    block: &impl Block,
) -> Result<IndexedBlock, SyncError> {
    let prev_block = match working_snapshot
        .get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order())
        .cloned()
    {
        Some(prev_block) => {
            if !working_snapshot
                .heights_to_hashes
                .values()
                .any(|hash| hash == prev_block.hash())
            {
                Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &prev_block)).await?  // <-- LINE 459
            } else {
                prev_block
            }
        }
        None => {
            let prev_block = self
                .source
                .get_block(HashOrHeight::Hash(
                    zebra_chain::block::Hash::from_bytes_in_serialized_order(
                        block.prev_hash_bytes_serialized_order(),
                    ),
                ))
                .await
                .map_err(|e| { ... })?
                .ok_or(SyncError::ValidatorConnectionError(...))?;
            Box::pin(self.handle_reorg(working_snapshot, &*prev_block)).await?  // <-- LINE 483
        }
    };
    let indexed_block = block.to_indexed_block(&prev_block, self).await?;
    working_snapshot.add_block_new_chaintip(indexed_block.clone());
    Ok(indexed_block)
}

Infinite loop via self-referencing block:

A compromised validator serves a block B where B.prev_hash == B.hash.
handle_reorg is called with B.
get_block_by_hash_bytes_in_serialized_order(B.prev_hash) finds B itself in working_snapshot.blocks.
Check: is B.hash in working_snapshot.heights_to_hashes? If B is a new chaintip not yet on the main chain, no.
Recurse with prev_block = B (the exact same block).
This repeats forever. The async recursion builds a new Box::pin future each iteration, consuming heap memory and CPU.

Stack exhaustion via deep reorg: A deep reorg of >1000 blocks would recurse >1000 times. Each async recursion creates a new Box::pin future on the heap. While this won't exhaust the native stack immediately, it will allocate unbounded heap memory and CPU time, effectively DoS-ing the sync task.

.expect("empty snapshot impossible") panic:

Location: packages/zaino-state/src/chain_index/non_finalised_state.rs:543-548

new_snapshot.remove_finalized_blocks(finalized_height);
let best_block = &new_snapshot
    .blocks
    .values()
    .max_by_key(|block| block.chainwork())
    .cloned()
    .expect("empty snapshot impossible"); // <-- LINE 548

If finalized_height is greater than or equal to all blocks in new_snapshot.blocks, remove_finalized_blocks retains only blocks at or above that height. If none exist, new_snapshot.blocks becomes empty. The .expect() then panics. While the comment claims this is "impossible," defensive programming dictates it is reachable under corruption or edge-case sync conditions.

PoC

Run a regtest.
Serve a block where header.previous_block_hash == block.hash().
Zaino's NonFinalizedState::sync enters handle_reorg and infinite-loops.
Sync never completes. CPU usage pegs to 100%. No new blocks are served to clients.

Fix

Add an explicit recursion depth limit (e.g., max 1000 iterations) and return SyncError::ReorgFailure if exceeded:
```
const MAX_REORG_DEPTH: usize = 1000;
```
Track visited hashes in a HashSet<BlockHash> during traversal to detect cycles and abort with an error.
Replace .expect("empty snapshot impossible") with a proper Err(UpdateError::DatabaseHole) or similar error return.

Additional Attack Vectors

Deep reorg DoS: A miner with significant hash power (or a compromised validator) triggers a deep reorg. Zaino spends excessive CPU and memory in handle_reorg, starving the async runtime and stalling response serving.
Fork-choice manipulation: By serving cyclic or very deep sidechains, an attacker can keep Zaino stuck in reorg handling indefinitely, preventing it from ever serving the real best chain.

Fixed in


          0.4.1

References

Updated Jul 31, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Aug 20, 2025

Activity

Details