tuftool
Activity
- Latest release
- 2mo ago
- Total releases
- 31
- Cadence
- ~2 months
- Last 12 months
- 3
Details
- License
- MIT OR Apache-2.0
- First release
- Nov 09, 2019
| Version | Released | |
|---|---|---|
0.17.0
unknown
|
0.17.0
unknown
Dependencies (30)
+ 22 more |
|
0.16.0
unknown
|
0.16.0
unknown
Dependencies (30)
+ 22 more |
|
0.15.0
unknown
|
0.15.0
unknown
Dependencies (30)
+ 22 more |
|
0.14.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.14.0
unknown
Dependencies (29)
+ 21 more |
|
0.13.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.13.0
unknown
Dependencies (29)
+ 21 more |
|
0.12.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.12.0
unknown
Dependencies (29)
+ 21 more |
|
0.11.1
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.11.1
unknown
Dependencies (28)
+ 20 more |
|
0.11.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.11.0
unknown
Dependencies (28)
+ 20 more |
|
0.10.3
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.10.3
unknown
Dependencies (28)
+ 20 more |
|
0.10.2
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.10.2
unknown
Dependencies (28)
+ 20 more |
|
0.10.1
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.10.1
unknown
Dependencies (29)
+ 21 more |
|
0.10.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.10.0
unknown
Dependencies (24)
+ 16 more |
|
0.9.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.9.0
unknown
Dependencies (26)
+ 18 more |
|
0.8.2
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.8.2
unknown
Dependencies (26)
+ 18 more |
|
0.8.1
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.8.1
unknown
Dependencies (26)
+ 18 more |
|
0.8.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.8.0
unknown
Dependencies (26)
+ 18 more |
|
0.7.2
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.7.2
unknown
Dependencies (27)
+ 19 more |
|
0.7.1
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.7.1
unknown
Dependencies (27)
+ 19 more |
|
0.7.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.7.0
unknown
Dependencies (27)
+ 19 more |
|
0.6.4
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.6.4
unknown
Dependencies (27)
+ 19 more |
|
0.6.3
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.6.3
unknown
Dependencies (27)
+ 19 more |
|
0.6.2
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.6.2
unknown
Dependencies (27)
+ 19 more |
|
0.6.1
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.6.1
unknown
Dependencies (27)
+ 19 more |
|
0.6.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.6.0
unknown
Dependencies (27)
+ 19 more |
|
0.5.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.5.0
unknown
Dependencies (27)
+ 19 more |
|
0.4.1
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.4.1
unknown
Dependencies (25)
+ 17 more |
|
0.4.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.4.0
unknown
Dependencies (22)
+ 14 more |
|
0.3.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.3.0
unknown
Dependencies (20)
+ 12 more |
|
0.2.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.2.0
unknown
Dependencies (20)
+ 12 more |
|
0.1.1
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.1.1
unknown
Dependencies (19)
+ 11 more |
|
0.1.0
unknown
2 CVEs
CVE-2026-6967
GHSA-4v58-8p28-2rq3
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough is Missing Delegated Metadata Validation
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryMissing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify delegated target metadata. It allows someone with write access to the metadata to serve expired or otherwise invalid targets from a TUF repository which tough will then trust rather than reject. Impacted Versions:tough 0.9.0 through 0.21.x, tuftool through 0.14.x PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process. Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2026-6966
GHSA-8m7c-8m39-rv4x
May 05, 2026
awslabs/tough Delegated Roles have a Signature Threshold Bypass
High
Network
High
Low
None
SummaryImproper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata. ImpactThe tough library, prior to 0.22.0, does not properly verify the uniqueness of keys in the signatures provided to meet the threshold of cryptographic signatures in delegated targets. It allows actors with access to a valid signing key to create multiple valid signatures in order to circumvent TUF requiring a minimum threshold of unique keys before the metadata is considered valid. PatchesThis issue has been addressed in tough version 0.22.0 and tuftool version 0.15.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. WorkaroundsNo workarounds to this issue are known. References
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact [AWS/Amazon] Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue. AcknowledgementAmazon Web Services Labs would like to thank Emily Albini of Oxide Computer and Oleh Konko of 1seal for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process Fixed in
0.15.0
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.1.0
unknown
Dependencies (22)
+ 14 more |