slice-deque

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer

The crate slice-ring-buffer was developed as a fork of slice-deque to continue maintenance and provide security patches, since the latter has been officially unmaintained (RUSTSEC-2020-0158).

While slice-ring-buffer has addressed some previously reported memory safety issues inherited from its fork origin (RUSTSEC-2021-0047), it still retains multiple unresolved memory corruption vulnerabilities.

Specifically, we have discovered four new memory safety bugs, each resulting in double-free violations that can occur when only safe APIs are invoked. These vulnerabilities correspond to four distinct safe APIs in the crate, each exposing unsound and vulnerable behavior due to incorrect usage of unsafe code internally.

Unfortunately, the maintainer doesn't have much availability to resolve these issues so there's no concrete timeline for fixes. Community contributions towards fixing these vulnerabilities would be much appreciated.

An issue was discovered in the slice-deque crate through 2021-02-19 for Rust. A double drop can occur in SliceDeque::drain_filter upon a panic in a predicate function.

Affected versions of this crate entered a corrupted state if mem::size_of::() % allocation_granularity() != 0 and a specific allocation pattern was used: sufficiently shifting the deque elements over the mirrored page boundary.

This allows an attacker that controls controls both element insertion and removal to corrupt the deque, such that reading elements from it would read bytes corresponding to other elements in the deque. (e.g. a read of T could read some bytes from one value and some bytes from an adjacent one, resulting in a T whose value representation is not meaningful). This is undefined behavior.

The flaw was corrected by using a pair of pointers to track the head and tail of the deque instead of a pair of indices. This pair of pointers are represented using a Rust slice.

Affected versions of this crate did not properly update the head and tail of the deque when inserting and removing elements from the front if, before insertion or removal, the tail of the deque was in the mirrored memory region, and if, after insertion or removal, the head of the deque is exactly at the beginning of the mirrored memory region.

An attacker that controls both element insertion and removal into the deque could put it in a corrupted state. Once the deque enters such an state, its head and tail are corrupted, but in bounds of the allocated memory. This can result in partial reads and writes, reads of uninitialized memory, reads of memory containing previously dropped objects, etc. An attacker could exploit this to alter program execution.

The flaw was corrected by properly updating the head and tail of the deque in this case.

The author of the slice-deque crate is unresponsive and is not receiving security patches.

Maintained alternatives:

• slice-ring-buffer