pgp

Summary

For some messages, rPGP returned incorrectly decrypted data without signaling that integrity protection was invalid.

Details

When decrypting SEIPD (Symmetrically Encrypted and Integrity Protected Data Packet), rPGP previously did not under all circumstances report the absence of valid integrity protection to callers of the library.

Impact

While the resulting invalid decryption output is not attacker controlled, its contents may be a security concern if an attacker can gain access to it.

Attribution

Discovered internally in the course of rPGP development work.

Summary

Previous rPGP versions could be caused to crash with a "stack overflow" when parsing messages that contain deeply nested message layers, such as messages with many signatures.

rPGP 0.19.0 resolves this issue with a more robust message handling implementation (via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/625).

Impact

An attacker could cause applications to crash in rPGP's message parsing subsystem, when applications attempt to ingest messages.

Attribution

Discovered internally during rPGP development, using a fuzz test suite previously contributed by Christian Reitter.

Summary

It was possible to trigger an unhandled edge case in the Rust Crypto rsa crate through rPGP packet parsing functionality, and crash the process that runs rPGP. This problem has been patched in a new rsa version. The new release of rPGP ensures a patched version of the rsa crate is in use, which prevents this issue.

Details

While parsing a special RSA secret key packet, rPGP calls the rsa crate with the provided key. On vulnerable versions, this results in a Rust "panic" during key construction. Note that an attacker can trigger this situation even in places where applications don't expect to handle foreign key material, for example while attempting to receive a message.

For more information on the rsa crate vulnerability, see https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/security/advisories/GHSA-9c48-w39g-hm26 and https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/624. In rPGP, this has been fixed via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/698.

Impact

This issue impacts availability (i.e. applications can crash).

Affected rPGP versions: rPGP 0.16.0-alpha.0 to 0.18.0 Vulnerable rsa versions: all before version 0.9.10

Workaround

The issue depends on the combination of affected rPGP and rsa versions. Users of affected rPGP versions can pin the patched rsa 0.9.10 via a cargo lockfile to mitigate the issue.

Attribution

Discovered by Christian Reitter from Radically Open Security during a security review for Proton AG.

Summary

For some messages, rPGP returned incorrectly decrypted data without signaling that integrity protection was invalid.

Details

When decrypting SEIPD (Symmetrically Encrypted and Integrity Protected Data Packet), rPGP previously did not under all circumstances report the absence of valid integrity protection to callers of the library.

Impact

While the resulting invalid decryption output is not attacker controlled, its contents may be a security concern if an attacker can gain access to it.

Attribution

Discovered internally in the course of rPGP development work.

Summary

Previous rPGP versions could be caused to crash with a "stack overflow" when parsing messages that contain deeply nested message layers, such as messages with many signatures.

rPGP 0.19.0 resolves this issue with a more robust message handling implementation (via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/625).

Impact

An attacker could cause applications to crash in rPGP's message parsing subsystem, when applications attempt to ingest messages.

Attribution

Discovered internally during rPGP development, using a fuzz test suite previously contributed by Christian Reitter.

Summary

It was possible to trigger an unhandled edge case in the Rust Crypto rsa crate through rPGP packet parsing functionality, and crash the process that runs rPGP. This problem has been patched in a new rsa version. The new release of rPGP ensures a patched version of the rsa crate is in use, which prevents this issue.

Details

While parsing a special RSA secret key packet, rPGP calls the rsa crate with the provided key. On vulnerable versions, this results in a Rust "panic" during key construction. Note that an attacker can trigger this situation even in places where applications don't expect to handle foreign key material, for example while attempting to receive a message.

For more information on the rsa crate vulnerability, see https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/security/advisories/GHSA-9c48-w39g-hm26 and https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/624. In rPGP, this has been fixed via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/698.

Impact

This issue impacts availability (i.e. applications can crash).

Affected rPGP versions: rPGP 0.16.0-alpha.0 to 0.18.0 Vulnerable rsa versions: all before version 0.9.10

Workaround

The issue depends on the combination of affected rPGP and rsa versions. Users of affected rPGP versions can pin the patched rsa 0.9.10 via a cargo lockfile to mitigate the issue.

Attribution

Discovered by Christian Reitter from Radically Open Security during a security review for Proton AG.

Summary

For some messages, rPGP returned incorrectly decrypted data without signaling that integrity protection was invalid.

Details

When decrypting SEIPD (Symmetrically Encrypted and Integrity Protected Data Packet), rPGP previously did not under all circumstances report the absence of valid integrity protection to callers of the library.

Impact

While the resulting invalid decryption output is not attacker controlled, its contents may be a security concern if an attacker can gain access to it.

Attribution

Discovered internally in the course of rPGP development work.

Summary

Previous rPGP versions could be caused to crash with a "stack overflow" when parsing messages that contain deeply nested message layers, such as messages with many signatures.

rPGP 0.19.0 resolves this issue with a more robust message handling implementation (via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/625).

Impact

An attacker could cause applications to crash in rPGP's message parsing subsystem, when applications attempt to ingest messages.

Attribution

Discovered internally during rPGP development, using a fuzz test suite previously contributed by Christian Reitter.

Summary

It was possible to trigger an unhandled edge case in the Rust Crypto rsa crate through rPGP packet parsing functionality, and crash the process that runs rPGP. This problem has been patched in a new rsa version. The new release of rPGP ensures a patched version of the rsa crate is in use, which prevents this issue.

Details

While parsing a special RSA secret key packet, rPGP calls the rsa crate with the provided key. On vulnerable versions, this results in a Rust "panic" during key construction. Note that an attacker can trigger this situation even in places where applications don't expect to handle foreign key material, for example while attempting to receive a message.

For more information on the rsa crate vulnerability, see https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/security/advisories/GHSA-9c48-w39g-hm26 and https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/624. In rPGP, this has been fixed via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/698.

Impact

This issue impacts availability (i.e. applications can crash).

Affected rPGP versions: rPGP 0.16.0-alpha.0 to 0.18.0 Vulnerable rsa versions: all before version 0.9.10

Workaround

The issue depends on the combination of affected rPGP and rsa versions. Users of affected rPGP versions can pin the patched rsa 0.9.10 via a cargo lockfile to mitigate the issue.

Attribution

Discovered by Christian Reitter from Radically Open Security during a security review for Proton AG.

Summary

For some messages, rPGP returned incorrectly decrypted data without signaling that integrity protection was invalid.

Details

When decrypting SEIPD (Symmetrically Encrypted and Integrity Protected Data Packet), rPGP previously did not under all circumstances report the absence of valid integrity protection to callers of the library.

Impact

While the resulting invalid decryption output is not attacker controlled, its contents may be a security concern if an attacker can gain access to it.

Attribution

Discovered internally in the course of rPGP development work.

Summary

Previous rPGP versions could be caused to crash with a "stack overflow" when parsing messages that contain deeply nested message layers, such as messages with many signatures.

rPGP 0.19.0 resolves this issue with a more robust message handling implementation (via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/625).

Impact

An attacker could cause applications to crash in rPGP's message parsing subsystem, when applications attempt to ingest messages.

Attribution

Discovered internally during rPGP development, using a fuzz test suite previously contributed by Christian Reitter.

Summary

It was possible to trigger an unhandled edge case in the Rust Crypto rsa crate through rPGP packet parsing functionality, and crash the process that runs rPGP. This problem has been patched in a new rsa version. The new release of rPGP ensures a patched version of the rsa crate is in use, which prevents this issue.

Details

While parsing a special RSA secret key packet, rPGP calls the rsa crate with the provided key. On vulnerable versions, this results in a Rust "panic" during key construction. Note that an attacker can trigger this situation even in places where applications don't expect to handle foreign key material, for example while attempting to receive a message.

For more information on the rsa crate vulnerability, see https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/security/advisories/GHSA-9c48-w39g-hm26 and https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/624. In rPGP, this has been fixed via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/698.

Impact

This issue impacts availability (i.e. applications can crash).

Affected rPGP versions: rPGP 0.16.0-alpha.0 to 0.18.0 Vulnerable rsa versions: all before version 0.9.10

Workaround

The issue depends on the combination of affected rPGP and rsa versions. Users of affected rPGP versions can pin the patched rsa 0.9.10 via a cargo lockfile to mitigate the issue.

Attribution

Discovered by Christian Reitter from Radically Open Security during a security review for Proton AG.

Summary

For some messages, rPGP returned incorrectly decrypted data without signaling that integrity protection was invalid.

Details

When decrypting SEIPD (Symmetrically Encrypted and Integrity Protected Data Packet), rPGP previously did not under all circumstances report the absence of valid integrity protection to callers of the library.

Impact

While the resulting invalid decryption output is not attacker controlled, its contents may be a security concern if an attacker can gain access to it.

Attribution

Discovered internally in the course of rPGP development work.

Summary

Previous rPGP versions could be caused to crash with a "stack overflow" when parsing messages that contain deeply nested message layers, such as messages with many signatures.

rPGP 0.19.0 resolves this issue with a more robust message handling implementation (via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/625).

Impact

An attacker could cause applications to crash in rPGP's message parsing subsystem, when applications attempt to ingest messages.

Attribution

Discovered internally during rPGP development, using a fuzz test suite previously contributed by Christian Reitter.

Summary

It was possible to trigger an unhandled edge case in the Rust Crypto rsa crate through rPGP packet parsing functionality, and crash the process that runs rPGP. This problem has been patched in a new rsa version. The new release of rPGP ensures a patched version of the rsa crate is in use, which prevents this issue.

Details

While parsing a special RSA secret key packet, rPGP calls the rsa crate with the provided key. On vulnerable versions, this results in a Rust "panic" during key construction. Note that an attacker can trigger this situation even in places where applications don't expect to handle foreign key material, for example while attempting to receive a message.

For more information on the rsa crate vulnerability, see https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/security/advisories/GHSA-9c48-w39g-hm26 and https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/624. In rPGP, this has been fixed via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/698.

Impact

This issue impacts availability (i.e. applications can crash).

Affected rPGP versions: rPGP 0.16.0-alpha.0 to 0.18.0 Vulnerable rsa versions: all before version 0.9.10

Workaround

The issue depends on the combination of affected rPGP and rsa versions. Users of affected rPGP versions can pin the patched rsa 0.9.10 via a cargo lockfile to mitigate the issue.

Attribution

Discovered by Christian Reitter from Radically Open Security during a security review for Proton AG.

Summary

For some messages, rPGP returned incorrectly decrypted data without signaling that integrity protection was invalid.

Details

When decrypting SEIPD (Symmetrically Encrypted and Integrity Protected Data Packet), rPGP previously did not under all circumstances report the absence of valid integrity protection to callers of the library.

Impact

While the resulting invalid decryption output is not attacker controlled, its contents may be a security concern if an attacker can gain access to it.

Attribution

Discovered internally in the course of rPGP development work.

Summary

Previous rPGP versions could be caused to crash with a "stack overflow" when parsing messages that contain deeply nested message layers, such as messages with many signatures.

rPGP 0.19.0 resolves this issue with a more robust message handling implementation (via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/625).

Impact

An attacker could cause applications to crash in rPGP's message parsing subsystem, when applications attempt to ingest messages.

Attribution

Discovered internally during rPGP development, using a fuzz test suite previously contributed by Christian Reitter.

Summary

It was possible to trigger an unhandled edge case in the Rust Crypto rsa crate through rPGP packet parsing functionality, and crash the process that runs rPGP. This problem has been patched in a new rsa version. The new release of rPGP ensures a patched version of the rsa crate is in use, which prevents this issue.

Details

While parsing a special RSA secret key packet, rPGP calls the rsa crate with the provided key. On vulnerable versions, this results in a Rust "panic" during key construction. Note that an attacker can trigger this situation even in places where applications don't expect to handle foreign key material, for example while attempting to receive a message.

For more information on the rsa crate vulnerability, see https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/security/advisories/GHSA-9c48-w39g-hm26 and https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/624. In rPGP, this has been fixed via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/698.

Impact

This issue impacts availability (i.e. applications can crash).

Affected rPGP versions: rPGP 0.16.0-alpha.0 to 0.18.0 Vulnerable rsa versions: all before version 0.9.10

Workaround

The issue depends on the combination of affected rPGP and rsa versions. Users of affected rPGP versions can pin the patched rsa 0.9.10 via a cargo lockfile to mitigate the issue.

Attribution

Discovered by Christian Reitter from Radically Open Security during a security review for Proton AG.

Summary

For some messages, rPGP returned incorrectly decrypted data without signaling that integrity protection was invalid.

Details

When decrypting SEIPD (Symmetrically Encrypted and Integrity Protected Data Packet), rPGP previously did not under all circumstances report the absence of valid integrity protection to callers of the library.

Impact

While the resulting invalid decryption output is not attacker controlled, its contents may be a security concern if an attacker can gain access to it.

Attribution

Discovered internally in the course of rPGP development work.

Summary

Previous rPGP versions could be caused to crash with a "stack overflow" when parsing messages that contain deeply nested message layers, such as messages with many signatures.

rPGP 0.19.0 resolves this issue with a more robust message handling implementation (via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/625).

Impact

An attacker could cause applications to crash in rPGP's message parsing subsystem, when applications attempt to ingest messages.

Attribution

Discovered internally during rPGP development, using a fuzz test suite previously contributed by Christian Reitter.

Summary

It was possible to trigger an unhandled edge case in the Rust Crypto rsa crate through rPGP packet parsing functionality, and crash the process that runs rPGP. This problem has been patched in a new rsa version. The new release of rPGP ensures a patched version of the rsa crate is in use, which prevents this issue.

Details

While parsing a special RSA secret key packet, rPGP calls the rsa crate with the provided key. On vulnerable versions, this results in a Rust "panic" during key construction. Note that an attacker can trigger this situation even in places where applications don't expect to handle foreign key material, for example while attempting to receive a message.

For more information on the rsa crate vulnerability, see https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/security/advisories/GHSA-9c48-w39g-hm26 and https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/624. In rPGP, this has been fixed via https://github.com/rpgp/rpgp/pull/698.

Impact

This issue impacts availability (i.e. applications can crash).

Affected rPGP versions: rPGP 0.16.0-alpha.0 to 0.18.0 Vulnerable rsa versions: all before version 0.9.10

Workaround

The issue depends on the combination of affected rPGP and rsa versions. Users of affected rPGP versions can pin the patched rsa 0.9.10 via a cargo lockfile to mitigate the issue.

Attribution

Discovered by Christian Reitter from Radically Open Security during a security review for Proton AG.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Impact

Affected rpgp versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected rpgp versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the Argon2 function. An attacker can provide a valid Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key packet (SKESK) which uses Argon2 for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since rpgp did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the rpgp process. Under some conditions, the memory resource exhaustion may trigger other system instability. Alternatively, this can make the program unresponsive via long computations. The attacker needs to trick a victim into attempting decryption, but does not require knowledge of the symmetric secret used by the victim.

There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

The impact details on the message parsing component varies with different versions. We've confirmed some of the problematic behavior on older versions such as v0.10.0 and see all recent versions as affected in some form.

The affected Argon2 functionality was introduced with v0.12.0-alpha.1, earlier versions are not vulnerable.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.2. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.

During a security audit, Radically Open Security discovered several reachable edge cases which allow an attacker to trigger rpgp crashes by providing crafted data.

Impact

When processing malformed input, rpgp can run into Rust panics which halt the program.

This can happen in the following scenarios:

• Parsing OpenPGP messages from binary or armor format
• Decrypting OpenPGP messages via decrypt_with_password()
• Parsing or converting public keys
• Parsing signed cleartext messages from armor format
• Using malformed private keys to sign or encrypt

Given the affected components, we consider most attack vectors to be reachable by remote attackers during typical use cases of the rpgp library. The attack complexity is low since the malformed messages are generic, short, and require no victim-specific knowledge.

The result is a denial-of-service impact via program termination. There is no impact to confidentiality or integrity security properties.

Versions and Patches

All recent versions are affected by at least some of the above mentioned issues.

The vulnerabilities have been fixed with version 0.14.1. We recommend all users to upgrade to this version.

References

The security audit was made possible by the NLnet Foundation NGI Zero Core grant program for rpgp.