openssl

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

Impact

ssl::select_next_proto can return a slice pointing into the server argument's buffer but with a lifetime bound to the client argument. In situations where the server buffer's lifetime is shorter than the client buffer's, this can cause a use after free. This could cause the server to crash or to return arbitrary memory contents to the client.

Patches

openssl 0.10.70 fixes the signature of ssl::select_next_proto to properly constrain the output buffer's lifetime to that of both input buffers.

Workarounds

In standard usage of ssl::select_next_proto in the callback passed to SslContextBuilder::set_alpn_select_callback, code is only affected if the server buffer is constructed within the callback. For example:

Not vulnerable - the server buffer has a 'static lifetime:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(b"\x02h2", client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Not vulnerable - the server buffer outlives the handshake:

let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Vulnerable - the server buffer is freed when the callback returns:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

References

https://github.com/sfackler/rust-openssl/pull/2360

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

Impact

ssl::select_next_proto can return a slice pointing into the server argument's buffer but with a lifetime bound to the client argument. In situations where the server buffer's lifetime is shorter than the client buffer's, this can cause a use after free. This could cause the server to crash or to return arbitrary memory contents to the client.

Patches

openssl 0.10.70 fixes the signature of ssl::select_next_proto to properly constrain the output buffer's lifetime to that of both input buffers.

Workarounds

In standard usage of ssl::select_next_proto in the callback passed to SslContextBuilder::set_alpn_select_callback, code is only affected if the server buffer is constructed within the callback. For example:

Not vulnerable - the server buffer has a 'static lifetime:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(b"\x02h2", client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Not vulnerable - the server buffer outlives the handshake:

let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Vulnerable - the server buffer is freed when the callback returns:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

References

https://github.com/sfackler/rust-openssl/pull/2360

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

Impact

ssl::select_next_proto can return a slice pointing into the server argument's buffer but with a lifetime bound to the client argument. In situations where the server buffer's lifetime is shorter than the client buffer's, this can cause a use after free. This could cause the server to crash or to return arbitrary memory contents to the client.

Patches

openssl 0.10.70 fixes the signature of ssl::select_next_proto to properly constrain the output buffer's lifetime to that of both input buffers.

Workarounds

In standard usage of ssl::select_next_proto in the callback passed to SslContextBuilder::set_alpn_select_callback, code is only affected if the server buffer is constructed within the callback. For example:

Not vulnerable - the server buffer has a 'static lifetime:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(b"\x02h2", client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Not vulnerable - the server buffer outlives the handshake:

let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Vulnerable - the server buffer is freed when the callback returns:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

References

https://github.com/sfackler/rust-openssl/pull/2360

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

Impact

ssl::select_next_proto can return a slice pointing into the server argument's buffer but with a lifetime bound to the client argument. In situations where the server buffer's lifetime is shorter than the client buffer's, this can cause a use after free. This could cause the server to crash or to return arbitrary memory contents to the client.

Patches

openssl 0.10.70 fixes the signature of ssl::select_next_proto to properly constrain the output buffer's lifetime to that of both input buffers.

Workarounds

In standard usage of ssl::select_next_proto in the callback passed to SslContextBuilder::set_alpn_select_callback, code is only affected if the server buffer is constructed within the callback. For example:

Not vulnerable - the server buffer has a 'static lifetime:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(b"\x02h2", client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Not vulnerable - the server buffer outlives the handshake:

let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Vulnerable - the server buffer is freed when the callback returns:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

References

https://github.com/sfackler/rust-openssl/pull/2360

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

Impact

ssl::select_next_proto can return a slice pointing into the server argument's buffer but with a lifetime bound to the client argument. In situations where the server buffer's lifetime is shorter than the client buffer's, this can cause a use after free. This could cause the server to crash or to return arbitrary memory contents to the client.

Patches

openssl 0.10.70 fixes the signature of ssl::select_next_proto to properly constrain the output buffer's lifetime to that of both input buffers.

Workarounds

In standard usage of ssl::select_next_proto in the callback passed to SslContextBuilder::set_alpn_select_callback, code is only affected if the server buffer is constructed within the callback. For example:

Not vulnerable - the server buffer has a 'static lifetime:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(b"\x02h2", client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Not vulnerable - the server buffer outlives the handshake:

let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Vulnerable - the server buffer is freed when the callback returns:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

References

https://github.com/sfackler/rust-openssl/pull/2360

Previously, MemBio::get_buf called slice::from_raw_parts with a null-pointer, which violates the functions invariants, leading to undefined behavior. In debug builds this would produce an assertion failure. This is now fixed.

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

Impact

ssl::select_next_proto can return a slice pointing into the server argument's buffer but with a lifetime bound to the client argument. In situations where the server buffer's lifetime is shorter than the client buffer's, this can cause a use after free. This could cause the server to crash or to return arbitrary memory contents to the client.

Patches

openssl 0.10.70 fixes the signature of ssl::select_next_proto to properly constrain the output buffer's lifetime to that of both input buffers.

Workarounds

In standard usage of ssl::select_next_proto in the callback passed to SslContextBuilder::set_alpn_select_callback, code is only affected if the server buffer is constructed within the callback. For example:

Not vulnerable - the server buffer has a 'static lifetime:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(b"\x02h2", client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Not vulnerable - the server buffer outlives the handshake:

let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Vulnerable - the server buffer is freed when the callback returns:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

References

https://github.com/sfackler/rust-openssl/pull/2360

Previously, MemBio::get_buf called slice::from_raw_parts with a null-pointer, which violates the functions invariants, leading to undefined behavior. In debug builds this would produce an assertion failure. This is now fixed.

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

Impact

ssl::select_next_proto can return a slice pointing into the server argument's buffer but with a lifetime bound to the client argument. In situations where the server buffer's lifetime is shorter than the client buffer's, this can cause a use after free. This could cause the server to crash or to return arbitrary memory contents to the client.

Patches

openssl 0.10.70 fixes the signature of ssl::select_next_proto to properly constrain the output buffer's lifetime to that of both input buffers.

Workarounds

In standard usage of ssl::select_next_proto in the callback passed to SslContextBuilder::set_alpn_select_callback, code is only affected if the server buffer is constructed within the callback. For example:

Not vulnerable - the server buffer has a 'static lifetime:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(b"\x02h2", client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Not vulnerable - the server buffer outlives the handshake:

let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Vulnerable - the server buffer is freed when the callback returns:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

References

https://github.com/sfackler/rust-openssl/pull/2360

Previously, MemBio::get_buf called slice::from_raw_parts with a null-pointer, which violates the functions invariants, leading to undefined behavior. In debug builds this would produce an assertion failure. This is now fixed.

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_inplace incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

This method was missed in the fix for GHSA-xv59-967r-8726

CipherCtxRef::cipher_update, CipherCtxRef::cipher_update_vec, and symm::Crypter::update incorrectly sized output buffers when used with AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers (EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_wrap_pad). For a non-multiple-of-8 input, OpenSSL writes up to 7 bytes past the end of the caller's buffer or Vec, producing attacker-controllable heap corruption when the plaintext length is attacker-influenced.

This only impacts users using AES key-wrap-with-padding ciphers.

X509Ref::ocsp_responders returns OCSP responder URLs from a certificate's AIA extension as OpensslString, whose Deref<Target = str> wraps the raw bytes with str::from_utf8_unchecked. OpenSSL does not enforce that the underlying IA5String is ASCII, so a certificate with non-UTF-8 bytes in its OCSP accessLocation causes safe Rust code to construct a &str that violates the UTF-8 invariant — resulting in undefined behavior.

Deriver::derive (and PkeyCtxRef::derive) sets len = buf.len() and passes it as the in/out length to EVP_PKEY_derive, relying on OpenSSL to honor it. On OpenSSL 1.1.x, X25519, X448, DH and HKDF-extract ignore the incoming *keylen, unconditionally writing the full shared secret (32/56/prime-size bytes). A caller passing a short slice gets a heap/stack overflow from safe code. OpenSSL 3.x providers do check, so this only impacts older OpenSSL.

The *_from_pem_callback APIs did not validate the length returned by the user's callback. A password callback that returns a value larger than the buffer it was given can cause some versions of OpenSSL to over-read this buffer. OpenSSL 3.x is not affected by this.

Summary

aes::unwrap_key() has an incorrect bounds assertion on the out buffer size, which can lead to out-of-bounds write.

Details

aes::unwrap_key() contains an incorrect assertion: it checks that out.len() + 8 <= in_.len(), but this condition is reversed. The intended invariant is out.len() >= in_.len() - 8, ensuring the output buffer is large enough.

Because of the inverted check, the function only accepts buffers at or below the minimum required size and rejects larger ones. If a smaller buffer is provided the function will write past the end of out by in_.len() - 8 - out.len() bytes, causing an out-of-bounds write from a safe public function.

Impact

Vulnerable applications using AES keywrap and allowing attacker controlled buffer sizes could have an attacker trigger an out-of-bounds write.

EVP_DigestFinal() always writes EVP_MD_CTX_size(ctx) to the out buffer. If out is smaller than that, MdCtxRef::digest_final() writes past its end, usually corrupting the stack. This is reachable from safe Rust.

The FFI trampolines behind SslContextBuilder::set_psk_client_callback, set_psk_server_callback, set_cookie_generate_cb, and set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb forwarded the user closure's returned usize directly to OpenSSL without checking it against the &mut [u8] that was handed to the closure. This can lead to buffer overflows and other unintended consequences.

When a Some(...) value was passed to the properties argument of either of these functions, a use-after-free would result.

In practice this would nearly always result in OpenSSL treating the properties as an empty string (due to CString::drop's behavior).

The maintainers thank quitbug for reporting this vulnerability to us.

Impact

ssl::select_next_proto can return a slice pointing into the server argument's buffer but with a lifetime bound to the client argument. In situations where the server buffer's lifetime is shorter than the client buffer's, this can cause a use after free. This could cause the server to crash or to return arbitrary memory contents to the client.

Patches

openssl 0.10.70 fixes the signature of ssl::select_next_proto to properly constrain the output buffer's lifetime to that of both input buffers.

Workarounds

In standard usage of ssl::select_next_proto in the callback passed to SslContextBuilder::set_alpn_select_callback, code is only affected if the server buffer is constructed within the callback. For example:

Not vulnerable - the server buffer has a 'static lifetime:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(b"\x02h2", client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Not vulnerable - the server buffer outlives the handshake:

let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

Vulnerable - the server buffer is freed when the callback returns:

builder.set_alpn_select_callback(|_, client_protos| {
    let server_protos = b"\x02h2".to_vec();
    ssl::select_next_proto(&server_protos, client_protos).ok_or_else(AlpnError::NOACK)
});

References

https://github.com/sfackler/rust-openssl/pull/2360

Previously, MemBio::get_buf called slice::from_raw_parts with a null-pointer, which violates the functions invariants, leading to undefined behavior. In debug builds this would produce an assertion failure. This is now fixed.