libp2p-gossipsub

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation accepts attacker-controlled PRUNE backoff values and may perform unchecked time arithmetic when storing backoff state. A specially crafted PRUNE control message with an extremely large backoff (e.g. u64::MAX) can lead to Duration/Instant overflow during backoff update logic, triggering a panic in the networking state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal libp2p connection and does not require authentication.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single crafted PRUNE control message:

1. Establish a standard libp2p transport session and negotiate a stream multiplexer.
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and negotiate the meshsub protocol.
3. Send one protobuf RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff value (e.g. 18446744073709551615 / u64::MAX). When processed, the oversized backoff can reach time-update logic that adds Duration::from_secs(backoff) to Instant::now(), causing overflow and panic.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing a libp2p Gossipsub listener and using the affected backoff-handling path can be crashed by a network attacker that can reach the service port. The attack can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the crafted control message.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a release that hardens Gossipsub backoff handling.

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Description

Summary

The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in backoff expiry handling.
After a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum backoff value, the value is accepted and stored as an Instant near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked Instant + Duration arithmetic (backoff_time + slack), which can overflow and panic with: overflow when adding duration to instant This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer.

Attack Scenario

An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted PRUNE control data:

1. Establish a standard libp2p session (TCP + Noise) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (mplex/yamux).
2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing ControlPrune with a very large backoff (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. ~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds; example observed: 9223372036854674580 for ~28h uptime).
3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through Behaviour::handle_prune() into mesh/backoff update logic.
4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (Instant::now().checked_add(...)), so the malicious near-max value is retained.
5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes backoff_time + slack using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical).
Any application exposing an affected libp2p-gossipsub listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted PRUNE backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message.

Differences from CVE-2026-33040

This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening.

This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.