hickory-proto
A Rust based DNS client, server, and resolver
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Activity
- Latest release
- 3d ago
- Total releases
- 23
- Cadence
- ~18 days
- Last 12 months
- 8
Reach
- Downloads
- 75.6M
- Stars
- 5.4k
Details
- License
- MIT OR Apache-2.0
- First release
- Sep 26, 2023
| Version | Released | |
|---|---|---|
0.26.3
patch
|
0.26.3
patch
Dependencies (20)
+ 12 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.26.2
patch
|
0.26.2
patch
Dependencies (20)
+ 12 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.26.1
unknown
|
0.26.1
unknown
Dependencies (20)
+ 12 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.26.0
unknown
1 CVE
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.26.0
unknown
Dependencies (20)
+ 12 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.26.0-beta.4
unknown
1 CVE
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.26.0-beta.4
unknown
Dependencies (20)
+ 12 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.26.0-beta.3
unknown
1 CVE
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.26.0-beta.3
unknown
Dependencies (20)
+ 12 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.26.0-beta.2
unknown
1 CVE
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.26.0-beta.2
unknown
Dependencies (20)
+ 12 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.26.0-beta.1
unknown
1 CVE
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.26.0-beta.1
unknown
Dependencies (20)
+ 12 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.26.0-alpha.1
unknown
1 CVE
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.26.0-alpha.1
unknown
Dependencies (41)
+ 33 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.25.2
unknown
2 CVEs
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
RUSTSEC-2026-0118
RUSTSEC-2026-0120
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
High
Network
Low
None
None
The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in The bug is reachable by any caller of A The affected code was migrated from ReporterDavid Cook, ISRG References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.25.2
unknown
Dependencies (41)
+ 33 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.25.1
unknown
2 CVEs
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
RUSTSEC-2026-0118
RUSTSEC-2026-0120
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
High
Network
Low
None
None
The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in The bug is reachable by any caller of A The affected code was migrated from ReporterDavid Cook, ISRG References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.25.1
unknown
Dependencies (43)
+ 35 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.25.0
unknown
2 CVEs
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
RUSTSEC-2026-0118
RUSTSEC-2026-0120
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
High
Network
Low
None
None
The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in The bug is reachable by any caller of A The affected code was migrated from ReporterDavid Cook, ISRG References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.25.0
unknown
Dependencies (43)
+ 35 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.24.4
unknown
1 CVE
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.24.4
unknown
Dependencies (41)
+ 33 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.24.3
unknown
1 CVE
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.24.3
unknown
Dependencies (41)
+ 33 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.25.0-alpha.5
unknown
2 CVEs
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
RUSTSEC-2026-0118
RUSTSEC-2026-0120
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
High
Network
Low
None
None
The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in The bug is reachable by any caller of A The affected code was migrated from ReporterDavid Cook, ISRG References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.25.0-alpha.5
unknown
Dependencies (40)
+ 32 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.24.2
unknown
3 CVEs
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h
RUSTSEC-2025-0006
Feb 10, 2025
Hickory DNS failure to verify self-signed RRSIG for DNSKEYs
Medium
Summary The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone. Details verify_dnskey_rrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verify_rrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verify_default_rrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in verify_default_rrset(), verify_rrset_with_dnskey() is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its Proof is returned. Similarly, verify_dnskey_rrset() returns Ok(false) if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says "If all the keys are valid, then we are secure", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to verify_rrset(), it will call verify_default_rrset(). The special handling for DNSKEYs in verify_default_rrset() will then call verify_rrset_with_dnskey() using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its Proof. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside verify_dnskey_rrset() and cut verify_default_rrset() out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely. Fixed in
0.24.3
0.25.0-alpha.5
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2025-25188
GHSA-37wc-h8xc-5hc4
Feb 10, 2025
Hickory DNS's DNSSEC validation may accept broken authentication chains
Medium
Network
Low
Low
None
SummaryThe DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone. Details
Similarly, PoCThe proof of concepts have been integrated into the conformance test suite, as ImpactThis impacts Hickory DNS users relying on DNSSEC verification in the client library, stub resolver, or recursive resolver. Fixed in
0.24.3
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.24.2
unknown
Dependencies (41)
+ 33 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.25.0-alpha.4
unknown
3 CVEs
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
RUSTSEC-2026-0118
RUSTSEC-2026-0120
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
High
Network
Low
None
None
The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in The bug is reachable by any caller of A The affected code was migrated from ReporterDavid Cook, ISRG References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h
RUSTSEC-2025-0006
Feb 10, 2025
Hickory DNS failure to verify self-signed RRSIG for DNSKEYs
Medium
Summary The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone. Details verify_dnskey_rrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verify_rrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verify_default_rrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in verify_default_rrset(), verify_rrset_with_dnskey() is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its Proof is returned. Similarly, verify_dnskey_rrset() returns Ok(false) if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says "If all the keys are valid, then we are secure", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to verify_rrset(), it will call verify_default_rrset(). The special handling for DNSKEYs in verify_default_rrset() will then call verify_rrset_with_dnskey() using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its Proof. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside verify_dnskey_rrset() and cut verify_default_rrset() out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely. Fixed in
0.24.3
0.25.0-alpha.5
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.25.0-alpha.4
unknown
Dependencies (44)
+ 36 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.25.0-alpha.3
unknown
3 CVEs
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-3v94-mw7p-v465
RUSTSEC-2026-0118
RUSTSEC-2026-0120
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation enters unbounded loop on cross-zone responses
High
Network
Low
None
None
The NSEC3 closest-encloser proof validation in The bug is reachable by any caller of A The affected code was migrated from ReporterDavid Cook, ISRG References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h
RUSTSEC-2025-0006
Feb 10, 2025
Hickory DNS failure to verify self-signed RRSIG for DNSKEYs
Medium
Summary The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone. Details verify_dnskey_rrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verify_rrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verify_default_rrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in verify_default_rrset(), verify_rrset_with_dnskey() is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its Proof is returned. Similarly, verify_dnskey_rrset() returns Ok(false) if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says "If all the keys are valid, then we are secure", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to verify_rrset(), it will call verify_default_rrset(). The special handling for DNSKEYs in verify_default_rrset() will then call verify_rrset_with_dnskey() using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its Proof. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside verify_dnskey_rrset() and cut verify_default_rrset() out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely. Fixed in
0.24.3
0.25.0-alpha.5
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.25.0-alpha.3
unknown
Dependencies (44)
+ 36 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.25.0-alpha.2
unknown
2 CVEs
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h
RUSTSEC-2025-0006
Feb 10, 2025
Hickory DNS failure to verify self-signed RRSIG for DNSKEYs
Medium
Summary The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone. Details verify_dnskey_rrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verify_rrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verify_default_rrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in verify_default_rrset(), verify_rrset_with_dnskey() is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its Proof is returned. Similarly, verify_dnskey_rrset() returns Ok(false) if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says "If all the keys are valid, then we are secure", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to verify_rrset(), it will call verify_default_rrset(). The special handling for DNSKEYs in verify_default_rrset() will then call verify_rrset_with_dnskey() using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its Proof. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside verify_dnskey_rrset() and cut verify_default_rrset() out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely. Fixed in
0.24.3
0.25.0-alpha.5
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.25.0-alpha.2
unknown
Dependencies (45)
+ 37 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.25.0-alpha.1
unknown
2 CVEs
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h
RUSTSEC-2025-0006
Feb 10, 2025
Hickory DNS failure to verify self-signed RRSIG for DNSKEYs
Medium
Summary The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone. Details verify_dnskey_rrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verify_rrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verify_default_rrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in verify_default_rrset(), verify_rrset_with_dnskey() is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its Proof is returned. Similarly, verify_dnskey_rrset() returns Ok(false) if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says "If all the keys are valid, then we are secure", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to verify_rrset(), it will call verify_default_rrset(). The special handling for DNSKEYs in verify_default_rrset() will then call verify_rrset_with_dnskey() using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its Proof. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside verify_dnskey_rrset() and cut verify_default_rrset() out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely. Fixed in
0.24.3
0.25.0-alpha.5
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.25.0-alpha.1
unknown
Dependencies (43)
+ 35 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.24.1
unknown
3 CVEs
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h
RUSTSEC-2025-0006
Feb 10, 2025
Hickory DNS failure to verify self-signed RRSIG for DNSKEYs
Medium
Summary The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone. Details verify_dnskey_rrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verify_rrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verify_default_rrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in verify_default_rrset(), verify_rrset_with_dnskey() is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its Proof is returned. Similarly, verify_dnskey_rrset() returns Ok(false) if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says "If all the keys are valid, then we are secure", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to verify_rrset(), it will call verify_default_rrset(). The special handling for DNSKEYs in verify_default_rrset() will then call verify_rrset_with_dnskey() using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its Proof. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside verify_dnskey_rrset() and cut verify_default_rrset() out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely. Fixed in
0.24.3
0.25.0-alpha.5
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2025-25188
GHSA-37wc-h8xc-5hc4
Feb 10, 2025
Hickory DNS's DNSSEC validation may accept broken authentication chains
Medium
Network
Low
Low
None
SummaryThe DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone. Details
Similarly, PoCThe proof of concepts have been integrated into the conformance test suite, as ImpactThis impacts Hickory DNS users relying on DNSSEC verification in the client library, stub resolver, or recursive resolver. Fixed in
0.24.3
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.24.1
unknown
Dependencies (41)
+ 33 more
Changelog
Compare changes
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|
0.24.0
unknown
3 CVEs
GHSA-q2qq-hmj6-3wpp
RUSTSEC-2026-0119
May 07, 2026
hickory-proto vulnerable to CPU exhaustion during message encoding due to O(n²) name compression
Medium
Network
Low
None
None
During message encoding, A malicious message with many records can both introduce many candidate labels, and invoke this linear scan many times. This can amplify CPU exhaustion in DoS attacks. This is similar to CVE-2024-8508. ReporterQifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks Fixed in
0.26.1
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
GHSA-v7pc-74h8-xq2h
RUSTSEC-2025-0006
Feb 10, 2025
Hickory DNS failure to verify self-signed RRSIG for DNSKEYs
Medium
Summary The DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone. Details verify_dnskey_rrset() will return Ok(true) if any record's public key matches a trust anchor. This results in verify_rrset() returning a Secure proof. This ultimately results in successfully verifying a response containing DNSKEY records. verify_default_rrset() looks up DNSKEY records by calling handle.lookup(), which takes the above code path. There's a comment following this that says "DNSKEYs were already validated by the inner query in the above lookup", but this is not the case. To fully verify the whole RRset of DNSKEYs, it would be necessary to check self-signatures by the trusted key over the other keys. Later in verify_default_rrset(), verify_rrset_with_dnskey() is called multiple times with different keys and signatures, and if any call succeeds, then its Proof is returned. Similarly, verify_dnskey_rrset() returns Ok(false) if any DNSKEY record is covered by a DS record. A comment says "If all the keys are valid, then we are secure", but this is only checking that one key is authenticated by a DS in the parent zone's delegation point. This time, after control flow returns to verify_rrset(), it will call verify_default_rrset(). The special handling for DNSKEYs in verify_default_rrset() will then call verify_rrset_with_dnskey() using each KSK DNSKEY record, and if one call succeeds, return its Proof. If there are multiple KSK DNSKEYs in the RRset, then this leads to another authentication break. We need to either pass the authenticated DNSKEYs from the DS covering check to the RRSIG validation, or we need to perform this RRSIG validation of the DNSKEY RRset inside verify_dnskey_rrset() and cut verify_default_rrset() out of DNSKEY RRset validation entirely. Fixed in
0.24.3
0.25.0-alpha.5
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev
CVE-2025-25188
GHSA-37wc-h8xc-5hc4
Feb 10, 2025
Hickory DNS's DNSSEC validation may accept broken authentication chains
Medium
Network
Low
Low
None
SummaryThe DNSSEC validation routines treat entire RRsets of DNSKEY records as trusted once they have established trust in only one of the DNSKEYs. As a result, if a zone includes a DNSKEY with a public key that matches a configured trust anchor, all keys in that zone will be trusted to authenticate other records in the zone. There is a second variant of this vulnerability involving DS records, where an authenticated DS record covering one DNSKEY leads to trust in signatures made by an unrelated DNSKEY in the same zone. Details
Similarly, PoCThe proof of concepts have been integrated into the conformance test suite, as ImpactThis impacts Hickory DNS users relying on DNSSEC verification in the client library, stub resolver, or recursive resolver. Fixed in
0.24.3
References Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.24.0
unknown
Dependencies (41)
+ 33 more
Changelog
Compare changes
|
|
0.1.0
unknown
|