hd-wallet
Activity
- Latest release
- 5mo ago
- Total releases
- 6
- Cadence
- ~42 days
- Last 12 months
- 1
Details
- License
- MIT OR Apache-2.0
- First release
- Oct 15, 2024
| Version | Released | |
|---|---|---|
0.7.0
unknown
|
0.7.0
unknown
Dependencies (11)
+ 3 more |
|
0.6.1
unknown
|
0.6.1
unknown
Dependencies (11)
+ 3 more |
|
0.6.0
unknown
|
0.6.0
unknown
Dependencies (11)
+ 3 more |
|
0.6.0-rc1
unknown
1 CVE
GHSA-2ff4-xfpr-m32r
Dec 18, 2024
`Slip10Like` derivation method instantiated with certain curves may allow attacker to find derivation path which results into very long derivation (possible DoS)
Medium
ImpactImpacted are the only ones who use
Theoretically, this could be exploited by an attacker by finding a derivation path that would force someone to execute a lot of iterations of this loop to find a valid child key. This attack, however, requires the probability of getting an invalid scalar from random 32 bytes to be high. Slip10 is protected from this attack as it's only defined on secp256k1 and secp256r1 curves, for which such probability is very low:
While standard curves are safe to use with slip10, we used to allow slip10-like derivation which can be instantiated with any curve. For instance, one could instantiate it with ed25519 or stark curves, for which probability of getting invalid scalar from random 32 bytes is >90%, so theoretically, attacker could try to DoS such construction. Patches
If you need HD derivation on other curves than secp256k1 and secp256r1, we suggest you to use:
Both derivation methods are non-standard, but secure and efficient. If you're still using WorkaroundsTechnically, you don't need to upgrade if you don't use slip10-like derivation instantiated with other curves than secp256k1 or secp256r1. However, if you do, migrating to other derivation method might be required. Reach out to us in DiscordIf you want to reach out to us, feel free to write to CreditsThanks to Alessio Marziali alessio.marziali@metaco.com for discovering and flagging this issue Fixed in
0.6.0
References Updated Dec 18, 2024 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.6.0-rc1
unknown
Dependencies (11)
+ 3 more |
|
0.5.1
unknown
1 CVE
GHSA-2ff4-xfpr-m32r
Dec 18, 2024
`Slip10Like` derivation method instantiated with certain curves may allow attacker to find derivation path which results into very long derivation (possible DoS)
Medium
ImpactImpacted are the only ones who use
Theoretically, this could be exploited by an attacker by finding a derivation path that would force someone to execute a lot of iterations of this loop to find a valid child key. This attack, however, requires the probability of getting an invalid scalar from random 32 bytes to be high. Slip10 is protected from this attack as it's only defined on secp256k1 and secp256r1 curves, for which such probability is very low:
While standard curves are safe to use with slip10, we used to allow slip10-like derivation which can be instantiated with any curve. For instance, one could instantiate it with ed25519 or stark curves, for which probability of getting invalid scalar from random 32 bytes is >90%, so theoretically, attacker could try to DoS such construction. Patches
If you need HD derivation on other curves than secp256k1 and secp256r1, we suggest you to use:
Both derivation methods are non-standard, but secure and efficient. If you're still using WorkaroundsTechnically, you don't need to upgrade if you don't use slip10-like derivation instantiated with other curves than secp256k1 or secp256r1. However, if you do, migrating to other derivation method might be required. Reach out to us in DiscordIf you want to reach out to us, feel free to write to CreditsThanks to Alessio Marziali alessio.marziali@metaco.com for discovering and flagging this issue Fixed in
0.6.0
References Updated Dec 18, 2024 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.5.1
unknown
Dependencies (9)
+ 1 more |
|
0.5.0
unknown
1 CVE
GHSA-2ff4-xfpr-m32r
Dec 18, 2024
`Slip10Like` derivation method instantiated with certain curves may allow attacker to find derivation path which results into very long derivation (possible DoS)
Medium
ImpactImpacted are the only ones who use
Theoretically, this could be exploited by an attacker by finding a derivation path that would force someone to execute a lot of iterations of this loop to find a valid child key. This attack, however, requires the probability of getting an invalid scalar from random 32 bytes to be high. Slip10 is protected from this attack as it's only defined on secp256k1 and secp256r1 curves, for which such probability is very low:
While standard curves are safe to use with slip10, we used to allow slip10-like derivation which can be instantiated with any curve. For instance, one could instantiate it with ed25519 or stark curves, for which probability of getting invalid scalar from random 32 bytes is >90%, so theoretically, attacker could try to DoS such construction. Patches
If you need HD derivation on other curves than secp256k1 and secp256r1, we suggest you to use:
Both derivation methods are non-standard, but secure and efficient. If you're still using WorkaroundsTechnically, you don't need to upgrade if you don't use slip10-like derivation instantiated with other curves than secp256k1 or secp256r1. However, if you do, migrating to other derivation method might be required. Reach out to us in DiscordIf you want to reach out to us, feel free to write to CreditsThanks to Alessio Marziali alessio.marziali@metaco.com for discovering and flagging this issue Fixed in
0.6.0
References Updated Dec 18, 2024 · Source: OSV.dev |
0.5.0
unknown
Dependencies (9)
+ 1 more |