gix-filter

Version	Released
`0.34.0` minor	Aug 22, 2026
`0.33.0` unknown	Jul 23, 2026
`0.32.0` unknown	Jun 22, 2026
`0.31.0` unknown	May 26, 2026
`0.30.0` unknown	Apr 27, 2026
`0.29.0` unknown	Apr 24, 2026
`0.28.0` unknown	Mar 22, 2026
`0.27.0` unknown	Feb 22, 2026
`0.26.0` unknown	Feb 10, 2026
`0.25.0` unknown	Jan 22, 2026
`0.24.1` unknown	Jan 06, 2026
`0.24.0` unknown	Dec 31, 2025
`0.23.0` unknown	Dec 22, 2025
`0.22.0` unknown	Nov 22, 2025
`0.21.0` unknown	Oct 22, 2025
`0.20.0` unknown	Jul 15, 2025
`0.19.2` unknown	May 16, 2025
`0.19.1` unknown	Apr 26, 2025
`0.19.0` unknown yanked	Apr 25, 2025
`0.18.0` unknown	Apr 04, 2025
`0.17.0` unknown 1 CVE	Jan 18, 2025
`0.16.0` unknown 1 CVE	Dec 22, 2024
`0.15.0` unknown 1 CVE	Nov 24, 2024
`0.14.0` unknown 1 CVE	Oct 22, 2024
`0.13.0` unknown 1 CVE	Aug 22, 2024
`0.12.0` unknown 1 CVE	Aug 22, 2024
`0.11.3` unknown 1 CVE	Jul 23, 2024
`0.11.2` unknown 1 CVE	May 22, 2024
`0.11.1` unknown 1 CVE	Apr 13, 2024
`0.11.0` unknown 1 CVE	Mar 14, 2024
`0.10.0` unknown 1 CVE	Feb 25, 2024
`0.9.0` unknown 1 CVE	Jan 20, 2024
`0.8.1` unknown 1 CVE	Dec 30, 2023
`0.8.0` unknown 1 CVE	Dec 29, 2023
`0.7.0` unknown 1 CVE	Dec 06, 2023
`0.6.0` unknown 1 CVE	Oct 12, 2023
`0.5.0` unknown 1 CVE	Sep 24, 2023
`0.4.0` unknown 1 CVE	Sep 08, 2023
`0.3.0` unknown 1 CVE	Aug 22, 2023
`0.2.0` unknown 1 CVE	Jul 22, 2023
`0.1.0` unknown 1 CVE	Jul 19, 2023
`0.0.0` unknown 1 CVE	Jul 01, 2023

0.34.0 minor

Aug 22, 2026

0.33.0 unknown

Jul 23, 2026

0.32.0 unknown

Jun 22, 2026

0.31.0 unknown

May 26, 2026

0.30.0 unknown

Apr 27, 2026

0.29.0 unknown

Apr 24, 2026

0.28.0 unknown

Mar 22, 2026

0.27.0 unknown

Feb 22, 2026

0.26.0 unknown

Feb 10, 2026

0.25.0 unknown

Jan 22, 2026

0.24.1 unknown

Jan 06, 2026

0.24.0 unknown

Dec 31, 2025

0.23.0 unknown

Dec 22, 2025

0.22.0 unknown

Nov 22, 2025

0.21.0 unknown

Oct 22, 2025

0.20.0 unknown

Jul 15, 2025

0.19.2 unknown

May 16, 2025

0.19.1 unknown

Apr 26, 2025

0.19.0 unknown yanked

Apr 25, 2025

0.18.0 unknown

Apr 04, 2025

0.17.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 18, 2025

0.16.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Dec 22, 2024

0.15.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Nov 24, 2024

0.14.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Oct 22, 2024

0.13.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Aug 22, 2024

0.12.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Aug 22, 2024

0.11.3 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jul 23, 2024

0.11.2 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

May 22, 2024

0.11.1 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Apr 13, 2024

0.11.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Mar 14, 2024

0.10.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Feb 25, 2024

0.9.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jan 20, 2024

0.8.1 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Dec 30, 2023

0.8.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Dec 29, 2023

0.7.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Dec 06, 2023

0.6.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Oct 12, 2023

0.5.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Sep 24, 2023

0.4.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Sep 08, 2023

0.3.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Aug 22, 2023

0.2.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jul 22, 2023

0.1.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jul 19, 2023

0.0.0 unknown

1 CVE

CVE-2025-31130 GHSA-2frx-2596-x5r6 RUSTSEC-2025-0021 Apr 04, 2025

gitoxide does not detect SHA-1 collision attacks

6.8 / 10

Medium

Network High None None Changed None High None

Summary

gitoxide uses SHA-1 hash implementations without any collision detection, leaving it vulnerable to hash collision attacks.

Details

gitoxide uses the sha1_smol or sha1 crate, both of which implement standard SHA-1 without any mitigations for collision attacks. This means that two distinct Git objects with colliding SHA-1 hashes would break the Git object model and integrity checks when used with gitoxide.

The SHA-1 function is considered cryptographically insecure. However, in the wake of the SHAttered attacks, this issue was mitigated in Git 2.13.0 in 2017 by using the sha1collisiondetection algorithm by default and producing an error when known SHA-1 collisions are detected. Git is in the process of migrating to using SHA-256 for object hashes, but this has not been rolled out widely yet and gitoxide does not support SHA-256 object hashes.

PoC

The following program demonstrates the problem, using the two SHAttered PDFs:

use sha1_checked::{CollisionResult, Digest};

fn sha1_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> gix::ObjectId {
    let mut hasher = gix::features::hash::hasher(gix::hash::Kind::Sha1);
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    gix::ObjectId::Sha1(hasher.digest())
}

fn sha1dc_oid_of_file(filename: &str) -> Result<gix::ObjectId, String> {
    // Matches Git’s behaviour.
    let mut hasher = sha1_checked::Builder::default().safe_hash(false).build();
    hasher.update(&std::fs::read(filename).unwrap());
    match hasher.try_finalize() {
        CollisionResult::Ok(digest) => Ok(gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into())),
        CollisionResult::Mitigated(_) => unreachable!(),
        CollisionResult::Collision(digest) => Err(format!(
            "Collision attack: {}",
            gix::ObjectId::Sha1(digest.into()).to_hex()
        )),
    }
}

fn main() {
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf"));
    dbg!(sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf"));
}

The output is as follows:

[src/main.rs:24:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:25:5] sha1_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Sha1(38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a)
[src/main.rs:26:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-1.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)
[src/main.rs:27:5] sha1dc_oid_of_file("shattered-2.pdf") = Err(
    "Collision attack: 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccbb7f0a",
)

The latter behaviour matches Git.

Since the SHAttered PDFs are not in a valid format for Git objects, a direct proof‐of‐concept using higher‐level APIs cannot be immediately demonstrated without significant computational resources.

Impact

An attacker with the ability to mount a collision attack on SHA-1 like the SHAttered or SHA-1 is a Shambles attacks could create two distinct Git objects with the same hash. This is becoming increasingly affordable for well‐resourced attackers, with the Shambles researchers in 2020 estimating $45k for a chosen‐prefix collision or $11k for a classical collision, and projecting less than $10k for a chosen‐prefix collision by 2025. The result could be used to disguise malicious repository contents, or potentially exploit assumptions in the logic of programs using gitoxide to cause further vulnerabilities.

This vulnerability affects any user of gitoxide, including gix-* library crates, that reads or writes Git objects.

Fixed in


          0.18.0

References

Updated Sep 10, 2026 · Source: OSV.dev

Jul 01, 2023

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